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This thesis explores the development of Australian concepts
of national security, in the context of traditional and
continuing psychological dependency upon its links of alliance to
the West. The Government claims that Australia's policy of
defence self-reliance within an alliance framework is a
'conceptual watershed' that has 'liberated' Australian foreign
policy; but it is an old theme in defence policy. Australia still
awaits a real revolution in its security concepts and sense of
regional identity. ANZUS, symbol of Australia's ties to the
western community, and the false impressions and expectations it
creates, now acts more to inhibit than to assist Australia's
future growth as a nation.
George Washington observed that "the nation which indulges
toward another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness, is in
some degree a slave" and that a truly independent nation bent
upon charting its own course in the world "may safely trust to
temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies". Australia's
own history points to the enduring good sense of those
observations. There is little more to be gained from alliance
than from acguaintance - and to sustain the latter, existence of
the former is neither necessary nor desirable as a permanent
state of affairs. Both Australia and the United States can in the
future "safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary
emergencies"
.
The need for an independent national defence was recognised
before Federation in 1901. However, Australians lacked confidence
in their ability to survive as a fully independent nation.
Australian national interest was identified with supporting the
British Empire, and in maintaining a racially pure "British"
society. There also developed a belief in some kind of informal
Anglo-Saxon brotherhood that carried with it a moral obligation
for America as well as Britain to help protect the 'indefensible
continent* against an invasion by an Asian power.
Still, Australia developed its own defence policy and
acquired a navy of its own; but it continued to allow foreign and
economic policy mostly to be determined in London. World War I
saw Japan and Australia cooperate to eliminate Germany's Pacific
presence before the end of 1914. Australia was safe, but felt
obliged to send troops and its navy to support Britain in the
northern hemisphere. From this point onward, Australia was drawn
ever more toward the notion of a global Imperial Union, with
common defence, foreign and economic policies, coordinated from
London. The practical difficulties of this were identified and
ignored. Australia forsook self-reliance for the promise of
British assistance in time of threat, in return for Australia's
commitment to Imperial (British) interests.
Australian support for Britain hobbled relations with
America, but in December 1941 Britain could not provide the
promised "main fleet to Singapore". Australia's troops and airmen
were away fighting for Britain, which could not provide war
materiel to Australia either. The Prime Minister turned to
America for help. This was provided but it took time, and the
United States and Britain already had agreed to beat Hitler
first. Although they were fighting together in the Southwest
Pacific, diplomatic relations between America and Australia were
often strained.
In 1951, Australia and New Zealand concluded a tripartite
security pact with the United States. ANZUS did not commit the
United States to help defend Australia, but Australians chose to
believe it did. Australia transferred its 'Imperial' dependencies
to the new relationship. Since then, Australian politicians in
particular have been prone to belief in an Australian "special
relationship" with the United States, expecting economic and
diplomatic considerations as well as a military guarantee.
Australia's practical alliance contribution has been small, but
the alliance has been a diplomatic burden for Australia, and
something of a fool's paradise economically.
In its history as a nation, Australia has always seen
itself as part of the west and has relied upon its links to those
far distant nations for its security in all senses - its
prosperity, its population, its defence and even its sense of
community and identity. This has to change. Australia's future
security hinges heavily on how it is regarded by regional
nations. The ANZUS connection causes Australia still to be
regarded as a white outpost in the Western Pacific and inhibits
its regional integration. But this is vital to both Australia's
economic development future and its sense of national identity.
Today, the end of the cold war is bringing radical changes
in America's view of it s interests in Asia. These will diminish,
not enhance, the importance in its eyes of its alliance with
Australia. The assumption of mutuality of interest is stronger
than the fact. The relationship has really only existed in any
definable way due to the existence of conflict, or the sense of
impending conflict. In times of 'peace', the US and Australia
have been largely indifferent to each other; and even in war, the
passage of time and events has tended to make the relationship
even more fractious, rather than "even stronger".
Australia has still to liberate its security policies and
national identity from the burden of formal alliance with the
West. It is time for Australia to take an active part in
redefining and pursuing its security interests in the expectation
that in all circumstances it can rely for assistance only upon
regional partners; and in the last extremity can rely only upon
itself. Both Australia and America must now conduct an honest
appraisal of their relationship, and determine how and in what
ways they would prefer it to develop in the future. They should
give less emphasis to permanent military alliance, and devote




STILL WAITING FOR THE REVOLUTION
"How on earth has such a nation survived until 1988?" asked
Noel McLachlan in one of the more stimulating literary outgrowths
of Australia's celebration in 1988 of the bicentennial
anniversary of European settlement. He observed that Australia's
"ideal of nationhood is only dimly perceived and half-heartedly
embraced." And even though Australia has "had its moments of
nationalist charm and ardour, even glory..." there has been "no
full-scale revolution..." because "most Australians appear to
have been interested in other things: [mainly] getting their fair
share of the self-esteemed workingmen's paradise and it's
pleasures - beaches climate and all. Hedonism not nationalism -
except in sport." 1
There certainly is some form of distinctive Australian
national identity, and it is sometimes stridently asserted - but
the nation as a political-economic entity seems to lack both the
stature and the confidence which one would expect from a country
which is richly endowed with natural resources and, as its
politicians (and most of the academic-bureaucratic policy
establishment) never tire of saying, is also one of the "most
secure in the world". But the fact is that Australia for almost
1. Noel McLachlan, Waiting For the Revolution . Melbourne: Penguin
Books Australia, 1989, pp2-3.
the whole of its existence, whether as a collection of British
colonies or as a nominally independent sovereign nation, has
indeed been a 'frightened country' 1 which has sought comfort
largely by submerging its identity within (and in the process,
subordinating its interests and policies to) the largely illusory
notion of a worldwide Western (primarily, Anglo-Saxon) fraternity
founded in a principle of 'all for one and one for all'. As
Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans put it:
For its first century and a half, Australia viewed
the world vicariously as a daughter of [the British]
Empire. A handful of matters aside, the national
interest was [perceived to be] more or less
indistinguishable from the Imperial interest, and
choices effectively non-existent...
Nor did the situation change dramatically even with the
post-War switch of focus to the United States.... 2
Senator Evans and his colleagues in the Labor Government
would have the public believe and may themselves be confident
that they have wrought something of a revolution in Australian
defence and foreign policy, and in economic policy too. But at
best, they have only planted the seeds. We still await the
revolution. Australia's overall approach to national security
still seems to be rooted in the notion of an 'indefensible*
continent which still "requirefs] a foreign policy that secure[s]
the attention of great and powerful friends . . . prepared to
1. A term coined by Australian former diplomat and head of the
Department of Foreign Affairs, Alan Renouf, in his book of the
same title.
2. Senator the Hon. Gareth Evans, "Australia's Place in the
World: the Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decision-Making," in
Desmond Ball (ed.), Australia and the World: Prologue and
Prospects . Canberra, Australian National University, 1990. p323
defend Australia." There is no doubt that, under the pressure of
a collapsing national economy and a radically changing regional
and world politico-economic environment, Australia has 'grown up 1
considerably as nation, especially in the last decade, and able
and articulate spokesmen such as Senator Evans have played key
roles in defining and promoting a view of Australian national
interests in a primarily regional context 1 .
Yet even as he hailed the "conceptual watershed" of a
policy of "defence self-reliance" which finally "liberated
Australian foreign policy" from its former preoccupation with
supporting the interests of the powers to whom Australia looked
for its ultimate security, Evans could say (with both a straight
face and an apparently clear conscience) that Australia's
military alliance with the United States "remains a fundamental
pillar of our defence and foreign policy". So it still is today,
according to no less a person than Prime Minister Robert Hawke,
who "hope[s] to reinforce that perception ... in the [East Asia]
region [and] among Australians as well." 2
My belief is that the foundations of this "pillar" are far
less substantial than many on either side of the Pacific may wish
1. The main vehicle for this, besides regular reiteration in
speeches and the like, was Evans' "Ministerial Statement"
(published as a booklet) , Australia's Regional Security .
Canberra: AGPS, December 1989.
2. The Rt.Hon. R.J.L. Hawke, Prime Minister of Australia (1983-)
,
Australia's Security in Asia . "The Asia Lecture" given at the
Asia-Australia Institute of the University of New South Wales,
Sydney, 24 May 1991.
to concede; further, the notion of a permanent alliance with the
United States has outlived its usefulness as a support for
Australian national security policy, and increasingly serves only
to obscure the nation's view of where its future interests must
lie.
It is high time for Australia to genuinely confront and
surmount its continuing 'dual dependencies': its dependence on
the cultural-economic framework of the "western (or, 'developed')
world" to define itself in global affairs; and its dependence for
its ultimate defence upon a trans-Pacific military alliance of
questionable practical worth. Having not quite let go of Mother
England's skirts, Australia still clings tightly to Uncle's hand
- and continues to seek both approbation and comfort in the
embrace of the west.
Australia today resembles nothing so much as the
unconfident son who though celebrating his majority, is content
to live with his parents, risking nothing while waiting for the
'big opportunity' to present itself virtually at the doorstep.
All the while, given reassurance and sustenance by despairing
parents and scorned by former peers (or inferiors) now doing for
themselves in a world of risk and promise. McLachlan the
nationalist cited the view ("from the heart ... the reverse of
patronising") of English historian Hugh Seton-Watson:
If Australians could realise that they no longer
needed to prove, either to themselves or to others,
that they were different from, and just as good as,
Americans or British; and if they could understand that
it is not enough to inherit a 'lucky country' but that
it is necessary to make provision, and spend money for
its defence, then a marvellous future [awaits] them.
Such a realisation would indeed be evidence of - and is
fundamental to - a genuine Australian revolution: liberation from
the psychological shackles of the "western alliance". Australia
is prone to make too much of its cultural affinity to the west
and not enough of the central imperative of its existence and
definition as nation - geography. It is time for Australia to
"leave home" and travel, mentally, the 10,000 miles which
separate it, literally, from its supposed sources of aid and
comfort.
Precious little of either will be forthcoming from any
quarter by the turn of the century, in a world wracked by the
"necessary pains accompanying the birth of a new hyperindustrial
order" 2 in which Europe and Japan are likely to form the two main
centres of capital formation and consumption, competing with each
other for the mantle vacated (though perhaps, only partially and
temporarily) by a retrenching United States.
1. McLachlan, Waiting For The Revolution , p3
.
2. Jacques Attali, Millennium: Winners and Losers in the Coming
World Order . New York: Random House, 1991, pl2. Attali, president
of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, foresees
the emergence of a "new market form" preceded by a period, which
we are now entering, of "uncertainty and apparent regression" as
the transition is made from the formerly dominant economic form.
Australia has nothing more to prove to either Americans or
British; but it still has a lot to prove to itself - and to its
geographical neighbours. To them it does have to prove it is
different from the senior and junior partners of the Atlantic
"special relationship". It does have to prove an independent
identity - and a will to independently exist and prosper, to
define, promote and be willing to defend unique and independent
interests. Boiled down, Australia must become able to define
itself without reference to an outdated, unrealistic and
(regionally) unwelcome conception of power relationships . This is
especially so because, like it or not, both the appeal and the
influence of the west in East Asia will continue to decline,
regardless of which of the world's key centres of economic power
ultimately comes to preside over the emerging 'ninth market
form' 1 . According to local perceptions that have gained
1. Attali's description for the economic order which he expects
to stabilise around a new "centre" in either Tokyo or somewhere
in Europe. The previous eight market forms he refers to are
defined by reference to periods in which a particular city-state
or key national centre could be seen as the "dominant city where
the essential financial, technical, cultural, and ideological
power is concentrated." A kind of 'centre of the world system'.
His eight centres: Bruges (1300); Venice (1450); Antwerp (1500);
Genoa (1550); Amsterdam (1650); London (1750); Boston (1880); and
New York (1930) . Between each period of clearly definable
dominance is an extended interregnum of "uncertainty and apparent
regression"; or "crisis". This seems to fit today's circumstances
rather well; especially with his view that "[crisis] begins when
it becomes necessary to spend too much value to create and
sustain demand . . . and when too much is spent on military
expenses to protect the market form". Seems familiar. My major
quibble with his theory, as it develops, is that he does not
really entertain a shift of the centre of gravity from East Coast
USA to, say, Los Angeles; or maybe even Mexico City. And he
probably overestimates Western Europe's prospects as one of the
two major competitors for pre-eminence. A Central European
'corridor of power' could emerge, from "Berlin to Budapest".
increasing currency in the region, the fact remains that the
nations of East Asia have achieved prosperity in large part by
not emulating the West in their forms and practices of
government, nor in their social structures and mores.
Whether it jumps or is pushed, the United States is
unlikely to maintain any significant military force in permanent
bases in East Asia by the turn of century. By this time, it will
have realised that the "unipolar moment" of unchallenged military
power is empty of promise for fashioning or maintaining a pre-
eminent position in the emerging world order, and will be engaged
in the radical internal reforms which, however difficult or
unlikely may seem their accomplishment, are essential to arrest
America's continuing relative decline as a world economic power
and cultural influence. The future strength of the United States,
it seems to me, lies in fulfilling the potential, so long denied
others and still largely untapped, in its own "western
hemisphere": Latin America. With which at least some others seem
to agree.
Australia meanwhile will be jockeying for position in a
world of increasingly cut-throat competition, as the newly
industrialising (or, like Australia, re-industrialising) nations
* According to "the International Finance Corporation [an arm of
the World Bank] and several private sources", Latin America
"appears to have guieted down" and "is in the middle of a
transition toward privatisation that could finally transform it
into an entirely new economic landscape". See Rodolfo A.
Windhausen, "Capital Flows South", Christian Science Monitor . 18
September 1991. Stand by for expansion of NAFTA into AFTA.
Followed by trans-South Atlantic investment into Africa?
atttempt to secure and if possible improve their positions in the
economic "hinterland" of the major centres. The mortal fear of
all these nations, which have or are acquiring a taste for the
fruits of economic development, will be to avoid being pushed out
into the "periphery" - that region of the economic wilderness
that Attali conceives as the realm of hapless and increasingly
hopeless providers of labour and raw materials. Nations will be
prepared to go to war to avoid this fate.
Australia cannot count upon influence or favour as a western
proxy in any of the centres in which it must compete, chief of
which will be East Asia: the most dynamic and ferociously
competetive region in the world. Australia will have to stand or
fall, and preferably rise, on its own merits. Nor can it count
upon military support, even in extremity, from a far distant,
locally preoccupied power whose interests may not be engaged -
and which if they are, might well lie on the 'other side of the
fence'. Australia does not need to subscribe to another version
of the infamous Singapore strategy 1 , nor can it rely on updated
version of the equally ineffective Imperial Preference system. It
must finally confront the necessity to hoe its own row, in a
region which until now has been regarded as culturally and
philosophically alien.
Suggestions of this type have traditionally been derided by
the political right in Australia as both unrealistic and
offensive - a form of cultural treason. They are not especially
1. See Chapters 3 and 4.
welcome on the left either - much of which has yet to shake off a
xenophobia rooted in a propensity to blame economic torpor and
unemployment of 'native born Australians' alike on Asian
mercantilism and "low-wage Asian labour" 1 . Neither side has
proven willing to bear the necessary expenditure to defend the
nation in the narrow sense, or to enhance its security in the
wider sense. The chronic and long-standing lack of faith shown by
Australians in themselves, and their continuing inability to come
to terms with the realities of their situation, are most marked
in the field of national security policy.
In Australia, national security has commonly been narrowly
defined as the ambit of 'defence' policy. The idea of
comprehensive national security has only recently started to
flower. The very notion of the 'indefensible continent' itself
reflects a deeply ingrained sense of inferiority which though
perhaps seldom conceded in word (or thought) , is constantly
revealed through lack of deeds. At least since the First World
War, it seems that the very conviction of its inability,
independently to make secure (whether by guns or by guile) the
nation and its interests has induced a sense of complacent
fatalism in Australians and their governments. And though
Australians could easily be (and were - perhaps, still are)
convinced of the imminence of an Asian threat to their existence,
they could at once demand that others supply their protection
1. The rocketing per-capita GNP in many Asian nations, with its
obvious implication for average wage levels, rarely is mentioned
from this threat, whilst treating with disdain bordering on
racial contempt the very people whom they acknowledged could at
will overwhelm them.
Australian former Prime Minister Robert Menzies pointedly
observed in 1939 that "what Great Britain calls the Far East is
to us the near north" - but he like his predecessors and his
successors ( chief among whom was himself after a period in well-
deserved political exile) still conceived Australia to be more of
a sharer, even inheritor, of the white man's burden than as part
of it. However, Australia's greatest burden is to be found
within itself; an accumulated weight of habitual preferences and
prejudices, unreasoning fears and unrequited affections.
Most Australians are inordinately proud of their nation's
martial prowess; yet newspaper polls repeatedly 'discover' that
the Australian public has little or no confidence in the ability
of the Australian Defence Force to defend the nation against
external aggression. Part of the problem may be that the form of
external aggression is seldom specified, and the bulk of the
* I have always wondered whether Kipling's poem was an
exhortation to "leadership" or a warning against the assumption
that such was necessary or desirable in the manner conceived and
practised by the western powers in Asia and elsewhere. Just
reflect upon some of his words:
"Take up the White Man's burden,
Send forth the best ye breed
Go, bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives' need"
Not much glory there, and as he warned, those "silent, sullen
peoples" have weighed "your Gods and you"; and seem to find them
wanting.
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population, used to its history being presented in a European or
continental Asian context (of invasion and subsequent physical
domination or absorption) , is almost never invited to consider
the broader issue of what constitutes - and what is required to
promote and preserve - the national security.
The history of Australian defence policy is largely the
history of invasion scares - or the lack of them. It reflects the
narrow outlook of a group of 'abandoned souls' struggling to
adapt themselves to an environment which seems by its nature
almost implacably hostile to domination by European man - which
is still what most Australians are; and arguably, through the
pursuit of so-called multiculturalism, are in some ways being
further encouraged to believe they are."1" Although it is
impossibly located over 10,000 miles from either of the two fonts
of western influence, Australia remains still a cultural
dependency of the west.
* It should also be understood that with the exception of the
British immigrants to Australia, this actually has been the
physical experience of many European and Asian immigrants in the
post-war boom of immigration that more than doubled Australia's
population in 30 years. In many cases, "invasion" was also
accomplished with the aid of internal subversion. Australia also
absorbed many British and Dutch 'refugees' from the de-colonising
nations of Asia. All of which helps account for the extraordinary
conservatism of much of the Australian electorate ( regardless of
which major party it votes for, since both are essentially "non-
revolutionary" in the sense of devotion to the status quo. More
of which later)
.
+ Ironically, by more recently 'entrenched' migrant groups from
Southern Europe, who among other things push the teaching of
European languages and 'heritage'; something that in my view can
be done at home. One can include only so much in a school
curriculum, and the clear priority is for Australians to gain
more knowledge and understanding of their neighbours.
11
The age of electronic communication has perhaps tended to
reinforce rather than reduce this fact. The 'tyranny of distance'
though real in terms of actual contact and perception of shared
interest, has nonetheless been largely thwarted in its positive
aspects of emphasising separateness and the need for getting to
know the neighbours better, by the ease with which news and views
from "home" (wherever it may have been) are transmitted to new
and less new arrivals to the country. Thus has been fostered a
perhaps excessive sense of shared identity and common purpose
with those so far away. The national performance is in many ways
strangely out of tune with the national self-image of a fiercely
independent, easy going and open society of opportunity.
This is also the case with Australia's partner in the ANZUS
alliance which promises so little yet is held to mean so much.
The heart of the matter is that Australia is not yet fully
mature, nor is either Australia or the United States fully
confident in itself. ANZUS to some extent makes each feel that it
is needed; but ANZUS has had a nearly fatal effect on Australian
long-term regional policy, whilst making almost no impact on that
of the USA other than what it can be exploited for in the short
term. The evidence of this is simple, but not simplistic. Though
Australians are ( as stated) unshakeably of the opinion that
their armed forces could "not defend Botany Bay on a Sunday
afternoon" they similarly seem to be unperturbed either by
** A remark attributed to former Liberal Party Minister for
Defence (1976-83) James Killen in a speech attacking the Labour
Government's supposedly inept handling of the Defence portfolio.
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their governments' predilection to keep spending on the defence
forces at minimal levels or by the also common tendency of
governments to announce defence programmes which are subsequently
reviewed to death on no more 'strategic' basis than the need for
economy. This economy is generally derived by a simple "zero sum"
federal budget formula that takes full account of what former
Prime Minister Menzies correctly identified as the medulla
oblongata of nearly every voter's political nervous system - the
"hip-pocket nerve"
.
Australians and their governments have yet to come to terms
with the fundamental rationale for possession of armed forces -
to provide government with the means independently to deploy and
where necessary apply force both to promote the broader national
interest as well as to more narrowly protect national sovereign
territory.
They are still inclined (and have been encouraged) to see
defence policy principally as a way to provide the intellectual
underpinning for persistence with what might be called the
"insurance premium strategy" - a means of paying out the minimum
possible to a powerful and willing ally consistent with the
anticipated return of economic favour at all times, and prompt
assistance in the event of looming military disaster. The
rhetoric of self-reliance is impressive, and it would be both
insulting and unfair to impugn the honest motives of its authors.
But revolution? Self-reliance is very much a function of self-
13
respect and self-confidence; of moral force. Where is it? When
will it be found? Still, I think, we wait.
The objective of a "force in being [able] to defeat any
challenge to our sovereignty [including] specific capabilities
designed to respond effectively to attacks within our area of
direct military interest" appears wholly laudable, and is perhaps
at last a sign of that long-awaited self-confidence. Yet
Australia's defence spending has now (1991-2) fallen to close to
its lowest ever postwar level (2.3% of GNP) 1 . The pace of re-
equipment of its armed forces is slow indeed, despite an
announced intent to further reduce service manpower and rely
still more upon "modern technology" and upon "warning time" whose
elasticity in definition is matched only by its demonstrable non-
utility as a 'cue' for either developing armed forces or (more
importantly) conducting diplomacy. And effective diplomacy can
still, in certain situations, depend heavily upon the ready
availability of effective force. However, the habit of dependency
seems too well ingrained: the perpetuation of dependence has
become synonymous with pursuit of self-interest:
1. In 1987, with Australia facing what the government described
as "generally favorable prospects for security in [our] own geo-
political environment", it was estimated that to achieve the
"levels of defence capability and the priorities reflected" in
the governments' ten-year plan, then "over the life of the
program", there would need to be allocated to defence "resources
generally within the order of 2.6% to 3.0% of GDP." Even this
meagre amount had to cover also the heavy costs associated with
using various defence equipment projects as ways to "kick-start"
Australian industry; though the dividend for the services, in
logistic supportability, should be appreciable - if the
industries can sustain themselves.
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Australia's alliances with the United States and
other nations impose upon us the obligation to provide
for our own defence [as] spelled out in Article II of
the ANZUS Treaty . . . American expectations in this
regard have been stressed by US administrations since
the late 1950s. 1
All this may be so, but how does it contribute to the
"liberation of Australian foreign policy"? Few would quibble with
the assertion that "basic self-reliance is the minimum that any
self-respecting country should contribute to an alliance", though
one might ask: "what is the purpose of the alliance?" It seems
reasonable enough to state that "Australia can scarcely pretend
to contribute to the defence of broader western interests if it
cannot defend itself." But what are those interests - and how
well do they coincide, if at all, with Australia's regional and
broader objectives? Does a nation raise and maintain armed forces
in response to the demands of others of others, or out of
obligation to itself? Are those armed forces (and its economic-
industrial and foreign policy measures) mere tokens or a genuine
earnest of national aspiration and will?
One should bear in mind that the current prescription for
Australia's defence strategy and force structure, from which
these passages are taken, was written mostly in 1986, during what
might be called the last big chill of the cold war. A lot has
changed since then; and the biggest changes in Asia - and the
world - are yet to come. Australia is embarking on a new era with
1. The 1987 Defence White Paper, The Defence of Australia, 1987
Canberra: AGPS, March 1987.
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a conceptual framework for its national security that is rooted
in the past. The past will not suffice for Australia to
accomplish from within the revolution that is needed in the
nation's perception of its security interests. This internal
revolution is the only way to avoid the imposition from without
of a more fundamental and detrimental revolution in Austalia's
security circumstances and future regional standing.
The revolution (being more conceptual than physical) need
not be violent and bloody if self initiated and pursued with
vigour and determination to succeed. For many it assuredly will
be emotionally wrenching; but it is nonetheless necessary, and
chronically overdue. Australia is regularly exhorted by its
geographical neighbours to get more involved in Asia; especially
Southeast Asia 1 . Which is shorthand for being less mentally
dependent upon its links to the west. However, the pleasures of a
sybaritic and superficially secure life, with that security
largely underwritten, it has been understood, by generations of
'old' and 'new' Australians, by those same links to the west, are
not easily foresworn. Especially not, perhaps, by the vast
numbers of postwar immigrants who have been enticed to its shores
precisely by that image - which is mainly that of the life they
would have wished to have led (circumstances and Hitler/Stalin
1. In a typical comment, regularly repeated by himself and other
Southeast Asian leaders, Singapore's then Prime Minister Lee Kuan
Yew in November 1988 "suggested it was time for Australia to
recognise it was its destiny to be part of the Asia-Pacific
region or risk becoming more and more irrelevant to it." See:
Michael Malik, "No Lee-way on Migrants", Far Eastern Economic
Review (FEER) , 1 December 1988, 26.
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willing) , with sunshine and salt water added. But pay for it?
Fight for it? Cultural affinity is insufficient excuse for
denying the imperative of geography and (ultimately) of economic
reality.
All of this tends to lead one to McLachlan's own question:
"Has the nation a future?" Yes; but only, as with all emergent
nations, through a violent break with the past. As I have said,
this will be more an emotional than a forcible break - but it
must be made. The break, in times past, and which a predominantly
British population could not make, was with the British Empire.
It took the twin shocks of war and Britain's economic
'abandonment' of Australia to force its attention finally from
the Atlantic and Mediterranean to the Pacific. Today, the break
that must be made is with the wider concept of the "western
community" - but principally with its representative in chief,
the United States. This is especially hard for Australians to
come to terms with - superficially. But it is not hard at all
when national interest is considered.
"Australia, a third-world economy with a first-world standard
of living, risks becoming a third-world economy with a third-
world standard of living" wrote The Economist's anonymous
correspondent in a 1986 survey of the nation's prospects. 1 He
need not have confined the scope of his remarks to the national
economy. Australia is indeed a third world developing country
1. "Forward Defensive: A Survey of Australia". The Economist . 7
March 1986.
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that is accustomed to regard itself as belonging to the "first
world". This is illusion. Although Australia received a direct
technology transfer from the then leader of the first world by
the process of white colonisation, and an accompanying direct
graft of social-cultural heritage and legal-administrative
institutions, it is in many respects still a 'developing nation'.
And as such it has less in common with the leaders of the
industrialised world than it may care to think.
Australia's role in the world to date has been conceived in
the context of its notional "first world" status, for the most
part. Though it has had occasion to recognise and lament its
limited dimension on the regional and world stage, this has more
generally been comfortably obscured by its habit of association
with the front rank of nations - nations whose interests are in
many ways opposed to those of the developing world. Australia has
been an assistant to the upholders of the status quo of world
power, and has profited but little from that status. It is time
for it join the ranks of the revolutionaries helping shape the
world of the next century.
Its lengthy association with the United States however, no
less than its former association with Great Britain, is serving
to bind it ever more tightly to a futile attempt to preserve a
status quo that already is crumbling fast. The "third world" is
18
precisely where Australia as an underdeveloped regional nation
belongs, and where it can indeed best develop its potential as
one of the key middle powers of the East Asia region and in the
world. It cannot join this growing club without relinquishing its
first world pretensions and dependencies. Unfortunately, and
almost incomprehensibly, Australia is, apparently, once again
bent upon doing the opposite. Looking at the supposed gains from
its long association with the power-brokers of the west, one can
only wonder why.
These thoughts are not especially original. They have been
put, and the questions that arise been asked, in varying ways
since at least the Second World war. But the time available to
find answers is running out. Britain, which managed to fail the
nation in several hours of need, and fooled it more a few times,
is irrevocably gone - from the region physically, from the world
in terms of effective influence on distant events. Yet few
Australians would dispute that the two nations are likely to
continue to share similar views on both the nature of and
preferred approach to many issues of global and regional
importance. The United States (at least, its permanent military
presence) , too, is going - if not of its own volition, then at
the behest and insistence of others. Probably both will coincide,
at any rate, and honour will superficially be satisfied on both
sides.
* I think that, with respect to the resources that it has
available, human and material, Australia is woefully
underdeveloped. It is about time Australia stopped advertising
potential and instead demonstrated some achievement.
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As for Australia, the need for a genuinely revolutionary
review of its security fundamentals is almost painfully clear.
The critical question is: will the revolution come from within or
from without? Unless the former is achieved, the latter is
inevitable, and no more welcome for that. Senator Evans has put
on record his view that:
The late 1980s and early 1990s are watershed years
for Australia. We are, whether we realise it or not,
engaged in nothing less than the reshaping of our
national identity. 1
This seems to be so, but it is not enough; is it not also
time to reassess our national goals and our international
relationships, to cast off habit masquerading as tradition, and
domestic expediency masquerading as security necessity? To be
prepared to pay the costs and reap the benefits of throwing off
at last the 'golden shackles' of alliance, for the genuine reward
of free acquaintance? How much longer will it take for that 'new
identity' to stride out on its own?
It is time for Australia to take an active part in
redefining and pursuing its security interests in the expectation
that in all circumstances it can rely for assistance only upon
regional partners; and in the last extremity it can not count
upon a great and powerful friend, but only upon itself. To admit
this and act upon it - promptly - is to accomplish our security
revolution. And what is not done promptly from within, may well
1. The Age (Melbourne) , 3 November 1991. Reporting the launch of
a book co-authored by Senator Evans and Bruce Grant.
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encourage from without changes in our security circumstances that
will not be to our liking. A revolution from without could well





The United States Secretary of State Mr James A.
Baker III and the secretary of Defence Mr Richard B.
Cheney, and the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Trade Senator Gareth Evans and the Minister for
Defence Senator Robert Ray met on October 8, 1990, in
Washington, D.C., to discuss significant global,
regional and bilateral issues.
Both sides welcomed the continuation of close and
regular ministerial-level consultations within the
framework of their long-standing alliance. The
discussions highlighted their extensive mutual
interests and shared strategic perceptions as allies
under the ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand and the United
States] Treaty. 1
The preamble to the post-Ministerial talks communique looks
a pretty standard piece of work: a reassurance to all and sundry,
including the participants and their electorates, that such talks
are important and ought to continue; and an assurance that the
two nations continue to see the present and future course of
world events in much the same light. But how can they?
The perspective from the United States, one of the world's
most populous nations and still the world's largest economy, its
preeminent military power, located in the northern hemisphere
astride the division between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans
,
and for over forty years widely regarded (not least by itself) as
the guarantor of the material prosperity and physical security of
1. US-Australia Joint Communique released by Embassy of
Australia, Washington DC, 8 October 1990.
22
not only western Europe but of substantial portions of East and
Southwest Asia, inevitably must differ substantially from the
outlook of a minor power on the southern edge of East Asia.
Australia, still sparsely populated and only partially
industrialised
,
and still struggling to identify its political-
economic 'niche' in the world, has to its east of it only the
western shores of Latin America and to the west the still largely
undeveloped tracts of the "dark continent"; both some 4-5000
miles distant. To the south, and not much closer, the frozen
wastes of Antarctica lie unpeopled and uninviting; to the north,
the most economically dynamic, and to most Australians still 1
,
the most culturally alien region of the world.
The United States has been accustomed to regard itself as
the standard bearer of democracy, arbiter of 'western values' and
protector of what has been loosely termed the "Free world".
Australia on occasion has played the role of journeyman-
subcontractor to past and present Centurions of the Western
world, but has more usually seen itself (or been content to see
* The major portion of export earnings (51%) is generated by
primary industry, including energy and minerals extraction.
Australia is a net energy exporter; in 1987 it ranked 9th amongst
the world's energy producers (higher than Iran, Iraq, or the
UAE) . See: The Economist Book of Vital World Statistics . ppl62-9.
1. The overwhelming majority of the Australian population has its
ethnic roots in Britain, Eire and continental Europe, with people
of English, Scottish and Irish descent predominant. It should
also be borne in mind that those parts of Australia which are
physically closest and most culturally receptive to Asia are also
the most sparsely populated - the Northern Territory (twice as
big as Texas; or, about 2/3 the area of Mexico) has less than
200,000 people, and is not yet a properly constituted State,
being administered from Canberra through a local House of
Assembly.
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itself) as a beneficiary, not a guarantor, of this western-
defined global protectorate. Talk of 'mature, equal' partnership
between Australia and the United States is common, especially
from the Australian side of the house whence it could be said to
be gotten out of forlorn hope by wistful self-deception. Similar
utterances from the US amount to little more than a diplomatic
pat on the head. Relations between the US and Australia lack
depth, despite a superficially close coincidence stemming from
the early recognition in Australia of the United States first as
a major Pacific power, and then as the only power which might
feasibly be depended upon as a guarantor of security against
substantial military threat.
But even today, there may still be a stronger sense of a
lingering "Imperial Connection" in Australia - reinforced by
continuing participation in the British Commonwealth and by the
still-extant formal link to the British Crown - than there is of
conscious, genuine affinity to the largest, most powerful
English-speaking nation of the "Pacific Rim". The history of
Australian-US relations indicates that the historical bonds are
weak, with shared perceptions of strong mutuality of interest
being transitory and wholly dependent on happenstance. Such
periods as there have been when the patina of mutual warmth has
overlaid the base metal of expedient 'unity' have been matched by
lengthy periods of mutual suspicion and even outright hostility.
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For all this, the United States and Australia have seen
fit to remain linked in a formal military alliance relationship
for the past forty years, the utility and value of which they
regularly reaffirm. But even here, the two nations' "mutual
interests" are not that extensive, and where they do coincide,
the underlying motives and perceived ramifications for the
furtherance of other interests, short and long term, may differ
significantly. The strategic perceptions of the world's major
nuclear and conventional power are almost impossibly different
from those of a minor league nation that still has difficulty
defining for itself the role if any of its small and steadily
diminishing armed forces. The US can still very much choose what
role it wants to play in the world - Australia, historically, has
been content to let others choose for it, thus steadily
increasing the difficulty of attempts to break free and choose
for itself. Historically, too, the United States has chosen its
wars (be they 'hot' or 'cold', ideological or economic);
Australia has either followed or got dragged by others into most
of those ( of all kinds) in which it has been involved.
Aiiae: The Dependency Syndrome
Americans are nowadays much given to complain that Japan has
been given a 'free ride' in the field of military security and
economic development, thanks to Americans bearing the cost of
providing for its defence. Many Japanese, who would like to see
their nation become more self-confident and visibly free of its
former dependence upon their former guardian, attribute Japan's
difficulty in breaking away, along with resentment at the
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complications caused by this difficulty, to a feeling of amae.
This word, with no direct equivalent in English, might be
considered to express a uniquely Japanese feeling; just another
of those many things that 'you westerners would not understand'.
But as with so many things, the feeling is known elsewhere, even
if the literary equivalent is not. An analyst of this emotion1
has noted that amae "is to be found in Western society also."
Australians, even if they do not know of amae, know all about
amae; it has helped shape their past, and still exerts a mighty
hold over their future.
Takeo Doi makes some interesting observations, pertinent to
(but not directed toward) Australia, in his study of the 'anatomy
of dependence'. Amae embraces "an overfamiliar attitude ... a way
of speaking designed to attract attention." It
represents an attempt to draw close to the other
person. . . . the craving of a newborn child for close
contact with its mother . . . the desire to deny the fact
of separation that is an inevitable part of human
existence ... to obliterate the pain that this
separation involves. 2
The amae feeling can also embrace the need "to depend on
another's affection", and to describe "self-indulgent behaviour
by an infant ... presuming the love of its parents", or in
another sense, "to presume on familiarity in a self-indulgent
manner". Naturally, it encompasses also a sense of shame and




embarrassment, at acting in this way, and at manifesting too
obviously the symptoms of dependent behaviour. And it also covers
the feeling of resentment that arises through either reguesting,
or feeling obliged to dispense, paternal grace and favour. This
is Japan today; this is Australia, too. Amae feeling generates
both a "drive to dependence, seeking assimilation with the
other", and "willful behaviour in a situation in which one
has ... already been accepted...". In less intellectual terms,
one could define amae as an expectation that, in return for
acceptable gestures of affection and affiliation, one would be
indulged in one's follies and rescued from their consequences.
Hiroshi Kitamura says that Japan "lost everything,
including [its] national confidence" 1 with surrender in 1945.
Australia lost its confidence with 'victory'. Before, during
,
and after the war, its people were treated like "twelve year old
children" - and took it. Only a country with supreme belief in
its eventual resurgence could have faced the disaster of 1945 and
conclude that "the war situation has developed not necessarily to
Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all
turned against her interest." Only in a nation sure of its
cohesion and purpose could a leader exhort the people (in
genuine expectation of compliance) to "pave the way for a grand
peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable
and suffering what is insufferable." Japan may be leaning on its
1. Hiroshi Kitamura, Psychological Dimensions of US-Japanese
Relations , Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1971, pl3.
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'revelation' of Amae as means to justify avoiding the burden of
explaining to its neighbours where it wants to go and how it
thinks it will get there, but Australia does not even acknowledge
amae. It is incompatible with the image of the "big country"; and
yet it is the single most observable characteristic of Australian
foreign and defence policy over the whole of Australia's life as
a nominally independent nation. Kitamura attributes to Japan a
number of feelings 1 that have characterised Australian attitudes
towards the United States from early in this century, and which
war has served only to intermittently exaggerate or mute. How
familiar these seem: "Respect and Awe" of the "huge American
potential for both constructive and destructive action"; a
"Feeling of being victimized" (higaisha-ishiki) , or "a feeling of
having been wronged or injured"; and "Placing on a Pedestal" of
idealism, which alternates with a sense of "disillusionment" when
the hero's feet of clay are once again revealed (embarrassing his
adherents)
.
It is also possible to see in Australian foreign policy
behaviour some other 'distinctive' Japanese forms of behaviour,
to wit: "Unrealistic and take-it-for granted attitudes"; and
"frustrated and hostile attitudes". Australian governments and
their public have consistently been annoyed by their perception
of an "attention Gap", or a disproportion between the attention
given the affairs of the patron by the client, and the attention
given the client by the patron. This generates "feelings of
1. Ibid., ppll-15.
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irritation" over the patron's supposed indifference; the idea
that the patron "lacks a sense of proportion" by not giving his
client what it feels to be its due; and the sense of "being
discriminated against", in that 'difficult* clients seem to be
given special favour to get them in the club, whilst those
already in get nothing extra to reassure them of their value.
Like Japan, Australia has to overcome its amae feeling toward the
US. Unlike Japan, Australia has to do this simply to assert,
rather than to magnify, its independent identity.
WHERE IT ALL BEGAN
The Search for Security
Australia's search for security within the embrace of
regionally interested, but geographically removed, major powers
is a history of unfulfilled expectation based on unrealistic
appreciation of the realities of international relations.
Australian expectations of its relationship with the United
States have consistently exceeded actual outcomes; chiefly
because Australia consistently overrates the importance of what
it discerns (or has discerned) to be the principle intangible
component of that relationship: an emotional bond that transcends
the harsh practicalities of national interest. Which is to say,
Australia's expectations of the United States have been derived
in the past, and I believe still are today, from a basis of
emotion rather than logic.
The basis for todays ' s military security pact with the
United States remains, as it was in 1950, something emotionally
29
sensed rather than rationally identified. In the 1940s through to
the late 1960s, it was a sense of mateship; in the 1970s and
since, it has been the sense of partnership. In the years up to
(and into the early stages of) World War II, Australian
expectations were based on a sense of kinship. And all of this
within an embracing idea of membership of first an Anglo -Saxon
and then a more broadly-defined 'western community* of nations.
It's sensations and emotions have consistently played
Australia false - unsurprisingly, since they have fluctuated so
greatly in intensity of both outward manifestation and inner
conviction. This is in itself 'no accident'. Just as the idea of
an Imperial Union of all the countries of the 'white Empire' was
"strategically absurd", so too is the notion of a permanent
coincidence of national interest between two nations so far apart
geographically, and in outlook and circumstance, regardless of
any similarity of origin and national credo. Military alliance
with the United States is fundamentally - irremediably -
illogical.
The folly has been compounded by the growing insecurity of
the United States itself. Australia's supposed protector is
undergoing a crisis of confidence conseguent upon the continuing
erosion of its ability to dictate the terms of international
relations over much of the world. As with its predecessor, Great
Britain, the US is seeking with increasing desperation and
illogic to shore up the old order to avoid having to undergo the
many adjustments necessary to deal with a period of revolutionary
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change that is sweeping the world. And like Britain, it is
clinging for reassurance and assistance ever more tightly to its
alliance relationships, adopting the understandable but
essentially hollow argument that it is in the interests of its
allies that it does so. Though the Bush Administration would
strenuously deny the charge, by its continual harping on the need
for "stability and security" it is apparent that the United
States chief objective is to preserve so nearly as it can a
facsimile of the cold war status quo in Asia, at least so far as
its own position is concerned. The U.S. seeks to foster in
others a sense of insecurity so as to assure itself of its power
and influence; and mask its growing sense of inadequacy in the
face of challenges to its former hegemonic power. It has become
so accustomed to determining the actions of others that it has
lost sight of the essential strategic absurdity of most if not
all of its alliance relationships.
Australia's emotional perceptions have not been
reciprocated to an extent where they generate reliable or even
favorable responses (emotional or material) on the part of their
objects. Further, the persistent resort to these emotional bases
for identification of national interests and hence of an
effective strategy for the national good - the national security,
if you will - has quite undermined the ability and courage of
Australian governments to comprehend and act upon the bare facts
of national interest. Even when such rational analyses are made,
seldom are they acted upon.
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The nations of Asia are now maturing out of the "Post
Colonial Era" - more so than into a "post Cold War Era". East
Asia as a whole is becoming far more racially and ideologically
assertive. From a position of either direct dependence on the
good offices of the west, or at least upon the exploitation of
competing western-based ideologies and power systems, a majority
of East Asian nations has reached a position of self confidence
from which it is prepared to 'hoe its own row', taking the
initiative in international affairs rather than reacting to the
actions of others.
However the US is still largely in the reactive mode that
has prevailed since the inception of containment. It has no real
plan for a New World Order; more a vaguely delineated hope that
was itself a reaction, some way of expressing that the big
ideological battle with the USSR was over, and also an attempt to
'include' Germany and Japan into basically the same US-dominated
system of international relations - on US terms. This, as
President Bush himself might say, will not stand. The US and its
Atlantic confreres may in effect be setting the scene for a new
cold war between their established club of 'haves' and power-
brokers, and the rapidly developing aspirants to such status.
Australia is geographically on the winning side of the Pacific;
mentally, it is still linked to those who, in east Asia at least,
will most likely be tomorrow's losers.
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The Colonies: Enterprise and Enervation
Almost from the foundation at Port Jackson of the colony of
New South Wales, its settlers came into contact with citizens of
the new English-speaking republic far across the Pacific; though
those early voyagers from the United States came not from the
Pacific but the Atlantic coast. Enterprising Yankee whalers and
sealers soon found that, more than a haven where "a thousand
ships of the line might lie in perfect safety", Port Jackson
offered profit from the sale of goods of almost every
description; cloth, hardware, food and (most profitable of all)
,
rum. The colonists, dismayed by reversed seasons, the hot, dry
climate and thin soil, unfamiliar diseases and the perils of
drought and bushfire, could not feed themselves for many years . -
Nor could they grow a surplus of grain for conversion into
intoxicating liquor which for many was all that made tolerable
life in exile from the 'green and pleasant land 1 which had
expectorated them. The American seafarers soon developed "an
infant triangular trade, breaching the East India Company's
* Also known as Sydney Harbour. Captain Arthur Phillip was not
impressed with the site first chosen for a penal colony on the
advice of Sir Joseph Banks; Botany Bay. Downcast by the
"waterless and drought-stricken environment" they found, Phillip
and some others sailed out to find a better site - which they
did, but a few miles to the north. The Union Jack was hoisted in
Sydney Cove on 26 January 1788.
* The fact that most of the settlers were felons from the cities,
and that their supervisors and jailers were mostly soldiers and
sailors, did not help either. There was little practical
knowledge of farming or animal husbandry amongst people who in
the main, convict and jailer alike, were used to either
expropriating or being issued their food and other necessities.
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monopoly, ... between the United States, Australia and China." 1
This trade, and the activities of the whalers and sealers around
the Australian coast, increased over time, especially as new
settlements were founded to the north, south and west. By 1835
the United States had appointed a consul to Sydney, although Mr
James H. Williams did not actually take up his duties there until
1839. Further consular appointments were made, to Hobart (1843)
and to Melbourne in 1852, by which time the first Australian gold
rush was well underway"*".
This swelled the number of Americans in Australia, mainly
with "forty-niners" continuing west from California, and with
deserters from visiting whalers and merchantmen. But the bulk of
the gold-rush immigrants came from Britain, Ireland and (in
lesser numbers) Scandinavia and central-southern Europe. American
direct influence on politics and society was limited. The
indirect influence of the American example (which was especially
attractive to transported English Chartists and Irish Fenians -
both groups, in effect, being political prisoners) was more
significant. It undoubtedly helped stoke the fires of Australian
republican-nationalism, and the drafters of Australia's federal
Constitution drew heavily upon both the original American
Constitution and subseguent legislation, interpretations and
1. Norman Harper, Australia and the United States . Sydney:
Nelson, 1972, pi.
+ The Colonies themselves, even though they all progressively
achieved self-government from 1851 onward, made no effort to
reciprocate with some form of commercial representation in the
United States.
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amendments. But the form of government finally adopted for the
Australian Commonwealth in 1901 owed much (perhaps too much) to
the influence of the "mother of Parliaments" and English law. The
fire in the bellies of those who agitated for an Australian
republic, free from all allegiance to the British crown, was soon
damped by economic depression, the continued squabbling among the
individual colonies (in effect, over questions of local
sovereignty, later enshrined as 'states' rights' 1 ); and by the
fears of invasion and foreign blockade that emerged and
periodically recurred from the mid-nineteenth century onward.
Despite a fairly steady flow of Americans engaged in
commerce, mining and civil engineering projects, and a dim
awareness of a growing American national power still 'going west'
into the Pacific, Australian's chief source of ideas and ideals
remained (or perhaps, became once more,) the British Empire; to
which most Australians continued to look for the assurance of
their physical protection, commercial viability and sense of
place in the world. How much more glorious to be a component of
the mightiest Empire the world had ever seen, than to be a
1. See: McLachlan, Waiting for the Revolution . ppl65-9. The worst
aspect of all this was the Colonies' insistence on retention of a
direct link to the British Crown; in effect, retaining the avenue
of appeal to a foreign government as a means of circumventing
unpalatable decisions of the national one. This naturally
appealed to the British. The other main difficulty that seems to
have arisen was the excessive eagerness of the founders for
compromise: they were "much more concerned with creating a bill
acceptable to all the colonial parliaments and the one at
Westminster than a document Australians could understand." It
seems they already had lost the gumption to take independence if
was not granted by act of the British Parliament. It was a
(still) potentially fatal error.
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struggling, indefensible republic locked in the fastness of the
South Seas, with only the Royal Navy standing between it and
perdition. Not everyone felt that way, of course. Even some
British, like Rear-Admiral George Tryon, commander of the Royal
Navy's Australian Squadron, urged the colonial Premiers to at
least provide, at their own expense, naval forces for local
defence which (unlike the Australia Squadron) would be directly
responsible only to themselves 1 . And on a wider plane, there
still were many who felt the only way ahead for Australia was
complete independence, American-style.
Internal Ideological Conflict
The British interests in Australia worked hard to counter
such disloyal tendencies and cultivate Imperial sentiment,
encouraging Australians not to dwell upon their shadowy pasts as
outcasts and refugees from the British and other empires, but to
celebrate their future as (moderately acceptable) citizens of an
ever-greater Bretagne d'Outre-Mer. In the words of Robert Hughes,
the 1888 Centenary celebration of English settlement in Australia
was:
conceived and [run] as a lavish feast of jingoism, a
tribute to the benevolent, all-embracing British Empire
[and its markets, its Monarchy, and its Navy]...
Bunting, flags, parades, speeches and more bunting were
rammed down the popular throat, and only republicans
gagged on them. ... The Bulletin, that anti-imperialist
paper, . . . excoriated the whole idea of the Centennial
as a slavish feast of Australian dependence.
1. Neville Meaney, The Search For Security in the Pacific. 1901-
1914 , Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1976, p55.
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The Bulletin lamented the fact that the "fifth-rate drunk"
being conducted celebrated not, as in "the great Republic", a
"triumph of liberty over grasping tyranny" but "a name but not a
nation, a huge continent content to be the hanger-on of a little
island". Dominated by British capital and its eager supplicants,
the colonial governments and the 'bunyip aristocracy 1 ' of
pastoralists and miners, Australia's "chains of iron are merely
exchanged for chains of gold." Australia already was choosing
comfort over self-respect, and thus, according to the Bulletin,
was still an unresisting prisoner of Britain "meaner [in spirit]
than Egypt and lower [still, in courage] than the Boer Republic."
The flaming spirit of independence and will to go it alone,
("poor [but] independent") behind these words, sadly was all but
extinguished in but a few years 2 . What spirit remained was (in my
view) even more sadly transmuted into rabid trade unionism, where
the 'them versus us' of genuine nationalism versus suffocating
1. A bunyip is a monster of Aboriginal legend, that reputedly
haunted waterholes. The term "bunyip aristocracy" refers to a
proposal by William Charles Wentworth, one of Australia's first
self-made 'landed gentry', for a system of colonial peerages on
the British model. According to a published report. Wentworth was
derided by Irish-born nationalist Daniel Deniehy in these terms:
"Here they all knew the common water mole was transformed into
the duck-billed platypus, and in some distant emulation of this
degradation, he [Deniehy] supposed they were to be favoured with
a bunyip aristocracy." See: G.A. Wilkes, A Dictionary of
Australian Colloquialisms . Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1978;
repr. Fontana Paperback, 1980.
2. See: Robert Hughes, The Fatal Shore . Sydney: Collins, 1987,
pp596-9. For further discussion of nationalism and the Australian
character, Noel McLachlan's quirkily written (it reads like the
lecture notes it probably was based upon) but perceptive and
informative "Waiting for the Revolution " is the best I have yet
read. It is written from a "social justice" perspective which he
calls 'radical'; but I don't think the one need necessarily imply
the other.
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Empire became the tendentious pursuit of 'workers (the wage-
slaves of Empire) versus the bosses (warders of the Imperial
economic prison)
•
; which continues to undermine attempts to
modernise the nation - from both sides of the mutually self-
imposed 'fence' between the two.
It seems that, although the push for national self-
government continued unabated until eventually it was delivered
through the benevolence of the British Parliament, a majority of
Australians remained unconvinced of their fledgling nation's
ability to achieve a secure prosperity as an independent
political entity. And so, although "inevitably [Australia's]
founding fathers drew on the American experience and looked to
the American constitution" as a "classical example of federal
government", few of them, or their countrymen, "had anything like
a profound knowledge or understanding of America. None had any
first-hand knowledge of American Government" 1 or of American
society. This proved to be a critical shortcoming.
Less critically, for Americans, the reverse also was true.
In fact, given federated Australia's rather peculiar status
(after 1901) as a 'self-governing Dominion' of the British Crown,
it is doubtful that all that many Americans would have been
1. Harper, pp7-8. Also see: McLachlan, Waiting for the
Revolution ; Chapters 3,4 &5 draw on a wide range of contemporary
sources from 19th century Australia to illustrate the origins and
fluctuating intensity and directions of Australian nationalist
feeling. It seems the chief weapons of the Imperialist-
propagandists were to cultivate self-doubt and appeal to "race
solidarity" as a means of maintaining the imperial grip on
Australian policy and, indeed, daily business.
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inclined to regard Australia as an independent nation in its own
right. And although Australians would always be receptive to some
American ideas, there were some not so subtle differences in
ideals between the two societies; and these remain extant to this
day. These social-ethical differences have been commented upon by
any number of observers from both sides of the Pacific, and their
tenor remains remarkably consistent in its essentials. 1 The
fundamental expression of these differences may lie in an
observation (whose origin I don't recall) that Australia, settled
almost two centuries after North America, was infused with the
liberal-egalitarian values of Bentham, whereas America was driven
by the hard-faced libertarianism of Locke. Maybe: Australia's
lack of land borders, of French and Spanish influence; its very
distance from the source of settlement and capital ; its location
in the 'wrong' hemisphere; the existence of a formidable desert
1. See, for example, the commentaries quoted in Harper, Australia
and the United States . The list of "brickbats and bouquets"
varies more according to the temper of the times than in the
basic characteristics. Perhaps geography, 'the bones of strategy'
is also the skeleton of national identity.
* As McLachlan notes (pl8) , it took Phillip and his convoy 8
months to get to Australia in 1787-8; it took the harrowed
Pilgrim Fathers 9 weeks to get to America in a fearful crossing
in 1619. The time ratio even today is little different. The
disincentives to self-motivated migration (especially in
comparison to the contemporary competitor, the much closer United
States) are obvious. Herein lie the origins of Australia's
"assisted immigration" schemes, run since colonial times, by
which the various governments actually paid people's fares to




stretching almost across the continent (both ways) + ; all these
contributed to the difference as well. And while in the early
19th century the whole of the Americas was ablaze with revolution
against its colonial masters , in Australia's neighbourhood, the
business of colonisation was still taking place almost until the
Second World War.
Misconstrued Inspiration
Perhaps most critically for Australia, its political
leaders, and the agitators from left, right and centre who
supported or opposed them, failed especially, for all their study
of the legal form of American Independence, to understand that
the most critical steps in the rise of America as a nation were
taken in the years immediately after 1786. It was America's great
good fortune to be guided with brilliance and perseverance by a
small and, it seems, from this distance of years, almost unique
assemblage of extraordinarily perspicacious and intellectually
gifted men - whose ability to see things plain, and work to make
the best of their circumstances, stood in stark contrast to the
often wishful and wistful hope for a 'kinder, gentler'
environment that characterised so many Australian-British in the
imperial autumn of the late-Victorian and Edwardian periods.
+ McLachlan calls it the world's largest natural cordon
sanitaire. Not a bad description, especially since to the north
it gives way to jungle, and to westward, much of it meets the
sea. And as Robert Hughes observes ( The Fatal Shore , p596)
,
"space, in America, had always been optimistic; the more of it
you faced, the freer you were - "Go West, young man!" In
Australian terms, to go west was to die, and space itself was the
jail."
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For all their study of the technical steps taken to
consolidate de jure American arrogation of self government de
facto, Australia's foundling 1 fathers never grasped the spirit of
the thing. It may be that "Bryce's American Commonwealth [was]
their Bible", and that "four fifths of the Constitution was
quarried from American legislation and decisions": but it was
sterile stuff, prose without the passion, without the sense of
the currents and eddies of popular controversy and contemporary
perceptions that would have lent it real life. No book, written
by and for Britons, could have given its readers the real
perception of what an enormous step it was to sever all ties with
the past and rely for the future on little more than the
conviction it must be better and the determination to make it so
- regardless of regret or lingering sympathy. Australia never
found itself a George Washington, since in the circumstances a
guerrilla general was not required; but it certainly could have
done (and still could do) with someone who had studied and
comprehended his Farewell Address. There, not in the dusty tomes
of the Supreme Court, or the dry pages of a home-mechanic's guide
to government; there was embodied and distilled the spirit of
independent nationhood. In a few short pages, Washington managed
to say what countless reports and White Papers have gravely, and
vainly, struggled toward - and, in the same spirit as the
Australian Constitutional drafters, ultimately shied away from.
1. I use the word advisedly. "Independent" government was
something that just turned up one day, like something that fell
off the back of a truck - one driving between Westminster and
Whitehall.
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And for this reason it is worthwhile to repeat a decent
portion of Washington's most enduring legacy to his nation - a
sound, commonsense basis for conducting its affairs, both
internally and with other nations. Since my focus is on the
damage done Australian security policy by dependence on great
power patronage and preference, one need only recount here those
portions of the Farewell Address bearing most directly upon
foreign relations:
The unity of government which constitutes you one
people is also now dear to you. It is justly so; for it
is a main pillar in the edifice of your real
independence, the support of your tranquility at home;
your peace abroad; of your safety; of your prosperity;
of that very liberty which you so highly prize. But as
it is easy to foresee, that from different causes and
from different quarters, much pains will be taken, many
artifices employed, to weaken in your minds the
conviction of this truth . .
.
Citizens by birth or choice of a common country, that
country has a right to concentrate your affections....
Let me ... warn you in the most solemn manner against
the baneful effects of the spirit of party,
generally. ... in [governments] of the popular form it
is seen in its greatest rankness and is truly their
worst enemy. .
.
It serves always to distract the public councils and
enfeeble the public administration. It agitates the
community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms,
kindles the animosity of one part against another ....
It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption,
which find a facilitated access to government through
the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and
will of one country, are subjected to the policy and
will of another
. . . nothing is more essential than that permanent,
inveterate antipathies against particular nations and
passionate attachments for others should be
excluded . . . The nation, which indulges towards another
an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness, is in some
degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or its
affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it
astray from its duty or its interest.
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So likewise . . . sympathy for the favorite nation,
facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common
interest, in cases where [none] exists, and infusing
into one the enmities of another, betrays the former
into [the] wars of the latter, without adequate
inducement or justification. ... And it gives to
ambitious, corrupted or deluded citizens (who devote
themselves to the favorite nation) facility to betray,
or sacrifice the interests of their own country,
without odium, sometimes even with popularity . .
.
Real patriots, who may resist the intrigues of the
favorite, are liable to become suspected and odious;
while its tools and dupes usurp the confidence and
applause of the people, to surrender their
interests. . .
.
It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent
alliances with any portion of the foreign world. . . .
let [any existing] engagements be observed in their
genuine sense. But ... it would be unnecessary and
unwise to extend them. ... we may safely trust to
temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.
Harmony, liberal political intercourse with all
nations, are recommended by policy, humanity and
interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an
equal and impartial hand; neither seeking nor granting
exclusive favours and preferences .... constantly
keeping in view, that it is folly for one nation to
look for disinterested favours from another; that it
must pay with a portion of its independence for
whatever it may accept ...; that by such acceptance, it
may place itself in the condition of having given
equivalents for nominal favours and yet [be] reproached
with ingratitude for not giving more.
There can be no greater error than to expect, or
calculate upon, real favours from nation to nation. It
is an illusion which experience must cure, which a just
pride ought to discard . . . .
*
Looking over these few sentences culled from a wealth of
plain truth, is apparent that in recent times - certainly since
1. Washington's Farewell Address. 1796 . In: Richard D. Hefner, A
Documentary History of the United States , New York: Mentor, 1991
(5th edition), pp62-9. The circumstances of the previous eight
years, which only emphasise the absolute wisdom of Washington's
observations and adjurations, are outlined in Hefner, pp59-62.
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the Second World War in Europe, since well before then in East
Asia - the United States consistently has violated both the
letter and the spirit of the Farewell. The former violated
perhaps more readily than the latter. But it is easily forgotten
- especially in Australia, where these principles were never even
tried - that particularly in its foreign dealings, American
policy was in its essence formulated strictly in accord with the
idea of foreswearing habitual fondness or habitual animosity
toward other nations. And thus the nation was able, by and large,
to maintain the sort of freedom in foreign affairs that Viscount
Palmerston was urging upon his parliamentary colleagues in the
mid-nineteenth century:
We have no eternal allies and no perpetual enemies.
Our interests are eternal, and those interests it is
our duty to follow.
During the heyday of the British Empire, Britain's own
policies corresponded as closely to the dictums of Washington (as
clearly endorsed by Palmerston) as did those of the United States
itself. Britain had no "permanent alliances" with anyone -
today's enemy was tomorrow's friend; and vice-versa. Cold-eyed
(not synonymous with cold-hearted) realism was the order of the
day; and the world was as peaceful then perhaps as ever it had
been - or will be in future. All knew where they stood - on
shifting sands. None thought it unusual.
Correlli Barnett has suggested that the rot set in with
growth in Britain of evangelical religion. There is something in
this, allowing that one of the new religions was that so drearily
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recorded in the Gospel of Karl Marx. The independent and
quarrelsome English:
now evinced a compassion for the underdog and a
sympathy for failure, a corresponding suspicion of
ability and success, that were unparalleled in other
countries ....
It seemed that:
. . . appeasement indeed had become a conditioned reflex
of the British middle and upper classes. Few would now
say with Palmerston that the practical and sagacious
thing to do in life was to carry a point by boldness:
knock an opponent down at once, and apologise afterwards
if necessary to pacify him.
This may have been "wholly benef icient" to British life at
home, but it was no basis for the conduct of foreign policy:
And so, in applying the qualities of gentleness,
trustfulness, altruism and a strict regard for moral
conduct to a field of human activity where cunning,
cynicism, opportunism, trickery and force, all in the
service of national self-interest, still held sway, the
twentieth-century British stood disarmed and blinded by
their own virtues. 1
It was Australia's misfortune that much of its population,
and the bulk of its powerful domestic interests were disposed,
thanks to British "cunning, cynicism, opportunism, trickery and
(economic-industrial) force" to blindly believe in the advertised
qualities of British "gentleness, truthfulness and altruism".
Most of its leaders also cynically manipulated Australian opinion
to a point where, even when the fact stood in glaring
l.Corelli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power . pp48-9.
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contradiction of the expressed sentiment, the public wished to
believe, and so could not bring itself to disagree that
Australia's entwining with Britain was in its own best interests.
Australia, like Britain a bit later and then America a bit later
still, got preoccupied too much with "what could and should be
done" to remedy la Condition Humaine; and not at all enough with
answering Lenin's more brutal question: "what is to be done?";
right here, right now, to improve our present position and future
prospects.
These are circumstances. The effects are best reflected in
the relationship that developed between Australia and the United
States, in the sometimes impenetrable shadow of Great Britain. It
is a story of Australia's Great Expectations of great intangibles
as substance of international relations - expectations all
unrealised; and all still persisted with "too long for what good
[they] have done". In its own peculiar way, Australia's story is
that of modern Japan; of fluctuating, often conflicting and
confusing, emotional sensations of taikoku ishiki and amae: of
"big country consciousness" and "small child dependence".
Barnett has also pointed out that, on any rational
assessment of environment and circumstance : "no small nations
would have chosen as a protector a great power 12,000 miles away;
conversely, no great power would have chosen to incur the
liability of weak allies on the other side of the globe." So why
did they do it? And why do they persist with it? I think the
answer lies fundamentally with the fears and hopes that developed
in Australia during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
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when it was still very much part of the British Empire; as was
much of its neighbourhood. And its nearest neighbour was then the
Netherlands East Indies.
Two imperatives dominated the political-military outlook of
the colonial masters of the 'mystic Orient': to prevent their
competitor powers from gaining a commercial or strategic upper
hand through occupation of suitable pieces of real estate. And,
to maintain, by any means, their tenuous grasp upon what they
had, in the face of simmering resentment from numerically huge
indigenous populations whose fortunes were beholden to the wish
and whimsy of a comparatively tiny number of European and
American overlords. The attitudes toward the guestion of security
in Australia were largely developed in, and conditioned by this




EVOLVING SECURITY PERCEPTIONS TO 1918:
WHITE AUSTRALIA AND THE DELUSION OF ANGLO-SAXON SOLIDARITY
In 1986 the Australian Government released a report entitled
"Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities" 1 . It's author, Paul
Dibb, advocated as the basis for his force structure proposals a
concept of defence that he termed a "Strategy of Denial". This
was hailed in some quarters as a conceptual watershed; and in
some others, condemned as plain stupid. Whatever its merits, the
idea certainly was no watershed. In one guise or another, the
denial to competing influences and powers of the Australian
landmass and adjacent portions of the globe has been fundamental
to all facets of Australian security policy, almost from the time
of the first British settlement.
Denial by acquisition gave way to denial by regulation;
which eventually was succeeded by what might be termed "denial of
cognition": the creation of a mental fortress Australia that
simply pretended it could shut out the reality of its physical
and political environs.
1. Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities : Report to the
Minister for Defence by Mr Paul Dibb. Canberra, Australian





Denial of territory was the basis for British settlement in
parts of the continent far removed from Sydney Cove, on what was
more a less a 'come in handy' principle. There might be little
overt attraction, but who knew what might come in handy in a
future conflict with, say, France - or Russia, or the
Netherlands, or almost anyone. And in any case, it was more
important to deny any putative adversary access to convenient
harbours from which to mount raids on British possessions and
shipping. This was an understandable attitude, given the havoc
wreaked by Suffren in the Indian Ocean during the Napoleonic Wars
- although the French expeditions to Australia during that time
had been cordially received.
Nonetheless, Britain after the Napoleonic wars seemed
determined to ensure that it would preempt by physical occupation
any French claim on the Australian continent which might be laid
on the basis of "prescriptive rights" deriving from original
discovery. Hence the establishment in 1826 of a garrison at
Albany, and foundation of the Swan River Colony (both in Western
Australia) in 1829.* Whilst this territory was being denied to
* After William Dampier's voyages in the late 17th century, which
tended to corroborate earlier Dutch accounts of the land as
worthless and its inhabitants as wretched, Britain had no
interest in Western Australia. Following St Allouarn's
'discovery' of "Leeuwinland" in 1772, the French were the only
serious explorers of the west coast (and much of the south-west)
until well after 1800. But unlike the British, "they did not rush
to establish settlements . . . before they sent settlers to live in
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France, similar efforts were underway in the north, supported by
the British Admiralty
if only [to anticipate] any moves the Dutch might
make to establish themselves on the north coast.
British claim . . . would be made doubly sure by the
occupancy. 1
Neither settlement prospered - the western Australian
settlers actually asked to have convict labour sent them, and the
garrison communities set up in various locations in the north had
all to be abandoned. It took the invention of the telegraph and
the undersea cable finally to force a permanent settlement at
Port Darwin (still known, then, as Palmerston) in 1872.
Denial by Regulation - Race Patriotism
The principle of denial of Australian and adjacent
territory to potentially competing European powers was later
complemented by one of the most pernicious notions to permeate
Australian political thought. Samuel Johnson observed that
"patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel"; Australia's
. . .Continued. .
.
strange places abroad they invariably made careful methodical
surveys of the resources." However, "the trouble with this was,
as in the case of western Australia, by the time they acguired
the knowledge, others had moved in ...". The story of French
exploration is well told by Leslie Marchant, France Australe .
(Perth: Artlook Books, 1982)
1. Peter G. Spillett, Forsaken Settlement . Sydney: Lansdowne
Press, 1972, pl3.
* Some settlement from inland had taken place, but it was still
pretty marginal and no less liable than before to fold up if the
seasons went badly. The telegraph meant that permanent settlement
had to be maintained, if only to tend the lines. See Alan Powell,
Far Country . Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1982.
Chapters 3 and 4
.
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scoundrels, their lukewarm nationalism subverted by Imperial
dependency, opted for racial patriotism. This concept, so
admirably suited for denial of the risks and responsibilities of
independent nationhood, tainted and distorted Australian security
policies (and the national image abroad) for over a century -
even to this day. It was a logical outgrowth of "race destiny" -
the assumption that all good white people could and should stick
together in their common destiny of enlightening the peoples of
the world - combining elements of social Darwinism, Christian
missionary zeal and a form of white supremacist noblesse oblige
to provide a guasi-philosophical underpinning for the domination
of much of the world by the European powers and later the United
States.
Within the British Empire, of course, this notion (which,
with its own special flavouring of belief in the superiority of
its social and political structures, became prevalent at the time
in the United States as well 1 ) was applied as a belief in a
peculiarly Anglo-Saxon mission to elevate the lesser peoples
placed under its benevolent rule by the laws of natural
selection. For its adherents, it was no less self-persuasive than
French colonialists 1 notion of the mission civilisatrice - but
1. Racialist sentiment, and action, was at least as well
-developed in California as in the Australian colonies. Although
President Theodore Roosevelt was at first prepared to regard
Japan as a friend of the United States, he became something of a
yellow peril man himself. But he handled things with a good deal
more finesse than did Australia's would-be statesmen. See: Robert
Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy . New York: Oxford
University Press, 1983, pp52-3.
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the 'Anglo' version was decidedly lacking both the charm and the
panache of France's attempt to make its colonial subjects
•coloured Frenchmen'. The British were not interested in
assimilation, because they did not believe it could work on any
significant scale. Americans thought the same. So did Australian
whites - there long enough, and the aboriginal peoples
sufficiently subjugated, to believe that they were the living
definition of 'Australian'. By 1857 there were in Australia
nearly 24,000 Chinese working on the goldfields of Victoria. 1 As
was the case in America, their industry 2 and their 'alien'
customs sparked fear and loathing which resulted in a number of
ugly instances of violence against them by the white miners. This
culminated in a brutal pogrom at Lambing Flat in 1861, by which
time the colonial governments had convinced themselves that the
Chinese and other 'Asiatic' races could not be assimilated into
1. Manning Clark, A Short History of Australia . Ringwood
(Melbourne): Penguin, 1986 (repr. 1988), pll5. An unknown number
also resided in New South Wales; Lambing Flat is in this state,
not far from the Australian Capital Territory.
2. They were, as in the American west, "patient enough to glean
what the white men scorned" and were persecuted accordingly. The
rise of the "White Australia" sentiment almost exactly
paralleled, in time and measure, the development of the Exclusion
Laws, and the feelings that gave rise to them, in California.
See, for example, Earl Pomeroy, The Pacific Slope . pp50&52, and
especially, pp 265-8. The prevailing view of the potential merit
and status of the Chinese is made plain by the guoted statement
from the California Farmer of 1854: "[the Chinese will] be to
California what the African has been to the South." As happened
in Australia too, it is noted by Pomeroy that "criticism of the
Chinese mounted in hard times, when the unemployed felt it was
wrong that jobs should go to men who lived on handfuls (sic) of
rice"; that is, to men who could get by (and even repatriate
money) on less than what was considered 'fair' by the unemployed
whites. A sentiment still echoing, one fancies, through the U.S.
Congress and other western parliaments.
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white societies, whose mores, social stability and standards of
living inevitably would be undermined. Preservation of social
harmony (and wages and prices) thus was made inseparable from
preservation of "racial purity", and the white Australia policy
was born in fact if not yet in name. 1 The twinned visions of
"mission" (or "race destiny") and White Australia were
intertwined with the notions of "territorial denial" of the
"indefensible continent"; mutually reinforcing in a way that ever
since has plagued Australian attempts to formulate a sensible
national security policy. Out of all this came the two main
strands of an embryonic Australian national security policy, in
which the United States increasingly would figure as a key
factor.
The first strand was a form of neo-colonial Monroe doctrine
espoused by colonial politicians from at least the 1870s. The
second, which grew concurrent with the other but took longer to
reach full flower in policy terms, was that of the Yellow Peril,
later known as the 'gravity theory', by which Asia's teeming
hordes, with an insatiable thirst for land, would drop from the
north and into the vast spaces of Australia. Both of these
affected Australia's view of the United States, even if the
United States remained more or less indifferent to events in
Australia, and deferential to the British desire to speak first
1. The term was apparently first used in campaigning for
Australia's first Federal election, held 1 March 1901. Such was
the fervour for exclusion of Asian immigrants that a British
caution against an overtly discriminatory immigration policy
caused arch-Imperialist W.M. Hughes to call for "separation" from
the Empire; i.e., for a Republic. See: Meaney, pill.
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(and last) on all matters affecting its imperial constituents,
whatever their racial status.
The South Pacific Monroe Doctrine
The demand for a "Monroe Doctrine for the South Pacific"
(such was not necessary for the already apportioned, western-
dominated areas of South and East Asia) grew from Australians'
fears that great power rivalry for territory and influence in the
South Pacific would necessarily mean extension to the region of
northern hemisphere conflicts. And with this would come threats
to Australia's trade and territory. 1 It was not inconceivable to
some that part or all of Australia itself might be 'bargained
away' by Britain in return for some other concession thought more
vital to English interests. Internal troubles in Fiji in 1870,
in which both Germany and the USA had some commercial interest,
prompted the Australian colonies to ask Britain to annex the Fiji
islands for fear that either of the other two nations might do so
first.
They represented that it would be inimical to "British
interests" if the Fijis fell under some other nation's control.
Gladstone's Liberal government was not disposed to annex the
1. See Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific. 1901-14 .
Chapters 1 & 2, "Problems and Perspectives" and "Colonial
Origins" cover the concerns of the colonial governments, and
demonstrates the vital part played in achievement of a consensus
on federation by their agreement on the need for a commonly
mounted system of defence.
* And the practical example of American westward expansion by
purchase, bluff and bluster may have contributed to such fears.
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islands, but the Conservatives under his successor, Disraeli,
were; and they did so in 1874. Certainly, "the British government
was more influenced by an assessment of its own interest in the
islands than by Australian pressure", but the Australian colonies
were also "perhaps led by this episode into believing that they
had more influence over British Pacific policy than was actually
the case." 1
This misconception persisted for a long time, and a similar
one later arose with regard to Australian influence on United
States policy in the region - and elsewhere. Encouraged by their
apparent success, the Australians continued to urge Britain to
swallow up virtually every remaining piece of "vacant" territory
in the South Pacific; but Britain's appetite for territory was
sated and it was less than thrilled by the unilateral annexation
by the Government of Queensland of the eastern part of the island
of New Guinea. The northern section of this unwanted windfall
later was traded to Germany in return for its support of British
ambitions in Egypt. Whilst making this agreement, Britain and
Germany, much to the colonies' dismay, also parcelled up the
remainder of modern-day Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and
the Gilbert and Ellice group. France, too, had been allowed by
Britain to consolidate its regional presence. This was not at all
what had been hoped for, and the Australian colonial Premiers had
not been consulted at all, either. But the colonies had not the
sovereign status nor the independent force themselves to acguire
1. Ibid., ppl6-17.
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these territories, in the arc from New Guinea to Fiji and Samoa,
that had been identified as Australia's northern "rampart". It
was clear that they had not achieved their goal of excluding all
powers other than the motherland to keep "the English people in
these distant lands as far removed as possible from the dangers
arising out of European complications". 1
These non-English were deemed by some to include the United
States, which by now was clearly a serious commercial rival to
Britain (and British-controlled Australian concerns) in the
western Pacific as a whole. There also was a nascent strain of
Australian "manifest destiny" in the air , which ambitious
colonial politicians, thwarted already by the regional
manoeuvrings of the main European powers, feared would be further
frustrated by the encroachments of the United States. But in the
event, the United States' acquisition of territory further afield
was regarded with equanimity; even welcomed.
American victory in the Spanish-American war provoked
"rapturous applause and public demonstrations of approval", and
the "acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands in 1898 and of
Tutuila ... in 1899 was also accepted calmly", even though
l.Ibid., pl7. As expressed by James Service, Premier of Victoria,
in 1885.
* This actually was the phrase used, but whether in conscious or
unconscious imitation of the American movement of the same name
is not clear. The problem with "Australasian" manifest destiny
was that it conceived Australia and New Zealand more in the role
of imperial property agents than as 'powers' acting in their own
right - Britain was required to do the annexing in order to
fulfill "Australasia's" destiny. All very odd. See: Meaney,
Chapter 1.
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Tutuila was in the Samoas which formerly had been considered part
of the 'backyard fence' required to be erected under British
suzerainty.
By this time the notion of Anglo-Saxon "race destiny" in
which the whites would inherit the earth due to their innate
superiority, was firmly established and it was widely held that
"the further the Americans became involved in the future of the
Pacific the better were the prospects for Australian peace and
safety." 1 Nonetheless it was apparent to all concerned that the
security of Australian territory and seaborne trade (meaning in
effect the national livelihood) lay chiefly in the hands of the
Royal Navy, at least until such time as the nascent Commonwealth
developed adequate naval forces of its own. The trouble was, as
Australian politicians were increasingly aware, the Royal Navy
faced a severe and growing challenge in its home waters, and had
little to spare for service in faraway reaches of the Empire -
whatever colour their inhabitants.
Australia's South Pacific Monroe Doctrine also had undergone
a not-so-subtle transmutation: frustrated by great-power
compromises, the Australians gave up on their original goal of
excluding non-British "races" from the region. Australia's
Monroe Doctrine shifted from its sharp focus upon the hope of
excluding from the 'Australian hemisphere', through unified
British rule of the Pacific island rampart, the tensions and
1. Meaney, p22.
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squabbles emanating from far-away Europe and dabbled in by the
United States. Encouraged by the emergence of another Anglo-Saxon
power in the Pacific, and alarmed by the rapidly growing power of
Japan, Australia's regional focus deteriorated into the blurred
vision of excluding from the continent and its surroundings all
those inferior races who would dilute the blood and impede the
manifest destiny to rule of the White Empire of the South Seas.
AFTER FEDERATION - PRIDE AND PREJUDICE
Cognitive Denial: the Yellow Peril
At federation in 1901, amid the many optimistic
pronouncements could already be detected some uncertainty as to
the nation's future. Despite fulsome protestation that "Australia
confidently awaits the future", the Sydney Morning Herald noted
that Japan was now "a recognised naval Power", and reposed its
hopes for Australian security in "that alliance of English
speaking peoples which will one day hold with secure and loyal
hands the balance of the world's peace in the interests of
civilisation and progress." 1 The Brisbane Worker was less
sanguine; Australia, "having escaped the Monarchy" (it wished!)
had a higher destiny than simply marching in lockstep to the tune
of "nations decayed and dying." Enough to gladden an American
heart perhaps: but The Worker saw no merit either in the
practical example of a democracy "which, like the United States,
1. The Sydney Morning Herald . 1 January 1901. In Crowley, vol.1,
pp4-5.
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is based on ... money-power, ceases to be democracy and becomes
plutocracy." 1 In Melbourne, already a bastion of conservatism (of
both right and left) , Imperial sycophancy prevailed - Federation
had simply "confirmed our allegiance to the Crown" and
forestalled the colonies becoming "ridiculous states, such as the
colonies of [Latin America] have become." British was,
undoubtedly, best: "no American President can hope a realm so
wide extended as that [of] a federated Great[er] Britain." The
American example ran a poor second to the Imperial presence and
"the blood-tie and common racial instinct already proved on the
battlefields of South Africa". 2
But a snake lurked in Britain's antipodean Eden - not just
Japan, but the whole of the Asiatic Horde. "It is good for the
world" quoth the Argus* syndicated bigot, "that a White Empire
should grow up in these Southern-Asian seas, as a counterbalance
to the . . . empires of China and Japan, with all their mysterious
possibilities. The coloured races" - those sinister reptiles! -
were "fast creeping down the Malayan Peninsula..." 3 . How
fortunate for the world, then, that Australia would "maintain for
Europe its civilisation here." The first new nation of the new
Century already was set fair to become the last bastion of
(British) white supremacy; which itself was under notice of
challenge.
1. The Brisbane Worker . 5 January 1901. In Crowley, vol.1, pp5-6.
2. The Melbourne Arous . 9 May 1901. In Crowley, vol.1, pp6-7.
3. Ibid.
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Japanese naval power, evident in 1901, but untested except
against the decadent Chinese, had nonetheless been tacitly
acknowledged in the 1902 Anglo-Japanese treaty. It was shockingly
confirmed in the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-5. Japan had
'arrived' as a first-class power; and the rivets were coining
loose from the "iron wall" of the Royal Navy. Having now proven
it possessed the professional expertise to overwhelm a
substantial fleet (albeit poorly trained and of uneven material
quality) from one of the world's great powers, the Imperial
Japanese Navy clearly was more than a match for the relatively
weak force of a few "First-Class" cruisers, light cruisers and
destroyers, occasionally supplemented by one or two pre-
Dreadnought battleships, that was distributed between the Royal
Navy's China, East Indies and Australia Stations.
The spectre of the "Yellow Peril", formerly thought
exorcised by the White Australia Policy legislated in 1901 1 , now
was enthusiastically raised again, and not only by white
supremacists and self-interested trade union leaders. Those well-
intentioned souls committed to the idea of an independent
1. For interesting samples of the debate see: Crowley, vol.1,
ppl3-18. The excuses offered for a White Australia corresponded
closely to those invoked, before and after, in the western states
of America to justify exclusion and/or expulsion of Chinese and
Japanese; but at least one Parliamentarian had the perspicacity
and the courage to point to the real reason underneath it all:
"the foundation of the Bill is racial prejudice. . . The Attorney
General has . .
.
[made] the humiliating confession" that the
"principal reason for shutting out the Japanese race is [that]
they are too thrifty [;] they work too hard .. are too
provident . . and possess so many of those old-fashioned virtues
that we Britishers cannot compete with them in our daily life."
How true.
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Australian foreign policy, and an independent defence force to
back it up, also found it a useful tool to overcome the sense of
complacency that was otherwise generated by the signing of the
Anglo-Japanese security treaty in 1902. The not so well
intentioned also battened upon it to promote the creation of
standing land forces in particular.
The real aim of those such as the local military acolytes
of Major General Sir Edward Hutton, the British-appointed
commander of the Commonwealth Military Forces from 1902 to 1904,
was to ensure creation of a force suitable for deployment under
British orders as part of an Imperial Reserve which would be used
to snuff out disturbances in the non-white Empire. The "Eastern
Menace" was to be brandished as posing the sort of massive
invasion threat that would justify a large standing army of
nearly 30,000 men. 1 Many Australian leaders, including those
committed to the idea of an independent Navy under national
command, had little faith in either the durability of the Anglo-
Japanese Treaty or the ability of the Royal Navy to prevail in
the event that Japan should take advantage of a conflict in
Europe to further its own grand design in Asia; in which view
they were wholly, if prematurely, justified. And Australian
politicians doubtless were uncomfortably aware that they had
1. See: Meaney, pp58-75.
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frustrated and insulted the Japanese to the limits of human
endurance when framing the Immigration Act of 1901.
*
The extent of Japan's future ambition was perhaps magnified
beyond reason; but that is to forget the temper of the times, in
which the gaining of power, it was presumed, created a thirst for
more, with one conquest leading inexorably to the attempt for
another.
"lis the first round of the struggle
of the East against the West,
Of the fearful war of races -
for the White Man could not rest 2
wrote "homegrown" author-poet Henry Lawson - in decidedly
Kiplingesque style. Senator Pearce, a future Defence Minister,
thought it "foolish" to regard the Anglo-Japanese treaty as
providing any durable security for Australia, and admonished his
Labour Party colleagues that Japan "has shown she is an
aggressive nation" whose appetite for conquest had been
stimulated, not slaked, by recent victory. It was inevitable that
Japan would seek "to obtain fresh territory", for "has that not
been the history of our own race?" He wondered if there was "any
other country that offers such a temptation to Japan as Australia
1. Meaney, ppl07-119, gives extensive coverage of the three-
cornered arguments on the subject that almost literally "burned
up the wires" between Tokyo, London and Melbourne. The Australian
government, though adamant in its position, which prevailed,
sought to duck continued representations from the Japanese
Consul-General by insisting all correspondence on the subject
should be routed through the British Foreign Office in London.
Though it was tactically expedient in this case, it was a
disastrous precedent for the conduct of Australian foreign
policy.
2. Quoted by Alan Powell, Far Country , pl40.
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does?" The newly formed National Defence League considered Japan
"the possible, if not the probable, enemy of the future". 1 The
Federal Government moved to take over administration of the
Northern Territory from South Australia, promising to build a
north-south railroad. It was the start of the movement, honoured,
like so much else (including the railroad) more in rhetoric than
in deed, to 'populate or perish' in the North. 2
EASTERN MENACE
A Glimpse of Salvation - The Great White Fleet
Future Prime Minister Alfred Deakin had ventured mildly that
once engaged in China, Japan might become mired there and unable
to divert its attention elsewhere. 3 But the victory over Russia
changed all that, and Deakin was as thoroughly imbued as any with
the doctrine of racial purity. In the words of the then (June
1905) Deputy Prime Minister, Allan McLean, although "the great
1. Comment from Deakin, McLean, Pearce and the National Defence
League all cited by Meaney, ppl26-127.
2. The Commonwealth eventually took over in 1911 - the railway,
promised most recently by Hawke in 1983, is still not built. See:
Powell, Far Country . ppl41-2. It is interesting to note that
Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson recommended in 1911 establishment
of a naval base at Darwin; but it would be useless, he said,
unless connected to the south by rail. As events proved in 1942,
Henderson was right - and in my view, he still is.
3. Meaney, pl24. Paraphrases an interview granted by Deakin to
the Sydney Morning Herald, 6 January 1904: "once established on
the Asian mainland, Japan would have more than enough to hold its
attention and consume its energy." This fond hope became more or
less enshrined as the basis of Anglo-Australian policy toward
Japan in the decade before December 1941.
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Power which has recently arisen in the East" was presently allied
to Britain, "that condition of things might not continue and we
must be prepared for what might happen." Thus was resumed a
protracted debate, both within Australia and between its
representatives and those of a stubbornly obtuse British colonial
office and Admiralty, in particular, over the future needs for
the defence of Australia 1 .
It was far from resolved when Deakin, by now Prime
Minister, got wind of Theodore Roosevelt's scheme to put the USA
on the world Power map by sending his Great White Fleet around
the globe. He "forced a reluctant colonial office to invite the
American [Fleet] to Australia" 2
,
by the simple expedient of
writing "what purported to be a private letter to the American
Ambassador in Britain, Whitelaw Reid, asking him to help persuade
the United States Government to allow the American fleet to come
to Australia." 3 The colonial office was furious, probably much to
the satisfaction of all Australians who knew what had gone on -
and in 1908 the Great White Fleet arrived, to a rapturous
reception from press, public and politicians. In private, the
Prime Minister considered this was "not so much because of our
blood affection for the Americans though that is sincere but
1. The whole story is well told by Meaney, The Search For
Security in the Pacific .
2. T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War , (Canberra: Australian
National University Press, 1978), p72.
3. M. Ruth Megaw, "Australia and the Great White Fleet", Journal
of the Roval Australian Historical Society (Sydney) . No. 56
(1970). Cited in Harper, Australia and the United States . p59.
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because of our distrust of the Yellow Race in the North Pacific
and our recognition of the 'entente cordiale' spreading among all
white men who realise the Yellow Peril to Caucasian civilization,
creeds and politics."
A Home Truth From Admiral Sperry
Publicly, Deakin like virtually all other commentators
could scarcely contain his joy at finding some other power to
take up the burden of protection of "the truth of blood and
race" . The whole population seemed to feel that even though they
had been 'abandoned' by the mother country to an uncertain fate
at the hands of Asian hordes, now 'our' Uncle Sam would put all
to rights, if needed, because Australians and Americans were
"blood relations". Deakin went so far as to propose an Anglo-
Saxon alliance in the Pacific. He seems to have been almost alone
in this desire. Politeness, pride and perhaps lingering prejudice
(for all the strident claims of 'kinship' and "the meeting of
broad and free democracies") all seem to have inhibited other
Australian leaders from proposing outright either alliance or
some other guarantee of protection.
American Admiral Sperry was in any case too shrewdly
circumspect to offer the slightest hint of such a thing, though
he was aware that in Australian minds his visit had "established
a curious sort of protectorate - a new Monroe Doctrine." 1 What
Sperry clearly recognised, besides his own government's aversion
to permanent entanglements with any portion of the foreign world,
1. Meaney, pl71. Quotes a letter from Sperry to his wife.
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was that Australia and the United States shared few "material
interests, without which mere blood ties count for little" (my
emphasis) . He told this to Deakin, and enjoined him to develop
trade in their [British] Pacific Islands, on the route
to Vancouver and San Francisco [because then] the world
would recognise the community of our commercial
interests and would not dare affront us as long as we
hold together. 1
It was good advice, and applied nearly egually as well to
Australian relations with Britain - there was no such thing as an
international community based on blood ties, but there could be
international cooperation, in security as in other matters, based
on mutual interests.
Deakin, like many Australians at the time and for decades
afterward, seemed not to take the hint; he issued invitations for
more naval visits, and for a visit (in 1909) by the President
himself. The latter offer was declined: perhaps Theodore
Roosevelt, despite his belief expressed in a letter to the
British King, that the interests of "the English-speaking peoples
are one, alike in the Atlantic and Pacific" 2 , was not anxious to
be identified with so blatantly and offensively racialist a
society. Almost alone amongst his compatriots, TR recognised "the
conseguences that blatant expressions of contempt for Japanese
l.Ibid., pl72.
2. Letter to King Edward VII, dated 12 February, 1908. In Barclay
and Siracusa, Australian-American Relations Since 1945 , p2
.
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migrants would have for America's international position" 1 ; and
this would have made him no less unique in Australia. A visit to
Australia so soon after America and Japan had concluded the Root-
Takahira agreement which formally "re-af f irm[ed] their
friendship" could only help revive the international tension TR
hoped he had just defused.
The intense public interest and goodwill toward the United
States that had been generated by Admiral Sperry and his Fleet,
soon began to wane in the face of all-pervasive British
influence, including a minor flood of 280,000 immigrants from the
old country in the period 1909-13. Few of these settled in the
north, where many considered it "unnatural to expect white people
to work manually". This gave rise, paradoxically, to calls for
the "White Australia fetish" to be dropped (above an Antipodean
version of the Mason-Dixon line) to allow population of the very
north which reputedly was threatened with imminent inundation by
the Yellow Tide, by (among others) the very peoples who were
supposed to be the threat. The stupidity of this proposal was not
apparent to its authors in the Pastoral Review, who seemed to
hanker for old southern-style slavery (indentured "black labour"
from almost everywhere but Japan) in plantation agriculture that
would permit "whites [to] live in comfort, [while] wives would
have domestics". 2
1. Robert Dallek, The American Stvle of Foreign Policy . (New
York: Oxford University Press), 1983, p55.
2. Crowley, vol.1, pp208-9.
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Only in innocent Australia, cut off from the world by
geography and willful subservience to the myth-makers of the
British Colonial Office and jingo press, could such a suggestion
have been publicly canvassed in 1914 - whatever other nations'
citizens might think in private. In any case, the proposal got
short shrift from a more determinedly racialist Federal
Government whose key constituents were concentrated in the
southern cities. So did Admiral Sperry's advice to Alfred Deakin:
Australia did not establish any form of trade representation in
America until 1918 - and then a trade Commissioner under the wing
of the British Embassy.
War scarcely modified (probably deepened) the innocence,
and actually contributed to a depopulation of the north, as many
of its bold young (white) men - of whom there were few enough -
signed on for another great adventure from which fewer still
returned.
THE ROAD TO WAR AND "GLORY"
"Antipathies and Passionate Attachments"
Though the Melbourne Age had in 1908 1 trumpeted that "the
people of America [would] admit the common trust of the two white
races whose destinies are bound up in Pacific dominance", in
which America had shown she would "perform her part" and would
expect Australia "to undertake our corresponding obligation", by
1914 American indifference and Australian passivity ensured that
1. The Age . Melbourne, 17 March 1908. In F.K. Crowley, Modern
Australia in Documents. Volume 1; 1901-1939 . ppl24-5.
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all sense of obligation was once more directed to the service of
the Empire.
Even so, the visit of the Great White Fleet had at least one
important and lasting effect. If a friendly fleet could make it
to Australia, so too could a hostile one. The visit had given
added point to the comment made by the Commonwealth's Naval
Director in a minute to the Minister for Defence:
With many ... it is a heresy to doubt the paramount
supremacy of the Mother Country's great Navy over [all
others, singly or however combined] ... [but] the time
is fast approaching when the existence of Australia
will depend upon the goodwill of America and the
politeness of Japan. 1
After 1908, Australians were easily convinced they must
have their own navy, rather than simply 'chipping in' towards the
cost of Britain's fleet. And after more wrangling with the
Imperial priesthood, God himself signed (in June 1911) the Royal
assent for creation of an Australian navy, whose major units
assembled in Sydney in barely the nick of time, on 4 October
1913.
Australia entered the Great War on 5 August, 1914, a day
after Great Britain; and within hours of the announcement had
fired what may have been the first "British" shot of the
conflict . America was forgotten: Theodore Roosevelt had written
1. Captain William Creswell, who later became the Chief of Naval
Staff of the Royal Australian Navy. In Barclay and Siracusa, p3
.
* From shore batteries at the entrance to Port Philip Bay
(Melbourne) , which prevented the attempted flight of the German
merchantman Pfalz.
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in his Autobiography, published in early 1914, that "America
should be prepared to stand at Australia's back in the event of
any emergency" 1 However, the "war to end all wars" was probably
not the sort of emergency he had in mind. Australia, after all,
volunteered to take part, though it seemed to have little
directly at stake. Woodrow Wilson, TR's successor, was certainly
of no mind to volunteer America for anything beyond 'saving' the
oppressed of Mexico and Central America. No-one minded; no
disappointment was expressed at its absence from the fray,
because in the event American help was not needed. And it was
not, after all, America's war.
The peripheral threat posed to Australian interests by
spillover of the European conflict into the western Pacific and
the Indian Oceans, could be quickly eliminated by Australia
herself, aided not by the blood brotherhood of either Britain or
the United States but by none other than the fearsome Eastern
Menace. These improbable partners swiftly terminated the German
presence in the Pacific.
Australia's "Splendid Little War"
The outbreak of war in Europe in August 1914 need not, by
rights, have involved either Australia or Japan. Each was far
removed from both the Balkans, where the spark was lit, and from
the land and ocean battlefields where the competing alliances of
the Triple Entente and the Central Powers commenced to bludgeon
1. Meaney, p260.
70
each other into penury and political upheaval. If the United
States (and the rest of the "New World" in the Western
Hemisphere), a 'mere' 3,000 miles or so across the Atlantic could
stand aloof from the conflict, why not the leading power of East
Asia and the only substantial nation in the South Pacific? The
potential for profit was great, the scene of conflict thrice as
far removed, and the causes of no particular concern.
Of course, it was more complicated than that. The United
States at this time still held firmly to its "true policy to
steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the
foreign world"; but Japan was formally allied to the United
Kingdom*, and Australia had muffed its chance for true
independence in foreign and defence policy by opting for Dominion
status under the British Crown at Federation in 1901. For
Australia, therefore, on this occasion as a guarter century
later, because Britain had declared war on Germany, "as a result,
Australia is also at war." 1 However, more than, respectively,
mere allegiance to an ally or filial loyalty to the British Crown
dictated that both Japan and Australia should take an active part
in the Great War.
Both nations' interests were strongly engaged, principally
because of the extensive colonial holdings of Germany in the
* The 1902 Treaty had been renewed in 1911.
1. As stated in the radio broadcast on 3 September 1939 by the
then Prime Minister, R.G. Menzies. In R.G. Neale (ed.), Documents
in Australian Foreign Policy. 1937-49: vol.11, 1939 . Canberra,
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976. Document No. 189.
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Asia-Pacific region. Japan had designs on Germany's territorial
'concessions' in China and its possessions in the North Pacific,
besides having a wish to further prove itself as a worthy partner
in the club of great powers still headed by Britain. Australia
could expect that its sea communications and possibly its
territory would be subject to attack by German naval forces
operating from German possessions in Asia and the South Pacific
(and possibly from the neutral Netherlands East Indies) . And it
still wanted German New Guinea, at a minimum. Germany's moderate
naval strength in the Pacific could do little to prevent this odd
couple from achieving their goals.
"Thank God We Have Had An Australian Navy.."
The British China squadron was of only marginal importance
in this calculation. Though nominally superior to the Germans, it
in fact was little more powerful than the squadron of Admiral
Cradock, which von Spee later annihilated at Coronel. But Japan
possessed the strongest Navy in the Pacific at the time. Admiral
Graf von Spee ' s squadron could not hope to prevent the Japanese
from forcibly occupying its base at Tsingtao, and would thus have
to flee to another haven. There was no refuge to be had in the
South Pacific, where "the fledgling Australian Navy possessed, in
HMAS Australia, flagship of Admiral Patey, a brand-new
* van der Vat suggests it was a worry to von Spee. But I doubt
it. He would have beaten them, being smarter and his ships,
faster. And as the British only later became aware, German guns
far outranged those of similar bore in the Royal Navy. (Sydney,
with 6 inch guns, closed to 10,000 metres from Emden, expecting
still to be out of range of von Mueller's 105mm (4.1") pieces.
She got hit.)
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battlecruiser capable of destroying the entire German
Squadron ... without assistance". In 1914 Patey's "British-built
flagship [HMAS Australia] was the most powerful warship ... in
the entire southern hemisphere." 1
The German Squadron was in a nutcracker, and obliged to
flee the Pacific. This was not solely due to the presence of
powerful opposing fleets. By simply avoiding combat with
superior forces the German Squadron might survive a war that -
whatever the outcome - was expected to be 'over by Christmas'. If
Schlieffen and his successors had it right, the peace would be
Germany's - and it would be back to Tsingtao and probably
Wei-Hai-wei to boot. Regardless, the option of guerre de course
was open: "[von Spee had] a good chance of inflicting
disproportionate damage and disruption for several weeks if not
months; he had half the surface of the globe to hide in; all he
needed was coal." But this he could not get, at least not in the
Western Pacific, because the first act of the Australian and New
Zealand governments after the outbreak of war was to mount joint
1. Dan van der Vat, "The Last Corsair: the Story of the Emden ".
London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1983, p33. The light cruiser SMS
Emden was detached from the Squadron to act as a commerce raider
and general distraction to the British in the Indian Ocean. After
a short but successful career in this role, Emden was reduced to
a floating wreck by HMAS Sydney before driving herself aground on
North Keeling Island in the Cocos group on 9 November 1914. Her
Captain, Fregattenkapitan Karl von Muller, and his officers and
ships' company were near-heroic figures to all who heard of their
exploits, due both to their professional expertise and their
chivalrous conduct. And the escape, eventually all the way back
to Germany, of her landing party, (stranded ashore during the
battle) in the commandeered sailing vessel Ayesha, added an
irresistible postscript of romance and derring-do in sharp
contrast to the sordid dreariness of the war in France.
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operations to capture the German colonies in the south, even as
the British and Japanese took care of those in the north*.
The first combined Australian-New Zealand operation of the
Great War was the occupation of German Samoa in August 1914; and
the first Australians to die in the war (two officers and four
seamen) 1 did so at Rabaul, during the Australian occupation of
German New Guinea in early September. By the end of the month it
was clear that von Spee was on his way out of the Pacific. Two
German cruisers were still loose in the Indian Ocean, but
Australia itself was secure and able to provide a more than
reasonable guarantee of security to the bulk of its overseas
shipping traffic. By November, destruction of the commerce-
raiding German cruiser Emden and the effective neutralisation of
her sister (Konigsberg) in East Africa, ensured the nation needed
to do little more to keep its peace of mind than maintain naval
patrols along its main shipping routes and in the vicinity of the
Netherlands East Indies.
Australia had got a handsome return from its investment in
a modern navy - and so had New Zealand, whose Prime Minister was
* But the Japanese got further south than either Britain or
Australia had wished - due to a staff balls-up. Japan took over
Angaur, which the Australians had assumed the British China
Sguadron would take care of; the British Admiralty had thought
Australia would do the job. Neither did it.
1. From the joint naval-military landing parties that occupied
New Britain. The RAN also lost, in still unknown circumstances,
the submarine AE-1, which disappeared with all hands on 14
September 1914. See: George Odgers, RAN - An Illustrated History ,
(Sydney, Child & Henry), 1985, pp48-57.
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moved to "thank God we have had an Australian navy in this
crisis". 1 Its quick success in deterring, forestalling and
countering German naval activity was indeed "the most eloquent
and effective answer to overseas [i.e., British] critics* ... who
[pre-war] condemned the self-reliant naval policy of the
Commonwealth." The Advertiser' s claim that the "powerful German
warships hover [ing in the South Pacific] only left because of
[their] wholesome respect for the Australian Fleet" was smug,
self-satisfied, and wholly correct. For Australia and New
Zealand, the war really was over 'over before Christmas'.
But the new regional power threw away the dividend of a
very respectable performance in it's own "splendid little"
portion of the Great War, with tragic results. Sydney, nemesis of
the Emden, had been escorting (with Japanese and other Australian
warships) a troop convoy bound for Egypt. While the Advertiser
crowed of Australia's regional success, the government sent the
bulk of the Navy to join Jellicoe's Grand Fleet. Regional victory
was subverted by capitulation to the Imperial pleasure. The rot
had set in earlier in 1914, when Prime Minister Joseph Cook had
pledged Britain 20,000 men in the event of war - four years
later, thrice that number of Australians were dead and another
quarter-million wounded. The successes in the Southern hemisphere
1. Reported in the Adelaide Advertiser, 11 November 1914. In
Crowley, vol.1, p228.
+ Chief among these was Winston S. Churchill, First Lord of the
Admiralty, 1911-15. His relationship with Australia, extending
over more than half a century, was not a happy one - even Menzies
couldn't stand him.
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were soon all but forgotten - the nation celebrated, instead,
"glorious sacrifice" in the killing fields of the north.
LOST VICTORY
Slave to its Affection
The 25th April is a public holiday in Australia. It has been
every year since it was first observed in 1925, on the tenth
anniversary of the day that Australia became "at last a nation,
with one heart, one soul and one thrilling aspiration." 1 The
national equivalent of the 4th July in the United States, or
Bastille Day in France? Hardly. The parades and church services,
the barbecues and race meetings, celebrate not the casting off of
an oppressive foreign yoke, nor the overthrow of a domestic
despot, but the slaughter and maiming in a futile and appallingly
conducted campaign, of over 33,000 of "those marvelous young men
[from Australia and New Zealand who] were the flower of this
world's manhood" 2 . ANZAC Day, as it known, is the anniversary of
the landing of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (along
with much larger British and French forces) on the Gallipoli
Peninsula in an attempt to force the Dardanelles, knock Turkey
out of the Great war, open a southern flank against the Central
1. This written in a 1916 editorial: "ANZAC Day: the Birth of a
Nation", The Freeman's Journal . Quoted by McLachlan, Waiting For
the Revolution
. pl91.
2. According to the English poet John Masefield, who shared with
rather too many bards of his time a ridiculously romantic vision
of the glory of war and human sacrifice: "they went like kings in
a pageant to imminent death", he wrote in his book Gallipoli
(London, 1916). Cited by McLachlan, pl95(n).
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Powers and - who knew what? To Winston Churchill, then First Lord
of the Admiralty, the strategic possibilities were "almost
limitless"; the Dardanelles "fascinated, then obsessed him." 1
"You are simply eaten up with the Dardanelles and cannot
think of anything else" wrote Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher,
the First Sea Lord, to his youthful political master on 5 April:
"Damn the Dardanelles! They will be our grave!" So they were.
Churchill was the major political casualty, thrown out of the
cabinet six weeks later, when Allied dead and wounded already
numbered in the tens of thousands. By January 1916, the
hopelessly botched enterprise concluded with a perfectly executed
evacuation; and Fisher's prophecy had been fulfilled for 58,000
men. Of these, almost 7600 were Australians. Not for the last
time, a Churchillian obsession had extracted a heavy Australian
payment. When the carnage ceased with the Armistice on 11
November 1918, over 52000 more 'marvelous young men' from
Australia had perished in the sands of Araby and the mud of
France; the lives of perhaps a hundred thousand more blighted by
mutilation and disfigurement. This was a grievous price to pay
for a fledgling nation of some 4.5 millions to step "in one
moment . . . into the worldwide arena in the full stature of great
manhood", as one British correspondent-propagandist put it - let
alone that those who were lost forever, through death, maiming or
derangement had been drawn chiefly from that small cohort of the
1. John Laffin, Damn the Dardanelles . Melbourne: Sun Papermac,
1985, p21.
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'best and the brightest' of its young men. Without their energy
and imagination "great manhood" could hardly be sustained in the
future.
Not that the "magnificent achievement" of dying in droves
brought any lasting benefit, apart from a grudging acknowledgment
of their unequalled fighting qualities from British brasshats who
nonetheless did not appreciate Australian troops' 'undisciplined'
tendency to pay more heed to commonsense and ability than to
orders and rank 1 . The all-volunteer Australians were of course
proud and jealous of their reputation as resourceful and
determined shock-troops; their adversaries both feared and
respected them2
, the folks back home lionised them. But many must
have wondered, as did Australian war correspondent (and later,
official historian) C.E.W. Bean, "whether we should not be
better .pa
served in all future dealings to be independent of these
1. "The problem of leadership of men of this class was of course
an exceedingly difficult one . . . [because] every second man was a
potential leader. On the field the private or the corporal found
the opportunity and seized it [and] capacity soon became the
basis of promotion. [But officers were not elevated] into
membership of a permanent caste in which advancement was
automatic. The officer was the subject of scrutiny from above and
a never ceasing suffrage from below ... [those] found impossible
were ignored by their men . .
.
[and almost always] removed. The
weeding out of officers was drastic but in the end there was not
a finer lot of battle leaders in the world... [Thus] The
Australian Army was in real fact a democratic army - democratic
in the highest sense because it solved the problem of
leadership." Round Table . London, March 1919. In Crowley, vol.1,
p313.
2. Ibid. The Germans thought them "... First Class Storm Troops.
The German lines opposite the Australians had during the last
months to be manned by volunteers."
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British people" in order that "we should get more respect out of
them." 1
Conscription: "One Part Against Another"
A very substantial body of Australian opinion* remained
unconvinced of any obligation to take part in what was
essentially a European war. Britain's use of Australian soldiers
convalescing in Dublin to help put down the 1916 Easter Rebellion
did not help matters. The Australian Labor Party was rent asunder
by the controversy between the Imperial Hawks and what might be
called the "Australia-first" faction. But even before this, Prime
Minister W.M. Hughes had fanned the flames of dissent during his
visit to London in early 1916; the British 'got to' him2 , and he
was thereafter the foremost advocate of both conscription and of
an Empire bound together by formal arrangement. "We don't like
the Imperialism that our little man is pouring out, to the great
joy of gouty aristocrats and dyspeptic millionaires" thundered
the Australian Worker in Sydney (it seems Hughes had no monopoly
1. McLachlan, p2 00. Quotes Bean's 13 August 1916 diary entry, as
cited by T. Morris, The Writings of C.E.W. Bean in France in
1916 . Melbourne B.A. Thesis, 1985. Bean was by this time
thoroughly exasperated by British censorship and propaganda,
besides their usual haughty condescension towards 'colonials'
whom they expected to do as they were told by their wiser
Imperial 'parents'.
* Most notably - but by no means exclusively - in the Irish-
Catholic population and the labour movement.
2. A forceful, eloquent and often witty speaker (in other words,
a great entertainer) , Hughes was in great demand to address
public gatherings. Intoxicated, it seems, by his reception, he
grew progressively more bellicose in tone - and was known as
"darling of the jingoes". See "Legal Ties or Free Sentiment", in
Crowley, vol.1, p216.
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on colourful language) . The Commonwealth Government already had
the power to conscript young men for military service overseas,
but clearly feared the electoral consequences. The matter (a
request for the moral rather than the legal right) was put to
public referendum in 1916, and, albeit narrowly, defeated. In
1917, it was rejected again. The margin still was narrow, but the
fact remained: over half the electorate was against being
compelled to serve in Britain's war.
The Prime Minister argued from the basis of Imperial need,
and also invoked a tactic used nearly 75 years later by America's
President Bush - criticism of the policy was disloyalty to the
troops already in the field. And he hit the race button - "craven
desertion" of the Empire would not only be "[untrue] to the men
of ANZAC" but to "the traditions of our race". Britain's "great
Generals Robertson [!] and Haig [!!]", its "great leaders on the
spot" 1 had solemnly assured Hughes the war was lost without a
couple of hundred thousand Australian conscripts. The place to
defend the White Australia Policy was in Europe; the defeat of
Germany (now reduced to par with the "darkies", "chinks" and
"japs"?) was the only way to ensure "the future of Australia -
free and white". It was an hysterical and illogical response to
the measured statement of Catholic Archbishop Mannix (itself in
response to the bloodthirsty cries coming from the Anglicans)
that:
1. See: The Conscription Debate , in Crowley, vol.1, pp266-72
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"conscription in Australia [could] cause more evil
than it would avert. I honestly believe that Australia
has done her full share and more . . . later on, many who
are now [conscription's] loudest advocates would
[resist] the taxation necessary to redeem our
obligations to the returned soldiers or to their widows
and orphans... [and] my good sense does not allow me to
believe that the addition of 100,000 or 200,000
conscript Australians to the 15 [millions] of fighting
men [already available] could be a deciding factor or
even a substantial factor in the issue of the war." 1
Prime Minister Hughes, for his trouble, was thrown out of
his own Party in November 1916 - but survived at the head of
government by crossing the floor and taking with him support from
those 'labour men' who felt they could not "refuse to reinforce
the heroic ANZACS". The "little Digger" continued to dig
Australia's political grave and tried on the electorate again in
1917, when the British, French and Russians between them had
contrived to slaughter with barely a discernible purpose a goodly
portion of their 15 millions of fighting men. Voluntary
enlistment had fallen by nearly 60% - news of the stupidity of
the Empire's "greatest Generals" was getting home regularly by
now with wounded diggers, nullifying the best efforts of the
Imperial censors and their many willing propagandists in the
press. Even the Bulletin, gulled by the 'glory' at Gallipoli, had
long since had its radical teeth pulled . Hughes wanted 7,000 men
per month - the number of casualties demanded it, he said,
inadvertently revealing the scale of the butcher's bill for
defence of White Australia before the Gates of Paris. New enemies





disloyal . . . Sinn Feiners" were sapping the fighting spirit of
the half million men (aged 18 to [!]44) who remained fit to
fight. This was about the same number that Haig had managed to
use up in 5 months of 1916 in the battles of the Somme.
Mannix reacted rather less coolly than in the previous
year, condemning Hughes' "utterly silly statements" and asking
"were all the soldiers at the front who had last time voted 'NO'
[also] enemies within the gates?"; not to mention over 50% of the
people as a whole. He then got quickly to the crux of the matter:
give Hughes and his so-called "loyalists" what they sought, and
become "henceforth puppets in the hands of those who happened to
rule." Enough was enough: Australia had done "as well as any two"
other Dominions, and the best thing it could do now was keep up
the supply of food to the European allies. If bigotry and
sectarianism were dispensed with, Mannix said, voluntary
recruiting would suffice to meet reasonable demands. Hughes lost
again. The formidable Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne had even
turned the tide of opinion, in the bastion of the Eastern
conservative establishment, from "YES" in 1916, to "NO" in 1917. 1
National-Imperial Schizophrenia
The heat generated by the conscription debates, and the
intensification of public opposition, might have suggested an
equally strong rejection of Australia's 'alliance by implication'
1. The Diggers themselves were only marginally (a plurality of
2.4 5%) in favour of the idea: if you'd volunteered, you couldn't
complain about the mess you'd landed in. But compulsion to serve
in other than home defence was, to many, not on.
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with Great Britain. Yet, paradoxically, much of the Australian
public seems also to have convinced itself that it had witnessed
a wonderful thing: the decimation of Australian youth had somehow
elevated Australia in mother's sight from bastard offspring to
favoured son. Though some had openly doubted - even opposed -
the wisdom of involvement in "the mad drama in Europe", the
majority from both sides of politics had felt Australia could not
"evade responsibilities" to the Empire: it was not the right
thing to be "willing to take the hand of mother in our time of
need (though such had not yet arisen) , and afterwards see her in
trouble and not go out to help her"
.
This was but a rationalisation ( later accepted as prime
motivation) for what was really a widespread thirst for war, as a
means of 'proving the nation's spirit'. Noel McLachlan has
suggested that the nation was looking for the 'blood sacrifice of
manhood' denied it by non-revolutionary, guasi-independence. He
is probably right: but the 'blood sacrifice' propitiated the
wrong god. The real and enduring cost to Australia of this
transient state of grace was that it lost its budding sense of
independent identity, and as a result lapsed willingly into a
period of renewed and redoubled subservience to the wishes and
interests of the British Empire; which as ever were considered in
'Empire Central' to be synonymous with and indistinguishable from
those of the "motherland".
The motives of the tenth of the population that did serve
overseas were impossibly mixed, and some might seem improbable
today. Many seemed to think it a great adventure, perhaps a
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welcome opportunity to escape the unremitting hardship of life on
the land, or to escape the stultifying rigidity and boredom of
their 'racially pure' society: "six bob a day tourists", they
called themselves. Regardless of intent, their comparatively
large numbers and their sterling performance (especially as
eulogised by British propaganda eager to emphasise the 'glory*
that went with serving the (British) colours) did bring Australia
a fleeting prominence in the great affairs of the world.
Australian Prime Minister William Morris Hughes could stand on
the same stage, sit at the same table, as the leaders of the
great powers - and make his demands, just as did the others. He
was "speaking for 60,000 dead" - more than the losses of the
United States, and he made sure President Wilson - and Lloyd
George and Clemenceau - knew it. What a price for a few minutes'
limelight!
Astray From its Duty or its Interest
Australia was better prepared for the immediate demands of
the Great War, so far as ensuring its own security interests were
met, than it either had been or would be during its periods of
direct dependence on the not so strong and willing apron-strings
of mother England. Despite the self-imposed blinkers of "race-
patriotism", Australian leaders had "made considerable progress
in defining the issues" central to national security in their
national setting; and they had begun to give practical effect to
their perceptions in the discussion and implementation of nascent
defence and foreign policies. Australian actions at the outset of
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war showed how much had been done towards overcoming the
problem of external security dependency. That was as good as it
got - ever.
The problem was that, apart from dealing with any local
difficulty that could be expected to arise, Australia felt
obliged to join in at the centre as well as on the periphery of
the conflict, by reason of its long-maintained (though
decreasingly necessary) commitment to Imperial solidarity bred by
continued cultural-economic dependency. And much of this was
generated and reinforced by the self-imposed regional
isolationalism that was the logical outcome of the doctrine of
racial purity and 'blood-alliance'. To reap the expected favour
from the chieftains of the Imperial race, it was necessary to
shed blood - as visibly as possible, which meant on the
battlefield of greatest concern to Britain. Cook's emotional
pledge to Asquith did not have to mean sending his 2 0,000 troops
wherever Britain chose - but he had already ceded control over
their deployment, just as earlier he had ceded to the British
Admiralty the automatic right to command of the Australian fleet.
As with the writing of the Constitution, Australia kept
yielding the substance of independence to mitigate unseemly
wrangling which might sully the image of its Imperial benefactor.
In 1901-2, Australia's Prime Minister Andrew Barton, confronted
with Australia's first test of its ability to conduct its affairs
as an independent nation, had run for cover in the Imperial
skirts when confronted with a difficult, but not insuperable,
difference with Japan. Both the Queensland colonial government
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before him, and America's President T.R. Roosevelt, showed it was
possible to reach a satisfactory compromise between Japanese
pride and western bigotry . Roosevelt's naval emissary, Admiral
Sperry, had warned of the unreliability of imagined ties of race
and sentiment, between nations so far removed in geography and
practical interest; and the truth of his words was proven only a
few years later.
When Australia might have needed British help, it was not
available. If it had swallowed Churchill's self-interested,
patently ridiculous assertion (in 1913, still trying to subvert
the agreement reached in 1911) that the safety of Great Britain
was the necessary and sufficient guarantee of the security of
Australia and New Zealand, then Australia would not have had the
Navy for which both countries soon were to "thank God". New
Zealand, Churchill had noted with paternal pride, was doing the
right thing - paying for a battleship to be based in "home"
waters. Australia, he made equally clear, was not 'on the
team'
:
the same naval power of Great Britain in European
waters also protects New Zealand and Australia from any
present danger from Japan.
He was lying - there is no other word for it - and he knew
it. Just as he and the British Admiralty knew it when they
* In fact the Japanese themselves were no less bigoted than the
white racists. They did not demand that all the rest be treated
better, only themselves; and even then "voluntary" quotas and
similar restraints on immigration were quite acceptable. Perhaps
they knew even then that they would one day 'strut their stuff
in a way the west could neither ignore nor deprecate.
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trotted out the same assurances for most of the next thirty
years. When war came in 1914 , Churchill's assurances were proven
as hollow as they were transparent; Admiral Sperry's, as true as
they were well-intentioned. And Australia's eternal threat proved
to be it's only source of practical help. Not content, like
Japan, to tend to its interests while still performing a
beneficial service for the Triple Entente, neither did Australia
seize the opportunity offered by the temporary brotherhood of war
to improve its relations with the only major power of its region.
The apocalyptic vision of submergence under a Yellow Tide obliged
it to believe that the worst of all possible fates was for its
imperial mother to be bested by Imperial Germany. The colonial-
dependent mentality was so well ingrained that many seem to have
assumed that Australia would simply be handed over as part of the
spoils - but why not then declare independence and declare a real
emergency such as both TR and even Woodrow Wilson might see as
reason to make good on TR's pledge of 1914.
THE REASON WHY
Rather than garrison Britain's eastern possessions ( a
respectable task, even compatible with race destiny, which would
have released 20,000 of Britain's white colonial troops), why did
Australia commit its men so far away? Until British diplomatic
bungling and military ineptitude stiffened the spine of a
crumbling Ottoman Empire, even the Suez canal was not under
threat. And it would hardly have mattered had it gone. Australia
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was shipping things out, not getting them in; both Cape routes
remained viable and the Americans had just opened the Panama
Canal. The whole thing was a nonsense. Even then, why send troops
to France? The "glory" of Gallipoli proved that Australian troops
could very well take care of Britain's business in the Middle
East. Why did not the British themselves draw this reasonable
conclusion (which would have economised substantially on the
shipping that their Admiralty's inertia was costing them in the
face of the U-Boats)?
Of course Australia's Imperialist politicians wanted their
men to be seen "shoulder to shoulder" with Britain in the thick
of the Western Front: though they seldom were; mostly they got
sent out in front. And the British could treat their public to
the heart-warming sight of the Dominions rallying to Britain in
her our of need. If Hughes could claim Australians had to die
because Britain's generals were getting her own young men killed
too fast, how much better for Britain to quell complaints about
the toll of unceasing, pointless deaths than by pointing to all
those 'magnificent young men', voluntarily travelling 12,000
miles just to sacrifice themselves on the altar of Imperial
glory?
I think there was, too, a second part to the answer:
Britain could not allow those in the non-white colonies to see
that a European emergency must lead to the withdrawal of British
forces. Australians were substituting for British in France,
because they could not be allowed, except in small numbers within
a still predominantly British garrison, to be seen to be required
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to substitute for them abroad. It would have dented the illusion
of British omnipotence - and it kept Australian attention
fastened, as through a telescope, firmly on Europe and the Middle
East.
It also played up the importance of the "imperial lifeline"
through Suez, even though this was mostly a one way street. How
much these things were calculated upon at the time is hard to
tell, but the conditioned reflexes thus established certainly
became major factors in British manipulation of Australian
governments before, during and after the Second World War.
These manipulations, and Australian responses to them, had
serious effects on the Australian view of its relationship with
the United States, and in the way it was conducted in the same
periods. Since both countries had ended the war on the same side
(in the field, even side by side) things should have gotten off




PARIS TO PEARL HARBOUR: 1918 TO 1941
HAPLESS RESULT OF A "HAPPY ENCOUNTER"
The entry into the Great War of the United States in April
1917 provided the first opportunity for large numbers of
Australians drawn from all areas and walks of life in their
country, to meet an equally large number of Americans of equally
diverse social and regional origins. It should have been a
mutually beneficial experience, but in the long run (and not such
a long run, at that) whatever good came of the informal contact
of groups and individuals, was completely undone by the mutually
reinforcing follies of the two nations' political establishments.
After the war, indifference gave way not to enlightenment, but to
unrelenting friction and even outright hostility. This came about
largely because of unreasoning American hostility to the British
Empire; and Australia's equally unreasoning attachment to it.
Thus the mutual regard and understanding which seemed to flower
on the Champs de Mars were ploughed under on a political
battleground near the Champs Elysees
.
"Honorary Diggers"
When the Americans finally arrived in France, the
Australians could recognise in them a much more closely kindred
spirit. As McLachlan observes, the "happy encounter" with
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Pershing's troops "must have rubbed in the joys of real
independence". 1 It is not hard to imagine Australians, fed up
with the "bloody Poms" welcoming the Americans and their well-
developed disdain for the "Goddamned Limeys"- and envying them
their independence of command and ability to dictate terms to the
other powers in return for their participation. Whereas Australia
was, according to the pro-Imperial 'establishment', simply acting
out of filial obligation; and got treated accordingly.
General Pershing's Army Staff went to France in May 1917,
but Wilson got "only a half a million Americans under arms in
1917" and by the end of the year only 40% of these were in
France, and still under training. Most of these men, and those
that followed, did not see combat until at least the following
March, when they had to be thrown into action to contain and
reverse Ludendorff's last-gasp offensive. Until that emergency
arose, their commander had insisted that they were not
sufficiently trained to enter the field in large numbers; and,
backed by his President, Pershing refused to feed his troops
piecemeal into larger French and British formations. By September
1918, "600,000 American troops launched a decisive campaign that
broke through German lines." 2 Wilson was hailed as the saviour,
and his troops as the heroes of Europe. The Australians hardly
rated a mention - they had launched and sustained the brunt of a
"British" offensive. Australian leaders had had to fight the
1. McLachlan, Waiting for the Revolution . p200.
2.LaFeber, The American Age . p288.
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British tooth and nail to get their lions out of the clutches of
Britain's donkeys, and into an army corps of their own, under
Australian (or acceptable English) generalship. And even with all
the praise they earned, the wider attitude to Australia could be
found buried within the eulogies: "The Digger is the best thing
that Australia has yet produced". 1 Powerful and willing cannon-
fodder for a declining and demanding friend.
Most Diggers apparently came to like the Doughboys (they
were not English, which was a distinct advantage 2 ) . Some went so
far as to call them "honorary Diggers"; a reflection of the fact
that the Americans, like the Australians, seemed an almost
entirely different breed of people from the dogged but uninspired
Tommies (in physigue, generally inferior as well 3 ) , who so
1. Crowley, vol.1, p313
2. Australian historian C.E.W. Bean, who by this time was really
fed up with the Britons, remarked on the "happy encounter" of
Australian with American troops in 1917. On Independence Day,
1918, four companies of American troops were attached to
Australian forces to receive their 'baptism of fire 1 in an
Australian attack. See: McLachlan, pp200-l, and p355(n).
3. Undoubtedly as a result mainly of abysmal living conditions
and poor diet. See Correlli Barnett, The Audit of War (London:
MacMillan, 1986) , Chapter Ten, "The Legacy of the Industrial
Revolution". Drawing on official reports from as early as 1844,
he draws an appalling picture of the miserable, degrading living
conditions of much of the British urban working class. "Even by
the late 1930s . . . the bulk of the industrial population were
still living in the same grim 'camps' first run up to house their
great-grandparents." Standards of sanitation and hygiene were
mediaeval. Infant mortality in the industrial cities was twice to
three times that of Holland; Glasgow's rate was higher than
Tokyo's. Malnutrition and plain bad diet was also a clear
problem: a survey in 1926-9 showed that children of the
"industrial classes" at age 17 were nearly four inches shorter
than "professional's" children. In 1883 the difference had been
nearly six inches. It is no wonder the British got so passionate
about "redistribution of wealth", or least of practical benefits
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willingly 'knuckled under' to an officer caste which was
regarded, with few notable exceptions, as providing the sort of
leadership that would be followed only by the idly curious or the
suicidal 1 . Many felt, like one Australian officer:
We are the stronger race with the stronger morale at
present, and some day [the British] will have to treat




But if any special regard was developed for the place the
American soldiers came from, and any widespread feeling that "it
would be better in all future dealings to be", like the
Americans, "independent of these British people", both sentiments
soon were submerged in the post-war torrent of Imperial quasi-
nationalism promoted by the political right and the mostly
conservative press.
. . .Continued. .
.
supposedly derived from being the world's greatest Empire. Its
sun had never even risen in much of industrial Britain.
1. Though Pershing and his officers, with some very notable
exceptions, were nothing to crow about. British General Sir Ivor
Maxse (one of the few who could justly be called first-rate) , was
appalled by the Americans' dreadful state of training and by the
ineptitude of their officers; most brigadiers were "Impossible.
Too old." And below them: "The officers with few exceptions knew
nothing and would learn nothing." But he admired the rankers,
who "were 'keen and brave' and their custom of ignoring their own
officers and seeking practical advice from Australian
veterans ... was tacitly approved." American staff planning,
medical and logistical support were almost non-existent; there
were even accounts of U.S. troops literally starving to death.
See: Denis Winter, Haiq's Command . London: Penguin, 1991, pp216-
221.
2. McLachlan, p201. The comment culled from Bean's Official
History . No further detail given.
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Mistaken Identity: Australia at War's End
Far from encouraging a more assertive sense of national
identity and interest the war left Australians more confused than
ever on both counts. Hughes, not content with having both split
his party and exacerbated the divisions of religion and
goccupation in Australian society (and the regional divisions as
well) , continued to undermine Australian identity in his attempt
to justify what he had done. While Hughes remained in London,
continuing his strident toadying to Imperial interests, his
deputy in Australia told the people that they had offered their
"unfaltering loyalty to [Britain's King] and to all that he
stands for." 1 It was of course acceptable to have some pride in
being an Australian, but the people should be proud
especially, to be Britishers; proud of our blood and
race and of our partnership in the Empire whose
existence means so much to our safety and welfare [no
memory there of 1914!], an Empire where justice rules
and charity prevails, and the weaker peoples are not
subjugated . . .
.
2
No memory of Australian history, either; though Mr W.A.
Watt, native-born Australian (one of the very few in Welshman
Hughes' government), probably could have recited backwards the
names and reigns of the Kings and Queens of England.
As the living began to return from France and Palestine,
bearing with them the aura of the ANZAC legend and the glamorous
1. Crowley, vol.1, p310.
2. Ibid.
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•myth of the Digger', it was held close to treason to suggest -
at least, out loud - that "our grand army of the dead" had, but
for a few score in 1914, gone to its glory for no satisfactory
reason.
*
"Sympathy for the Favorite Nation"
In London, William Morris Hughes and his racial brother2
David Lloyd George were meeting with dignitaries from the other
Dominions and India, setting out the Imperial position for the
Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Complaining bitterly that
Australia , despite its great contribution to the Empire, had not
been consulted over the terms of the Armistice, Hughes and the
other premiers of the White Empire united to successfully demand
a place for each at the Peace Conference, where decisions would
be taken that would bear directly upon their individual nations'
vital interest. Nonetheless, they had also agreed, in the glow of
an unprecedented level of wartime cooperation (achieved only very
late in the war, after prolonged complaint) as an "Imperial
Commonwealth", to have Britain represent them all at the
1. 'Treachery to the fallen' was the sort of jingo terminology
pushed by the Returned Soldiers and Sailors Imperial League of
Australia (RSSILA) , which was put together in 1916 with the
avowed aim of securing adequate post-service benefits for
Australians returned frc active service abroad. But it was
captured from the start by Imperial jingos, and lobbied
ceaselessly on behalf of conscription. Its postwar activities in
some states had more in common with those of Germany ' s Freikorps
than with soldiers of "the first truly democratic army". In
Queensland the RSSILA threatened to take matters into its own
hands if the State government did not overcome its "lack of
courage" and actively suppress the 'Bolsheviks'. See: Bolshevism
in Brisbane . Crowley, vol.1, pp319-21.
2. Even, ethnic brother. They both were Welsh.
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Armistice negotiations. They also, it appears, were close to
unanimous in their poor opinion of both President Woodrow Wilson
and most if not all of his 14 points. They would give Wilson his
League of Nations, if it would keep him (and a goodly part of
their own electorates) happy; and do their best to throw out or
emasculate anything else which might clash with their pursuit of
self-interest. This pretty well took care of Wilson's hastily
conceived and ill-defined agenda for world peace on American
terms. 1
In September of 1919, Billy Hughes came home claiming
triumphantly that thanks to his efforts "Australia is safe". He
had secured the mandate for exclusive Australian administration
of German New Guinea, even though "President Wilson's fourteen
points forbade it"; and - "the greatest thing" - had saved the
White Australia Policy in the face of not only Wilson but of a
"world assemblage ... from all the corners of the earth." Thanks
to these great achievements, Australians could sleep secure in
the knowledge that they would remain "more British than the
1. The "blueprint" for the Fourteen Points Address to Congress,
given on 8 January 1918, was put together in four frantic weeks
by a small team known as The Inquiry, and headed by columnist
Walter Lippmann. They produced eight of the "points' for Wilson;
he added the other six himself. These (the first five and the
fourteenth) "dealt with general principles" and were the ones
that "captured the [American] public's enthusiasm. But the
territorial provisions in the other eight points were the crucial
ones to the warring governments." Colonel House, Wilson's "human
intercessor", on arrival in Paris on 25 October 1918 decided he
could "dally no longer over this Armistice". He summoned Lippmann
and told him "You helped write these points. Now you must give me
a precise definition of each one ... by tomorrow at ten o'clock."
It is no wonder they lacked something in precision and
practicability. See: Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the
American Century . New York: Little-Brown, 1980, ppl27-53.
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people of Great Britain". Australians, now the sole guardians of
British racial purity, it seems, could now "achieve our great
destiny, which is to hold this vast continent in trust for those
of our race who come after us" 1 . Sixty thousand Australians had
died to provide a south sea bolthole for those genetically-pure
Britons seeking a new locus for civilisation. The new Imperial
transmigration scheme was already underway - and relations with
the United States and Japan damaged beyond any necessity; with
the latter, probably beyond repair.
The Empire Strikes Back - Hughes and Wilson at Versailles
"The man is surely the guintessence of a prig" said Sir
George Trevelyan2 of Wilson in 1917. William Morris Hughes
cheerfully would have seconded that remark. He was clearly
unimpressed with Woodrow Wilson, thinking him something of a
political babe in the woods, it appears. In his memoirs, Hughes
damned Wilson with faint praise: "[Wilson] had brilliant
intellectual gifts ... he was inspired by lofty ideals... but he
lacked those gualities which go to make a great leader of men." 3
He portrayed Wilson as a stubbornly opinionated dreamer and a
glory-hunter to boot, in words that fairly crackle with a kind of
1. Australia is Safe . Crowley, vol.1, pp323-5. Quotes Hughes'
address to the House of Representatives on 10 September, 1919.
2. Quoted in Walter LaFeber, The American Age . pp277-8. This
after Wilson's appearance on Capitol Hill on 22 January 1917,
when he laid out his principles for an "organised common peace"
to serve the interests of "every enlightened community."
3. W.M. Hughes, Politics and Potentates . Sydney, Angus &
Robertson, 1950. In Harper, Australia and the United
States . pp62-6.
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mildly contemptuous pity. He described with relish his
confrontation with Wilson over the New Guinea Mandate; which
Hughes won. Wilson undoubtedly regretted his departure from the
usual American position on the ambiguous status of the Imperial
Dominions
,
+ and found the rumbustious Hughes just plain offensive
to a person of refined sensibilities such as himself.*
Australia's clear identification with colonialism, its
egually clear rejection of both the 'open door' and the principle
of self-determination, and thus its unwavering support of the
interests of the perfidious, decadent European powers, all
painted it as merely a lackey of Great Britain. And not at all a
country "one in freedom" with the United States.
Worse than that, Hughes caustically eloquent advocacy of
(his version of) his demi-nation's interests had held Wilson up
for public ridicule before the "four corners of the earth", and
contributed to the systematic subversion of the fourteen points
which Wilson and his supporters were likely neither to forgive
nor forget. Americans on both sides of politics also were
determined to break the British Empire, and here was Hughes
seeking strenuously to defend both the empire and all it stood
for. Wilson, who had put nearly 5 million Americans into uniform
to make the "world safe for democracy", was told his effort
+Which was that, since they professed allegiance to a common
crown, they were to be spoken for by one voice: that of London.
* And he was not alone in that. Hughes' parliamentary colleagues
found him hard to take.
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counted little, by the Premier of a country whose entire
population came to about the same number. "I'm speaking for
60,000 dead", snarled Hughes at the new pretender to world
leadership; clearly implying that America's mere 53,000 was an
insufficient sacrifice, that it was opportunistically trying to
steal from others the fruits of the victory that they - not the
rapacious, late arriving, over-moralising, United States - had
won.
"Our little man" obviously enjoyed himself kicking Wilson's
shins, but forgot that he was kicking the office of President as
well as the man. Wilson might well be getting undercut at home by
a hostile congress and growing disgust at both "Lloyd George's
lack of scruple and Wilson's lack of skill" 1 (and a feeling that
the "British had cynically betrayed the ideals for which the .
.
war had ... been fought" 2 ), but he was still the incumbent of an
office revered by Americans perhaps more than "we British"
revered the Monarchy. Hughes had lashed himself to the mast of
Empire and Australia would have to bear with it the fury of the
storm brewing in Washington. In 1917 Wilson had told eminence
grise Colonel House that American financial leverage, provided by
a growing trade surplus and spiraling war loans, would allow
America to dictate terms to Britain and France: "they will be
financially in our hands" 3 . Tied to London and Sterling, so was





Australia. Americans would not support Wilson's world peace; but
they were more than ready and able to conduct world economic
warfare.
Hughes, a consummate political street-fighter (and himself
not averse to a spotlight or two) who believed thoroughly in the
•art of the possible', forgot there were plenty more like him in
Washington, with lots more international clout. And he did not do
so well for Australia in Paris as he obviously believed. In his
own admiration for his performance on the international stage,
Hughes seems to have fallen into a prepared trap on the matter of
the infamous 'racial equality' clause which Japan wanted written
into the Covenant of the League of Nations. Hughes' strident
defence of Australia's right to control immigration (and thus
exclude anyone it didn't want to 'taint' its precious blood), was
certainly offensive to Asian sensibilities and upsetting for
white 'liberal' opinion; but he was in effect only saying what
all the white nations thought. Aside from the 'White Empire',
they just did not want to admit it. Even so, Hughes still failed
to gain majority support for his stand, which ought to have
failed and thereby forced upon Australia a less visceral approach
to race and immigration.
His bacon was saved, in peculiar circumstances, by (of all
people!) Wilson 1
, who still did not rise in Hughes' estimate; the
1. Wilson was chairman of the drafting committee for the Covenant
of the League of Nations, to which Japanese Baron Makino had
proposed the insertion of a clause guaranteeing equal rights to
all men regardless of race. This would demolish, according to
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sceptical little Welshman probably thought it just confirmed
Wilson's pusillanimous hypocrisy. In his battles with Wilson for
Australian control of the former German New Guinea, Hughes again
found himself acting as the stalking horse for other ambitious
Dominions and of course for the interests of Europe's two sagging
Empires, whose own claims were by no means modest nor
altruistically motivated. Later contacts with the US, even though
not involving the two antagonists of Paris, went little better.
Some Unfortunate Precedents
Australia's Prime Minister had also inaugurated two
unfortunate trends that would further plague Australian social-
political development, and the Australian international image,
for decades afterwards. The first was that of sending Prime
Ministers abroad to represent the nation, which tended to seduce
them away from the more mundane business of daily life in
Australia to the superficial glamour of sitting at a table with
(but largely disregarded by) the major powers. They consistently
would overestimate their nation's importance, and underestimate
. . .Continued. .
.
Hughes, Australia's control over immigration (which he also
wished extended to New Guinea). As in 1901-2, Makino was willing
to compromise - he "sought no more than a technical right of free
entrance"; that is recognition of equal status as human beings.
Had Hughes had the slightest knowledge of Japan (such as its own
deep feeling and practice of racial exclusivity) he might have
compromised. But true to form, the abrasive little man would not
give way. Wilson threw out the 11-6 vote on the ground that it
was not unanimous: democracy in action! This, mainly because his
own western states were as racist as Australia. See: T.B. Millar,
Australia in Peace and War
. pl21; for an account of the goings on
at Versailles; and Earl Pomeroy, The Pacific Slope . pp269-77, for
an account of the western states' attitudes to the Japanese in
particular.
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its weakness and incapacity to genuinely influence events in the
world. They would never see the need (the absolute necessity) to
just hold back and consolidate their own nation's position -
economically, socially, militarily, diplomatically. It was always
another Charge of the Light Brigade: superficially glorious, but
ultimately inconsequential - at awful cost. "Not though the
[public] knew
,
someone had blundered" - yet again, as usual, in
support of their own self-image.
With few exceptions, what Australia needed was a well-
supported and well-briefed Foreign Minister, and a network of
professionally staffed Embassies and consulates. This did not
seem to play well with political leaders who felt their very
position granted them gifts of omniscience beyond the reach of
mere men. It is my view that Australian Prime Ministers so
enjoyed the (cunningly orchestrated) flattery and outwardly
deferential treatment they received in London and other capitals,
that they were willing to subvert the national interest in order
to secure for themselves that standard of reverence which they
had never received ( nor earned, it might be said) in their own
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country. It is a maxim amongst sailors that things never look so
well as in a foreign port - it seems to apply no less amongst
politicians.
The second adverse trend was to allow Australia to be pushed
out front as a stalking horse for measures the major powers, for
their own good reasons, did not want to be the first to propose.
Australia and other minor members of "the club" could be sent out
like forward scouts, to draw fire and reveal the position of the
adversary. Casualties could be heavy in that role: Australia took
them.
The 1921 Imperial Conference:
"Illusion of a Common Interest"
So convinced was Hughes of the value to Australia of a
military-economic alliance with Britain that he was willing to
concede to Britain the ultimate direction of Australia's foreign
relations, in the interest of having a say (so he thought) in the
direction of all Imperial policy. British Prime Minister David
Lloyd-George put Britain's view plainly: the Dominions may have
"been given egual rights in the control of the foreign policy of
the Empire [in recognition of] the aid they gave us during the
* I have observed at first hand the deferential treatment
accorded "Very Important Persons" in countries outside Australia,
and I am assured by people in the appropriate departments at home
that the same is given there. But there is nonetheless a
difference. Australians still tend to equate service with
servility, and 'kick-up' at the slightest provocation
(opportunity?) . An Australian visiting Europe, especially, but
also the United States, in an official capacity at high level, is
treated (literally) with deference and his whims accommodated in
a manner which he never before has known - but to which he, like
any other mortal, would gladly become accustomed.
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Great War" but even so, that right could only be exercised 'up to
a point'. It was all very well allowing the "white Empire" to
talk about Imperial foreign and defence policy, but "The
machinery must remain [in London] ... you must act through one
instrument [which had to be] the British Foreign Office." 1
Despite the practical difficulties of maintaining effective
continuous consultation to provide the desired inputs into
British policy "machinery" (and which Hughes himself clearly
identified) , Hughes still was more than willing that Australia
should yield (or at least, not claim) a greater degree of
autonomy in all aspects of its external relations in order to
further the best interests of the Empire. He had grown accustomed
to painting on a larger canvas and with a bolder palette than was
available at home, and in his eagerness to be an imperial
statesman he seems to have been quite willing to sacrifice a
large measure of real sovereignty of action. By no means was he
the last Australian politician to labour under this delusion, for
which as always the nation paid the price.
Hughes actively resisted attempts by Canada and South Africa
to secure "a formal constitutional statement of the dominions'
existence as completely sovereign states, legally free to stay
neutral in a British war, or to secede from the Commonwealth". 2
He was in fact seeking to formalise what he viewed already as an
1. Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power . Atlantic
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1986, ppl74-5.




informal alliance between Britain and Australia. Like the British
themselves, he did not see beneath the facade of victory to the
deep and debilitating weakness at the heart of the Imperial
structure: the chronic backwardness of British education and
industry, and the equally chronic absence of will to either
recognise or tackle these problems in any major degree. 1
He failed to see the truth in his own admonition of support for
finding a way to reconcile the (irreconcilable) dictates of
geography with the ideal of unified Imperial policy: the 1921
Imperial Conference was indeed "the last magnificent flare of a
dying illumination." Hughes and his successors hitched
Australia's fortunes to a falling star. Seventy years later, they
were still doing the same thing.
The military security issue most vital to Australia was the
future of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. Britain wanted to renew it,
and Hughes quite rightly observed that Australia's security
interests would be best served if this were done. The USA did not
1. Correlli Barnett's The Audit of War offers a damning
indictment of the whole British system from the mid-nineteenth
century until 1945. There were plenty who saw the problem - and
very few prepared to remedy it, except through social welfare
measures which the country could not pay for. When I first read
this book it made my flesh crawl: over the same period, and after
1945 thanks to assisted immigration and continuing British
preference, Australia had imported just about the whole mess,
lock, stock and barrel. It was like a child born with a
congenital defect.
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want the Treaty renewed, even in modified form. 1 Hughes thought
it an impossible position - American intransigence on the matter
would oblige Britain to give grave offence to a "proud and
sensitive people" (who nonetheless were expected to remain calm
and well-disposed in the face of Australia's insulting
immigration policy) who had been faithful allies. The treaty had
furthermore "helped to avoid competition in naval armaments in
the Pacific and Far East".
The Netherlands and France, whose possessions in the Far
East were "almost wholly defenceless", wanted the treaty renewed
- and so did Japan. Hughes was angered that:
America would neither work with us nor allow us to
work without her . . . [but had offered no worthwhile
substitute arrangement]. To rebuff a faithful ally
without cause was to invite trouble [and]... would
reasonably be interpreted by Japan as evidence of our
intention to reverse our policy.
Britain's ambassador in Tokyo echoed this warning. Britain
was being made to choose between Tokyo and Washington - but
Washington was offering nothing to offset the inevitable
hostility that would be roused in Japan. And wishful thinkers in
Britain, like Winston Spencer Churchill, had in their anxiety to
1. See: Barnett, The Collapse of British Power , pp251-4.
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes "bluntly informed the
British Ambassador in Washington that 'he viewed the renewal of
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in any form with disquietude' and
made the ambassador's flesh creep with references [to the
consequences]"; which presumably were all financial. The British
economy was in tatters; the 'Geddes Axe', about to swing.
2. W.M. Hughes, The Splendid Adventure (London: Ernest Benn,
1929) . In Harper, Australia and the United States . pp67-71.
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avoid facing the reality of Britain's decline, succumbed to that
same hopeful hogwash of brotherhood of the "English Speaking
Peoples" that already had so fatally attracted Australia.
Churchill's views were shared by one Arthur Balfour 1 - who would
head the Empire delegation to the Washington Naval Conference.
Churchill thought it would be 'fatal' to combine with Japan
against America. That not only mis-represented the situation, in
actuality (the object was, as both Hughes and Lloyd-George
appreciated, to be able "to exercise greater power over the
Eastern policy [of Japan] as an ally") but misread both the
balance of power in the world and American attitudes. Lloyd
George thought it would be wrong to "give up Japan". From the
point of view of British Imperial interest, the old cynic was
right. 2
However, Britain had no answer to the now overwhelming
economic pressure that America could bring to bear 3 , and Lloyd-
1. Barnett, p263. Balfour in 1917 waxed lyrical about "the two
great branches of the English-speaking race", that had sprung
"from the same root" and now were to be united in perpetuity "for
one common purpose in one common understanding." In Churchill's
view the purpose was to keep the Anglo-Saxons on top, and the
understanding was that Britain would provide directions, and
America, the money and (when needed) the muscle.
2. Ibid, pp262-3.
3. Interestingly, America's major bankers did not support the
hard line taken by the politicians regarding payment of war
debts; just as they had also argued against imposing punitive
reparations on Germany. J. P. Morgan's Tom Lamont had worked hard
at Versailles to avoid an excessive burden being placed upon
Germany (he agreed with his bank's analysis that it could lead
only to depreciation of the mark, and subseguent inflation)
.
Lamont also thought the Harding-Coolidge 'philosophy' ("they
hired the money didn't they?") on war debt as a political-
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George's resolve was further weakened by his wish to placate
America to secure his rather confused territorial ambitions in
the Middle East (and his unconfused objective to hold sway over
the bulk of the known oil resources of the region) , and by the
pro-American arguments advanced by Canadian Prime Minister
Meighen. Hughes argued strongest against Meighen ("the Voice of
America") , but did not prevail in his wish for the Anglo-Japanese
Treaty to be renewed before matters came to a head later in 1921
at the Washington Conference.
"Cases Where no Real Common Interest Exists":
The Washington Naval Conference
The Washington naval conference nailed shut the coffin of
British naval supremacy. Churchill thought it wonderful - it
would save money. And he gathered unto himself an increasing raft
of delusions to support his belief; these came back to haunt
Australia, though the 'last Lion' would be unrepentant. He was




economic lever was potentially disastrous: "[Harding is] the last
man in the world to lead 120 million people [in the U.S.] from
the darkness and confusion of [the Great War] out into the
light." And he felt the same way about American 'leadership' for
the rest of the (trans-Atlantic) world. Jack Morgan argued that
the debt should be cancelled: "the Allies had sent soldiers
against Germany while America was still sending only dollars;
decency demanded that the war debt be regarded as a subsidy and
not as a loan." See: Ron Chernow, The House of Morgan . ppl99-218.
Bush should be very grateful that apparently no-one in Germany or
Japan had read this book by late 1990.
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Pussycat' 1 . The broad technical results of the conference are
well enough known; Charles Evans Hughes ambushed the delegates on
the first day of the conference with sweeping proposals for
scrapping of existing tonnage of major warships, construction
limits and agreed ratios of tonnage between the major naval
powers2 . The two major side effects for Australia are perhaps
less widely recognised.
Firstly, the United States reverted to its policy of having
Britain speak as the sole voice for the Empire; the Dominions
were not to be separately represented, though they might be
permitted some slots in the British delegation. Curzon, the
British Foreign Minister, was quite happy with this arrangement,
and in fact would have been more than willing to dispense with
the troublesome colonials altogether, though his Prime Minister
was not willing to go that far. But the upshot was the same - the
Dominions were put back into short pants, and Australia and New
Zealand especially had aided and abetted the process by their
willingness to forego independent diplomatic representation
1. As David Irving notes, Churchill "remained unerringly
convinced that he was protecting his country and its empire from
its greatest enemy. Yet in reality he had allied himself with the
Empire's profoundest enemies ..."; East Coast anglophiles
notwithstanding, I think this judgment is correct in the broad
sense. Americans may have had some sympathy for Britain's
predicament, but there was little empathy. There may be more now,
with America itself in decline and a goodly portion of the world
gloating over the fact.
2.LaFeber, pp3 21-3.
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abroad. The eloquent and persuasive Hughes was the chief
culprit, having exhorted the Dominion Prime Ministers (and in
effect his own public) in 1921:
"What new right, what extension of power can [fully
autonomous policy-making and individual diplomatic
representation] give us? . . . What could the Dominions
do as independent nations that they cannot do now? . .
.
What can they not do, even to encompass their own
destruction by sundering the bonds that bind them to
the Empire?" 1
By this very endorsement of the virtues of Imperial
bondage, Hughes was helping to condemn Australia to a retreat to
the Colonial status that its pre-war politicians had shown some
promise of growing out of. This had serious effects for
Australia's later attempts to win US support in the Pacific as
the threat of war with Japan loomed ever larger less than two
decades later: in Washington as well as in London, "Australia was
treated like a colony because it acted like one." 2
The second, more visible effect of this development was
that Australian major warship tonnage was included in the British
quota; and Australia got part of the British scrapping quota, too
- in the shape of the Flagship, the Battle-cruiser HMAS
Australia. In April 1924 she was scuttled off Sydney Heads,
1. Barnett, The Collapse of British Power , pp262-3.
2. David Day, the Great Betrayal: Britain. Australia and the
Onset of the Pacific War. 1939-42 . New York: Norton, 1989, p31.
Day's book makes it abundantly clear that the 'betrayal' of
Australia's security interests was brought about as much by its
own politicians' ineptitude and eagerness to fall in with British
desires, as much as by dissimulation and outright duplicity on
Britain's part.
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through which she and the rest of the infant RAN had steamed so
proudly less than 11 years before. This generated a good deal of
resentment against both London and Washington. "Strong men were
wet eyed: many cursed. It was a tragic blunder." 1 But such
sentiment was short-lived among the general public. Strangely
enough, Australia's political leaders seemed to draw little if
any of the opprobrium due to them for having allowed such grave
insults to Australia's purported sovereign identity to be
inflicted by their 'brethren' situated so many thousands of miles
away; apathy was setting in again.
Another unfortunate effect, less visible, was that, so far
as the Australian Delegate to the conference, Senator George
Pearce, was concerned, his travel to America had served more to
confirm old prejudice than to broaden his outlook on relations
with the new giant. Pearce was unimpressed with both President
Harding and his understudy (and eventual successor) Calvin
Coolidge - but so were many Americans, which he seems to have
overlooked 2 . No-one demurred against Pearce 's judgment, even
1. Odgers, R.A.N. - An Illustrated History . p72. Citing the
comment of RADM H.J.Feakes, Commanding the Australian Squadron.
Ironically, Australia went to her premature grave to the
accompaniment of a 21-gun salute, fired by a visiting squadron of
the Royal Navy.
2. See: LaFeber, pp316-7 and pp324-5. LaFeber notes that Coolidge
"liked to sleep eleven hours a day". He quotes the memorable one-
liner of "writer Dorothy Parker [who] was told in 1933 that
Coolidge had died". Her reply: "How can they tell?"
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though he had proven himself an "intellectual Bourbon" 1 after a
pre-war visit to Japan. 2 It has been stated that
this led Pearce to resist greater Australian intimacy
with the United States, and to the deferral of the
establishment of formal diplomatic relations. 3
Another "tragic blunder"; though no-one wept. Pearce,
already a senior politician, held ministerial portfolios before
and during the Great War, and for most of the inter-war period;
his views would have carried great weight, and he was a key
figure during the trade wars of the 1930s. The outlook was not
promising. But in 1922, Pearce could tell the Parliament that it
was, and get away with it. The same man who in 1911 had (guite
sensibly) told his colleagues that he had once thought Australia
an "appanage of England [but] now saw that Australia's future
would be more largely affected by the nations to the north than
by any group of European powers" 4
,
now proclaimed a triumph of
fatuous altruism over arduous realism:
1. "Remembered everything, learned nothing". I first heard this
term used by former Treasurer Paul Keating; like many of his
venomous turns of phrase it is memorable, if ultimately
unilluminating to those not "in the know". He should do something
about that.
2. Pearce, as Minister for Defence, visited Japan in 1911. He
apparently came back full of fear - but without the slightest
notion why, apart from the fact that they were different, and had
a lot of industry that could be put to warlike use. See: Meaney,
p225.
3. Millar, pllO.
4. Ibid. Neither Pearce nor his colleagues seemed to find it at
all incongruous that he had just come back from representing his
country as an 'appanage' to the British delegation.
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"Japan [has] realised that the fate of ...moral
isolation from the rest of the world [must be
avoided] ... at all costs ... I believe that Japan is
peaceful"
.
Whether or not it would remain so was in any case beside
the point. Tranquility in the Pacific was assured by the
compromise of British naval power to accommodate American envy
and commercial ambition : "what better guarantee can there be
for the peace of the world, than a friendlyf!] understanding,
full and complete, between the two great English-speaking Empires
of the world?" Pearce was referring to two mortal commercial
enemies, and to a third great power (Japan) that already
considered itself morally isolated thanks in no small part to the
misguided efforts at Versailles of his own Prime Minister.
The rapid succession of postwar conferences between 1919
and 1922 should have improved Trans-Pacific relations by
facilitating regular high-level contact between Australia and
America. But it seems that the more they saw of each other, the
lower became their mutual regard. Encounters between Australia's
and America's senior politicians and the impressions carried away
from them were, by and large, less than cordial.
SHARING THE BURDEN OF EMPIRE
Trade: A Losing Battle With America
After the divisions caused by the war and the Red Scare of
1919, Australia settled down and in fairly optimistic mien began
to tackle the task of national development. "Men, Money and
Markets" had to be acquired to develop Australia's "vast
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potentialities". Although the lack of confidence in external
relations seems to have been almost total, there was also,
according most Australian chroniclers of the 1920s, a general
mood of optimism in the nation's ability to develop rapidly as an
economic power with a living standard that was still amongst the
highest in the world. The American example of the nineteenth
century was cited as the main reason for development of protected
industries intended mainly to serve the domestic market - the
economic illogic of this (the market still little more than 5
million souls; about 4% of the U.S. population) was not apparent
to most. The bulk of the protected industries were either local
offshoots of British firms, or local monopolies such as BHP
(steel and mining) and CSR (sugar refining)
.
Australia still was riding mainly on the sheep's back, and
on the production of wheat and unprocessed minerals, even as it
does today. The same troubles arose, too. In 1922 the Fordney-
McCumber Act became the first in a series of hostile tariff and
other trade barriers introduced in the United States to protect
uncompetitive domestic industries, including mining and
agriculture where Australia already was producing more
efficiently despite its high-wage, high-cost economy. European
and Japanese manufacturers also suffered, which meant Australia
suffered twice. Britain was in a severe industrial slump, and
lacked dollars and gold to pay its war debts. Australia, tied
into the sterling bloc, also lacked dollars it needed to pay for
a rising tide of American imports. Large loans were raised in
London to help fund mainly state-sponsored national development
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schemes, and to fund the assisted passage and placement on the
land of British migrants to Australia. Australia also followed
England back onto the gold standard in 1925.
Australia's mountain of public and private debt began to
grow, but still could be serviced by rising volumes of exports,
although uncompetetive secondary industries were already failing
or suffering temporary closures for lack of demand. Increased
tariffs on foreign goods did not appreciably help, and the impact
of first the 1929 Wall Street crash and then the 1930 Smoot-
Hawley tariff was devastating. Britain's greatest concern for
Australia's plight was that it's heavily borrowed state
governments should not stop servicing their English debt. The
Bank of England sent out Sir Otto Niemeyer to tell the federal
government to tell the states to stop all borrowing and adjust
their budgets to ensure England got its money. The ire of the
burgeoning army of unemployed was directed at "England's money
lords", but the government was easily persuaded that it was all




Australian-American relations during the inter-war years
were just let drift. Australians certainly got to see a lot of
American films and read a good deal of the now-prodigious
outpourings of American authors. Little such traffic went the
other way, and the same was true with merchandise trade -
Australia took 24% of its imports from the US by 1928-9, and sent
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only 6% of its exports to the US market. This imbalance persisted
throughout the prewar period, and despite the aggravation caused
by foolish practices on both sides, the root cause was that
Australia needed US manufactures far more than the US needed
Australian raw materials and primary products; the two were, then
as now, international competitors for primary exports.
Improvements in the position, even had the US reduced its tariffs
and quotas on competitive Australian products such as wool, would
most likely have been only at the margins. Australia had added to
its problems by subscribing , again seemingly out of ill-
conceived loyalty to mother, to an informal system of reciprocal
trade preferences with Britain, in which Australia gained little
and lost much. The same was true of the Imperial transmigration
scheme: it cost between 1,000 and 2,000 Pounds to settle just one
immigrant, at a time when commodity prices were already falling.
But in 1925, the Prime Minister (Stanley Melbourne Bruce) "said
that the position not only of Australia but of the whole Empire
depended upon a redistribution of its white population." 1 Apart
from the sheer expense of getting immigrants in this way, the
states bore an enormous burden of expenditure for public works,
railways and other infrastructure.
The Great Depression made things very much worse,
especially through the formalisation at Ottawa in 1932 of the
Imperial Preference system. Despite the Prime Minister's claim
that "Britain is helping us", little discernible benefit accrued
1. Crowley, vol.1, p400.
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to Australia. The agreement could be seen more as 'revenge' for
America's adversarial trade protection measures (such as the 1930
Smoot-Hawley tariff) and a variety of dog-in-the manger
administrative restrictions that caused Australia considerable
inconvenience - which no doubt was the intent. 1 Mounting
aggravation and unceasing British lobbying led to the ill-fated
Trade Diversion policy of 193 6. It was an unmitigated calamity,
diplomatically and economically, - all the more so for being
bluntly announced and crassly implemented. It harmed Australia's
profitable trade with Japan and gained it little or nothing in
concessions from its maternal "ally" - despite the intent of
holding open the Australian market to British goods 2 , which
largely involved denying it as much as possible to those of
higher quality and which were available (much more readily) from
1. The irritants included restrictions on entry to America of
Australian businessmen, though no reciprocal restrictions were in
force in Australia. A good summary of the trade question, as
affecting Australia, Britain and the United States is given in
T.B.Millar, Australia in Peace and War . ppllO-15. While Australia
took a thrashing in the U.S., the Americans gradually were able
to largely circumvent Australia's restrictions by increasing
sales via Canada.
2. Announcing the policy on 26 May, 1936, Sir Henry Gullett said
in Parliament: "there is room for a substantial increase of
Australian [primary] exports ... to Britain provided we are able
to give to Britain an increased share of the Australian market."
All 'Empire' goods would be admitted free of licensing (quota)
restrictions, except for vehicle chassis; this privilege went
only to Britain. Further, "owing to the extraordinary growth of
[textile] imports from foreign sources [Japan] at prices which
defy all competition" some action had to be taken "to preserve a
reasonable proportion of the trade for the United Kingdom" . The
proposed solution was to impose a mutually agreed quota on
Japanese textile products. But Japan would not agree, and so a
tariff wall was put up instead. At this time Australia was
enjoying a two-to-one advantage in its trade with Japan. See:
Crowley, vol.1, p561.
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the US. And of course it caused needless aggravation with the
United States at time when war was once again looming dark on the
horizon.
By 1935 many influential Australians, including members of
all political parties and many of the government's military
advisers, were openly sceptical of both the commitment and the
capability of Great Britain to provide in timely fashion the
"main fleet to Singapore" and thus fulfill the reassurance it
routinely had given Australian governments over the inter-war
period of Imperial assistance to deflect a Japanese southward
thrust, should the need arise. Yet even as the Lyons government
grew increasingly guerulous - and even started spending some
money of its own to remedy the abysmal state of Australia's
defences - Sir George Pearce , now the Minister for External
Affairs, would complain to the US Consul-General in Sydney that
"in matters of politics there was a feeling that America was
indifferent to Australia's welfare and could not be counted upon
to come to her aid in case of need" and also that "in matters of
trade there was a real hostility [in Australia] to the United
States.
"
Fortunately, the Consul-General possessed a sufficiently
generous spirit to credit Pearce with "the gift of saying some
pretty bitter things without giving offence"! Pearce recited a
list of grievances that clearly had been allowed to ferment for
* He of the Washington Conference; not the most felicitous
choice for the portfolio.
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some time, without any noticeable improvement to the quality of
the draught he administered: the US had delayed entry into the
Great War; it had not joined the League of Nations; it had forced
upon Britain a reduction in naval strength [specifically, in
cruisers] to parity with the US, although the responsibilities of
the two nations were in no way comparable. America was
indifferent to "her Pacific obligations, as evidenced by her
withdrawal from the Philippines"; Australia could not count on
American help in the event of a Japanese attack. Then Pearce
turned to trade, citing American tariffs imposed on Australian
primary products for which there was no domestic American
competition. This could not be "forgotten or forgiven".
The Consul General (Jay Pierrepont Moffat) 1 protested,
citing an adverse climate of public opinion in America, but
neither Pearce nor his colleagues were very much interested in
the niceties of American domestic politics when it came down to
hard cash and the plight of the politically powerful rural lobby;
nor the plight of the equally powerful buy-British lobby, which
infested every corner of the business and political
establishments. Subsequent discussions went no better; the
Australian side even saw little merit in Moffat's eminently
sensible suggestion that Australia should have its own
1. Sizeable extracts from Moffat's diaries, which record his
meetings with Pearce and other Ministers and officials, and his
"haul-down report" on Australia and its people, are found in
Harper, Australia and the United States , pp95-118. See also in
Harper, ppll8-29, retrospective analyses of the Trade Diversion
Policy.
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representative Commissioner in Washington - an extraordinary
attitude, but one which seems to reflect the extraordinary
staleness of thought in Australia at the time. Much complaint,
little self help, and virtually looking for an excuse to start a
fight with the Americans to curry favour and a few table scraps
from Britain. The Empire was moribund, but these men just would
not believe it; even though they were prepared to berate the US
for not being prepared to demonstrate its support for a
commitment it had never made; that is, to guarantee the security
of Australia from armed attack.
Imperial Defence: Growing Doubts
And this at a time when even Billy Hughes
,
the chief
architect of Australia's post-war dependency on Imperial
solidarity and British military might had to acknowledge that
these could no longer be relied upon, and Australia would have to
look to its own devices for its security. The League of Nations,
weakened by abstentions and withdrawals, and by the military-
industrial impotence of its nominally greatest power, was a
broken reed, as were the many other 'covenants without swords'
entered into by Great Britain up to 1935. Britain could barely
* Still in Parliament after over 30 years in the House. One of
the main problems of Australian government between the wars was
that it relied largely on the same coterie of individuals that
had been around even prior to the Great War. The loss of 60,000
of its best young men seems to have gutted the country of
political talent and vigour; an affliction not confined to
politics, either. Most of the incumbents seemed to have sat there
too long for what good they had done, to paraphrase Cromwell, the
same ailment afflicted the body politic after 1945, contributing
to both the stagnation of the Menzies years, and the chaos of the
Whitlam period.
120
defend itself from the threat of a resurgent Germany, and
militant Japan was no longer Britain's ally.
Hughes' illogical search for an Imperial alliance had also
led to a wholly illogical defence policy based upon the idea of
cooperative Imperial Defence. Under this concept, Australia, in
return for the assurance that in time of trouble in the Pacific,
Britain would send a "main fleet" to Singapore, had pledged
itself to send men to wherever Imperial interests might be
threatened. These interests could in fact only be construed as
"British interests"; the Canadians and South Africans wanted none
of it. Even the British Chiefs of Staff doubted the wisdom of the
Imperial Defence concept: and had wondered in 193 where the
sense lay in Australia promising to send troops off in one
direction so that Britain could send ships and troops to far-away
Singapore. It was a good question that almost no-one in
Australia, especially not its British-appointed Chiefs of Naval
Staff, nor its parsimonious politicians, cared to ask for quite a
while after 1930, let alone before.
Britain's own service chiefs picked huge holes in the
whole notion of Imperial burden sharing. Having pointed out its
fundamental illogic as a concept, they turned to its
impractical ity as policy; especially as an "informal" policy that
depended for its effectiveness, if any, upon all parties to it
having the same idea of what objectives were to be achieved:
. . .we have been forcibly struck by the fact that whilst
it is clearly laid down that each part of the Empire is
responsible for its own local defence, no express
mention is made of collective responsibility for Empire
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defence, and the inference, undoubtedly drawn by many
of the Dominions, is that the United Kingdom would
automatically shoulder the bulk of responsibility for
the defence of the Empire in a major war. 1
As the Chiefs rightly pointed out, the Dominion forces were
not factors to be relied upon, but had to be treated only as
"possible bonuses". This was, and remained, the truth of the
matter for Britain; what Australia especially did not see (or
openly admit) was that the converse, too, held good. British
forces had to be treated as a possible (not probable) bonus in
the event of war. But Britain's service bosses were not allowed
to air these views outside of their ministries; and they passed
only tainted, 'politically correct' appreciations to their
satraps in Australia.
By 1935 it was very apparent that the "Singapore strategy"
could not anyway be counted on - the Sembawang base was far from
complete in facilities or defences, and the febrile (compared
with times past) Royal Navy would probably be unable to provide
the naval forces necessary to make the base any more than an
isolated bunker* Something had to be done, said Billy Hughes, by
Australia, for Australia, from "within our own resources and ...
within a comparatively shorter period of time." 2 The leader of
1. Barnett, The Collapse of British Power . p209.
2. See especially Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People,
1939-41
. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1952, pp41-47. Also
Correlli Barnett, The Collapse Of British Power . pp214-219.
Hughes considered that in Australia's circumstances, "the
aeroplane came as a 'gift from the gods'"; but he was far from
endorsing the Labor Party view that a bunch of aircraft was
almost entirely the solution for Australian defence needs. He
wanted the army and the navy strengthened as well. The debate
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the Labor Party, John Curtin, agreed: "the dependence of
Australia upon the competence, let alone the readiness, of the
British statesmen to send forces to our aid [in the event of
confrontation with an Asian power] is too dangerous a [foundation
for] Australian defence policy." 1 Australia, he said, needed an
effective Air Force and an aircraft industry to support it. Yet
little of practical value was done, aside from an increasing
tendency to assume that America would take the burden which
Britain now could no longer carry. This was an interesting
assumption, given the legacy of mutually low regard arising from
the (now-abandoned) Trade Diversion policy.
The trade diversion policy had gone ahead despite some well
reasoned argument from Moffat to the effect that the Australian
Government was about to cure its economic problems by killing its
patient. It very nearly did so, and earned a good deal of
hostility from both Japan and the US in the process. The public,
according to Moffat, entertained a more friendly disposition
toward the US than especially the Anglophile conservatives who
dominated the Government at the time; but it was a fuzzy and ill-
. . .Continued. .
.
degenerated all too often though, as Hasluck observes, "into a
Navy-Army controversy", with the Air Force flitting around the
edges. It did not make for good policy making, and a lot of money
was wasted on inappropriate measures; much of the army vote, for
instance, went into coastal fortifications. And a lot of the
money voted for both Navy and Air Force could not be spent due to
planning confusion, administrative inefficiency and British and




defined regard of the potential supplicant for the potential
saviour, a hangover of "race solidarity" and a feeling that there
had to be some viable alternative to simply basking in the
dimming rays of an empire whose sun was now well past the white
dwarf stage.
As Moffat remarked at the end of a well-considered critique
of the ills of Australian society (though still reflecting
something of an American's incomprehension of a people who will
not embrace wholeheartedly the virtues of the American model)
:
"the great trouble is that the Australian has really
little understanding of American psychology, and there
is all too little intercourse between the two, either
official or through an exchange of travellers, to bring
about a better understanding of the other's character
and mentality."
He undoubtedly was correct in his assessment of
Australians' ignorance - his own compatriots would better reveal
their own in a few years' time.
Australia's Imperial Identity
Many Australians were more likely to recall that America
had stood on the sidelines for most of the Great War, and
profited handsomely from it: "America has come out of the war the
richest nation in the world. Australia, with her population of
5,000,000 has come out of the war with a debt of 350 [million
pounds]." 1 This was equivalent to well over a billion dollars.
After the war, Australia found that America showed scant respect
1. The Catholic Press . Sydney, 28 August 1919. In Crowley, Modern
Australia in Documents , vol.1, p325.
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for its contribution, which Australians felt had earned a seat at
the high table of nations. But to Americans, they, like all the
Dominions, were just subjects of the British King and not an
independent nation at all. Britain should speak for them; if this
did not suit, why then, become a republic like the USA. Britain
was of course rather more accommodating on this point, and the
American suspicion that Dominion representation was mainly a ploy
by Britain to ensure its Empire bloc could vote down America in
international conferences and the nascent League of Nations,
probably was justified. Belittled by America and indulged by
Britain, in the wake of the postwar conferences Australians
seemed to feel a deepening sense of obligation to the Empire, to
help prop up what many knew in their hearts was a house riddled
with the termites of industrial decline, financial exhaustion,
social-political upheaval at its centre and nationalist
dissension abroad.
The makeup of the population was undoubtedly a major
factor, and its "Britishness" was accentuated by what amounted to
an Imperial transmigration scheme set up towards the end of the
war to "redistribut[e] the white population of the Empire." 1
Another factor was that Australia was one of the few places
where .pa
1. T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War . p380. it appears that
the aim was to keep the "white Empire" safe for Britain's sons,
especially for its jobless ex-servicemen. It cost Australia a lot
of money to indulge mother (and its own racialist policies) so.
Tens of millions were wasted putting 'soldier settler' immigrants




there had not been a major sell-off of British assets to
help pay for war materiel - Britain still dominated Australian
commerce, and thus to a large extent the policies of the nation.
Wartime propaganda, and its self-justifying extension into
the postwar period, had also played a key role - Australians,
still suffering that sense of latent inferiority that the British
so love to cultivate in others (even in their own home-grown
criminals) , had now made the appropriate sacrifices to the
motherland to be accepted as "true sons of empire". Having
finally gotten accepted into the family of the civilised, why
walk out again and so soon? And how to justify the sacrifice?
British race destiny and "Imperial Nationalism" offered the only
solace. McLachlan cited the death of his uncle Claude at Ypres in
1917. His (McLachlan' s) mother cherished Claude's memory and
though "proudly Australian" was (or became) "British to the
core". She "idolis[ed] everything British." McLachlan's view is
that "to justify Claude's death so far away, she felt compelled
to persuade herself that England was well worth his dying for.
The alternative - that it had been a futile sacrifice -
unthinkable." But the unthinking worship of Britain bred a mental
stupefaction that only made it harder for Australians to deal
with the world as it was - especially since nearly all their
information of it (and the image of Australia to the world) was
beamed through the warped lens of British cultural dominance.
The churches inveighed against American films which stirred
in the pure British youth "ill-regulated passion"; "the
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exhibition of the degenerate life of 'fast America' cannot be
good for any class of community". 1 Artists and scientists alike
fled Australia as if the black death had descended upon it -
petty-mindedness and wowserism dominated (Norman Lindsay
despairing, on departure in 1931, that in Australia "there could
be no hope for culture" 2 as things stood) along with union
bloody-mindedness and managerial stagnation. By 1935, it was
being questioned whether the "advantages" of remaining in the
Empire "namely a market for our goods and naval protection,
outweigh the disadvantages of our being culturally 'colonial' and
intellectually minor forever" 3 . The "advantages" were already
illusory, the disadvantages crippling. Even by the eve on war,
"85 percent of [our printed] news comes through
London . . . [and] we get very meagre news of Pacific
countries. [Our news] is selected in the first
place ... on account of its interest for a British
public. ... It is not only a British view, but ... an
official British view that dominates the Australian
newspapers' account of world affairs. [And so]
Australians ... follow uncritically the official
British lead in foreign policy ...[and] a general
acceptance of British views." 4
1. Australian Christian World . 27 June 1924. In Crowley, vol.1,
pp387-8.
2. Politics and Culture . in Crowley, vol.1, p557.
3. Ibid., pp558-9.
4. Crowley, Vol.1., pp599-600. The next time Mr Baker complains
about Australian restrictions on American pulp TV shows
(including 'pseudo-news') being sold to Australia, he might bear
in mind this "censorship by saturation".
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One Last Try For Imperial Defence
The ultimate absurdity in the farce of Imperial unity was
played out at the 1937 Imperial Conference - the first held since
1930. The Australians came demanding assurances from Britain that
it was committed to Australia's defence; and at the same time
wanted to be told what they were expected to provide for the
defence of Britain. The outcome would be laughable were it not so
serious, and so similar to the sorts of silly noises that emanate
annually from ANZUS communigues. No plans were made, no force
structure targets set, no strategic objectives defined. The
Commonwealth nations agreed that each was "bound to adopt such
measures of defence as are deemed essential for their security,
and for the fulfillment of their respective obligations." They
undertook to "consult and cooperate with one another in the cause
of peace and in all other matters of common interest."
Both sides knew there was a better than fair chance that
Britain would be involved in another European war; and if it was,
could not help Australia. Neither side would admit it. The
British contented themselves with some calculations that they
hoped never to be called upon to give substance to; the
Australians contented themselves with the illusion that Britain's
sense of obligation would overcome all obstacles in the event.
Australian rearmament proceeded at a dilatory pace, guided by
very little logic indeed, save the overriding 'necesity' for
Australian forces to be trained and eguipped to 'British
standards'. Since no one had said outright "Australia will be on
its own", nothing useful was done to deal with this eventuality.
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The wish of indivisible union overcame the stark logic of
physical separation and necessarily local preoccupation.
A DARKENING HORIZON
In the meantime, Australian politicians continued to
blunder blindly onward in the belief that if only they pleaded
long and loud enough, eventually the United States would promise
to defend them from the Japanese. Treasurer R.G. Casey wrote in
1938 that developing a stronger bilateral relationship with the
United States was now "for us, a matter of desperate endeavour" 1
- but again, nothing substantive was done, and Australia's sole
representative in Washington was the Australian Counsellor at the
British Embassy. The United States steadfastly refused to give
any such undertaking, for its own good reasons, and must have
been somewhat perplexed in any case about the absolute lack of
effort being made by Australia to look out for itself.
Australia's rearmament effort, such as it was, as a whole was
almost entirely directed to support of British requirements in
the Middle East and in Britain itself. Australia's conduct of its
affairs with the United States was more that of a voice in the
British choir than a strong solo performance, and Australia's
representative thought this a good thing.
1. In a letter to Frank Officer, the lone Australian in the
British Embassy in Washington. Cited in Glen St. J.Barclay,
Friends in High Places: Australian-American Diplomatic Relations
Since 1945 . (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1985), p4
.
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Incredibly, F.K. Officer replied to Casey's inquiry on the
advisability of opening an Australian legation in Washington that
he (Officer) thought:
"the present arrangement . . . amply sufficient for
keeping [Australia informed] on the position here and
for providing the British ambassador with an Australian
advisor when it becomes necessary for him to take some
special action on behalf of Australia[i]" .
The utility of his post, Officer averred, was dependent
mainly on how well the token Australian got on with the British
ambassador; one need not be clairvoyant to discern what sort of
stance would best satisfy the Empire's representative in
Washington. And there is no doubt Officer had the right attitude,
from the British point of view - which hopelessly misread
American attitudes. Officer thought the fact that he was there at
all would demonstrate to American officialdom "that Australia
takes sufficient interest in their relations with the States ",
though even he had to admit that his situation in Britain's
embassy did little for Australia's claim to be an independent
nation acting on its own behalf.
He knew that "the United States Government are very anxious
to have us represented here in the same way as Canada and South
* Given the frequency with which these protestations of loyalty
to the Crown and 'existing arrangements' crop up in diplomatic
traffic of the period, I wonder to what extent they had become
the "form". Was there a sense that the old order was not right
for Australia, but that to adhere to it was politically correct,
and to buck was injurious to career prospects? No less than one
is routinely assailed today if daring openly to question the




Africa, and to be represented themselves on a diplomatic basis in
Australia", but admitted he was "always a supporter of the
present system", and proceeded to expatiate upon the financial
expense that would be involved. The sum was in fact trifling by
almost any standard - he made it sound as if a second gold rush
would be needed to sustain the expense. To Officer (and much of
the Australian political-bureaucratic establishment, it should be
added) , the chief justification for such fiscal profligacy (about
$60,000 per annum, if the embassy buildings were leased, not
purchased) was that "in these times of stress an Australian
Legation cooperating closely with the British Embassy would be
some use to British prestige and influence in this country." 1
Incredible!
"A Hell of a Way Off"
It should hardly have been surprising then for Australia's
High Commissioner to London, S.M. Bruce, to learn in
conversation with President Roosevelt that Australia's security
in the event of a southward push by Japan would not be of any
great moment to the American public and their representatives:
"public opinion was not yet educated to the point of approving
any commitments in this direction." Roosevelt referred to cabinet
discussion held some time before, in which he had canvassed
1. Letter to Casey, 25 January 1939. Documents on Australian
Foreign Policy. 1937-49; vol.11. . Canberra, Australian Government
Publishing Service (AGPS) , 1976. Document No. 11.
* Also an ardent Anglophile, who would have done better to give
his sometimes refreshingly penetrative scepticism toward British
policy a freer reign.
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opinions regarding hypothetical attacks on Canada and Australia.
In the event of the former, the United States would:
"have to intervene ... [but as to] an attack on
Australia, ... after some hesitation the Attorney
General [had] replied, voicing . . . the general view of
the Cabinet, 'Well, Australia is a hell of a way
off . m1
Though other members of the Administration made slightly
more reassuring murmurs 2 and did not voice open disagreement with
Bruce • s hopefully expressed view that the US public would "insist
on the US taking a hand" against a Japanese southward push,
neither did they make any guarantees of indirect or direct
assistance. Since Bruce spoke essentially from the British point
of view, which saw the US as holding the Imperial fort in East
Asia until the temporary inconvenience in Europe had been dealt
with (he also made a plea for writing off Britain's remaining war
debt from the Great War) , he probably succeeded only in
reinforcing the impression in the US that anything to do with
matters in the Pacific that might be of concern to Australia
should be discussed with Whitehall - which would convey the
decisions and instructions to Australia as appropriate.
1. Ibid., Document 82, attachment II. (Letter Bruce to Menzies, 8
May 1939.)
2. Ibid. Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles thought the





The struggle for an American commitment to Australia's
defence continued unabated, but Australia continued to do stupid
things despite its increasing concern about its military and
industrial nakedness. The height of silliness (and the depth of
subordination to narrow British interest) was reached when,
despite Roosevelt's adjuration on the need to improve
communication and especially personal contact between the two
countries, Australia continued to frustrate American attempts to
institute a direct air service across the Pacific, in an attempt
to support British efforts to institute an "Empire Air Route"
across the Pacific.
This required British access to landing rights in Hawaii,
which the U.S. continued to deny so long as it was prevented by
the Australian government from flying across the Pacific direct
to Australia. Although it was clearly in Australia's interest to
tell the British to sort out their problem on their own, while
encouraging Pan-American to fly straight into Sydney from
Honolulu, the Australian and New Zealand governments instead
chose to help Britain bargain from its position of weakness by
offering the ridiculous alternative to the Americans of cutting
off all access to New Zealand as well: and further isolating both
* The Pan-American Airways trans-Pacific 'clipper' service was
obliged to terminate in New Zealand to preserve an artificial
volume of traffic on the trans-Tasman "Empire" link between
Auckland and Sydney.
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countries from the United States. 1 A similar nonsense applied
with regard to trans-Pacific cable communications, which even in
1940 were still being routed through Canada "to protect the
business of the British Empire cable system." 2
While this pathetic little episode was played out, Keith
Officer reported from Washington that "there is still strong
isolationist feeling" among the American "public [who] view the
world situation as one problem and on the Atlantic side at all
events do not regard the Far East as a distinct guestion . .
.
[and] the Administration attitude is based on [this feeling]." 3
Australia was doing little to help its case in America, even
though Britain was now almost certain to be at war before the
year was out.
1. Cabinet Submission . 3 August 1939. In DAFP, vol.11, ppl64-6.
The Minister for Aviation (J.V. Fairbairn) informed the Cabinet
that "we should not acguiesce in a refusal of British use of
Hawaii when we have such a good bargaining counter in the
permission for landings in Australia and New Zealand which are
essential to any American service into the South Pacific. We must
therefore . . . threaten ... to withdraw permission for the
American service to New Zealand and perhaps actually withdraw it
unless the U.S. Government [permits the British to fly via
Hawaii]." It seems not to have occurred to Fairbairn or his
colleagues that they might instead offer something as a guid pro
guo; as in 1936 with Trade Diversion, they cut off Australia's
nose to try and maintain Britain's flabby face.
2. Day, The Great Betrayal . p47. McEwen, Minister for External
Affairs, stated that: "the fact that the Empire is at war makes it
particularly desirable that the Empire cable route should be
protected from a form of competition [from the US] which would
militate against its preservation." In other words, with
competition more advanced, convenient and cheaper to use. I am
all for accepting the 'temper of the times' when interpreting
people's actions, but these men seem to have spent too long
outside with their hats off.
3. DAFP vol.11, pl75.
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On 23 August 1939, Menzies told the public that Britain
would not go to war alone, and he was not referring to France:
"Misapprehension continues to exist in foreign
countries as to the effect of modern constitutional
developments in the British Empire. It is true that
each of the great British Dominions has had full
recognition accorded to its nationhood . . . but this
independence does not mean separatism ... we are still
members of one family, and our family feeling is
reinforced [not] weakened by our growth. . .
.
Australia stands where it stood 25 years ago." 1
Menzies both demeaned his country and overestimated its
position. To be older and stronger and still living at 'home' was
no achievement. And Australia did not stand where it had in 1914;
it had regressed. Nine days later, the Admiralty sent a signal
that should have struck terror into Australian hearts: "Winston
is back." Two days after that, Menzies performed his "melancholy
duty" and informed Australia that it would follow Britain into
another war on the wrong side of the globe.
Menzies' motives were both instinctive loyalty to the land
he worshiped from afar, and the domestic political advantage he
hoped to reap by turning Australia into some kind of industrial
•bastion' of the Empire. By volunteering to raise a 'special
[expeditionary] force' he hoped to gain in return British help to
establish war industries in Australia that could be turned to
peacetime manufacture. Thus the ambition to create domestic
aircraft factories producing British designed aircraft; after the
war, the factories could be used for production of (British)
1. DAFP vol.11, pl82.
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automobiles. 1 He also hesitated to send his expeditionary force
overseas - not out of concern for Australia's security in an
increasingly volatile regional situation, but to extract
assurances that shipping would be provided first for Australian
primary products. He gave away the Navy to the British Admiralty
almost at once, and almost single-highhandedly destroyed any
combat potential then existing in Australia's woefully inadeguate
Air Force, by reducing it to a training organisation devoted to
providing cannon fodder for the RAF. The British Chiefs of Staff
were happy to accept the "bonus" of Australian manpower and
limited naval materiel.
But they could offer nothing in return, beyond the
assurances (often conveyed via their appointees who headed the
Australian services) that something would turn up if Australia
was threatened. There was no thought now of the strategic
absurdity, first admitted in 1930, of Australia sending ships and
men to the Mediterranean and Middle East (and Churchill wanted
the troops in France and England, too, along with the Airmen)
,
while insisting that Britain do the reverse. The Labor Party
offered little opposition to this fatuity; it had its
reservations, but its leaders were only slightly less British in
1. See: David Day, The Great Betrayal ; especially Chapters 2-6.
This is a sordid little tale of sacrifice of national interest to
narrow political ambition. Not only did he wilfully subordinate
national interest to his own interests, he also plotted to ensure
its continued subjugation to Britain; part of the aim was to
ensure exclusion of American aircraft or motor vehicle
manufacturers, whose production technologies and organisation
were infinitely superior to those of the British. The man should
have been impeached.
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outlook than Menzies; and no doubt also saw the war as being good
for employment and wages.
Churchill did all he could to ensure that Australia was
starved of military equipment from both Britain and the United
States - especially modern aircraft, even as he exerted
continuing pressure for Australia to contribute the maximum
possible manpower to the defence of Britain and its position in
the Middle East and Mediterranean. Churchill regarded the
Dominions as useful livestock, to milked for all they were worth,
fed as little as possible, and slaughtered if necessary. And of
course he and Roosevelt were already in the process of agreeing
that should America finally decide that its public would permit
it to enter the war, it would be chiefly to "lift the curse of
Hitler from the brow of mankind" before turning to slap down the
presumptuous Japanese.
Australia, on no better ground than her Prime Minister's
inability and/or unwillingness to see truth of her situation,
continued to press for, and when given them swallow, British
reassurances regarding the defensibility of the British
possessions in Asia. That these were decreasingly believable had
no discernible effect on actual preparation for a Japanese strike
south; apart from timorous concurrence in the need to keep closed
the Burma Road. This in itself helped rouse hostile emotions
amongst the many Americans who felt a deep commitment (in
principle, of course) to the security of China. Even by September
of 1940, the Department of External affairs observed that "the
British empire would be in no better position to face Japan in
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war" for some months hence, when "two [ancient] battleships of
the Royal Sovereign class should be in commission." Just what
difference this was supposed to make can have appeared then no
less relevant a question than it does now - but no-one asked.
Criticism was reserved for the Americans, whose " negative and
indefinite attitude . . . made it apparent that . . . the United
Kingdom would in practice have to deal alone with Japan."
The US administration, motivated it seems, as much by desire
to break once and for all the back of the British Empire, 1 as by
the need to stave off the loss to Hitler of Britain itself, was
performing in a uniquely useless fashion with regard to problems
in Asia; but this was no less true of the British and their
kinsmen. It seems not to have occurred to the Departmental
briefers of the Australian cabinet that the real problem for
Australia was not that the British had to stand alone in Asia; it
was that Australia was already alone in Asia, with "the devil to
pay and no pitch hot". Casey, now representing at last2 an
1. See David Irving, Churchill's War
.
(New York: Avon Books,
1987) . Chapter 37, "The Unsordid Act". Roosevelt certainly seems
to have been determined - even to enjoy his opportunity - to make
Britain grovel and beg; and go broke. Whatever his flights of
fancy, and his attitudes to China seems not to have progressed
far beyond this, FDR appears to have firmly grasped the fact that
this was America's chance at empire, by breaking both challengers
and incumbents for once and for all.
2. He took up his duties as Australian Minister to Washington on
6 March 1940. He reported on 17 May that "events of the last few
days have shaken profoundly United States complacency." However,
there was "no sign that the United States will come into the war
at an early date." Casey remarked upon the "fear on the part of
so many [Congressional] candidates that to speak the truth" about
the need to aid Britain and France could cost them the
Isolationist vote. He later (28 May) saw the President, whose
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independent Australian presence in the American capital, believed
that nothing could be gained from the Americans until after the
Presidential elections in November 1940; and, like Roosevelt, he
was none too clear about what might be got after that. 1
Roosevelt was dissembling though, if not lying outright,
when later in the year he still claimed public opinion would not
let him move the United States from a stance of material support
(for Britain only, under the pressure of Churchill's incessant
and as it turned out, excessive demands) to direct involvement in
the war: "by September 1940, 53 percent of Americans believed it
more important to help Britain defeat Hitler than to stay out of
the war. The number rose to 68 percent by January 1941 and
remained nearly constant for the rest of the year." 2 Churchill,
obsessed with the need to keep Britain secure (and to him, by
. . .Continued. .
.
chief concern seemed to be that the British fleet not fall into
German hands. See: DAFP vol. Ill, p306 (Document 251) & p350
(Document 3 00)
1. Casey reported on 29 May 1940: "The person upon whom I called
yesterday [the President] said to me that if legislative measures
had to be brought before Congress [to aid the] Allies it would
provoke three weeks acid debate that would do more harm than good
and might reverse present [positive] public opinion trend." Casey
further observed that: "public opinion is the real Government of
this country. The divorcing of the Executive cabinet from the
Legislature means that the President cannot face Congress up to
an issue under threat of a general election. [The] Majority of
Congress is opposed to participation [in the war]." The attitude
would change only under very visible pressure of changed public
opinion, and this looked unlikely:the only person with "any
chance of swinging public opinion quickly is the President and he
does not believe he could do so unless some specific incident
occurs." See: DAFP, vol. Ill, p3 54. Document 3 07.
2. Robert Dallek, The American Stvle of Foreign Policy . pl29.
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inference, the whole world) just could not believe that he was
being gulled by Roosevelt who, committed to destroying rather
than preserving the remains of old empires, was playing Churchill
like Heifetz played violin 1 . It was very good domestic politics:
the war allowed Roosevelt to give
his ragged nation a sense of empire. Ten millions were
unemployed and his New Deal was in disarray, but by
plugging in to Churchill's war at the most judicious
moment, he would bring wealth and prosperity to his
great nation. ... by ruthless power politics and
financial huckstering he made it a great power. He
blackjacked his allies into parting with their Gold. 2
And thus into parting with their sovereignty of action.
Roosevelt "ran rings around the British" and "regarded Churchill
1. It seems unfair to say this, considering that the two men did
indeed seem to develop considerable mutual regard. But FDR was
still devoted first and foremost (and rightly) to his view of
American interests, and these had to diverge significantly from
Churchill's views about Britain's. Britain was an "old tired
power" whose time was up. It had to give way to the USA, Russia
and China. David Irving quotes Vice President Henry Wallace's
diary: "when there are four people in a poker game and three of
them are against the fourth, [FDR said] it is a little hard on
the fourth." Wallace took this to mean that FDR regarded the
other 'new powers' as his helpmates in dismembering the old,
tired one. Interior Secretary Harold Ickes' diary for 19 January
1941 recalled the President's having said that "we have been
milking the British financial cow", which was now, however,
"about to run dry". See: Irving, Churchill's War . pp484-6.
2. Ibid., pp483-4. Anyone familiar with his work will soon
discern that Irving has no love for Americans - but he has even
less for Churchill. And he does do his research. Irving provides
facts that support my own intuitive suspicion that Roosevelt
•suckered' Churchill, whose belief in British omniscience
(especially his own) did not allow him to contemplate the
possibility that he could be conned by a mere American naif.
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as a pushover - unreliable and tight most of the time". 1 So far
as Australia went, it was just one the many pawns on the global
gameboard, and no more. Both were now learning the same harsh
lesson: "mere sentiment and blood ties count for little."
Regional Weakness
In early 1941 Australian land forces took part in their
first major action of the war, the capture of Bardia in formerly
Italian-held Libya. The public gloried in the fact that the
'heirs' of the Australian Imperial Force of the Great War had
upheld the illustrious tradition of their predecessors. The
Australian commander, General Blarney, also reinforced a precedent
from late in the first war, by strenuously resisting all British
attempts to split his divisions and pepper them throughout
British formations. That, and provision of its own logistic
support and rear echelon troops, was about as much progress as
had been made in Australian practice from twenty-odd years
before; there was still no real control over where and when the
troops would fight.
l.Ibid., p484(n) & pp489-91. According to a record kept by
Canadian Prime Minister MacKenzie King. Mcrgenthau went out
ferreting for 'hidden' British assets, and former Vice-President
John N. Garner considered the British the richest people, per
capita in the world. They should be prepared to spend every last
penny "if they care anything about their freedom." Harold Ickes
thought his Cabinet colleagues were vultures: "these same people
seem to agree that our own safety depends upon Britain's ability
to withstand Hitler, and yet . . . they wanted to be perfectly sure
that England was fighting naked, with bare hands, before they
would be willing to go to her aid under the pending Lend-Lease
Bill."
141
Over the next few months, in another echo of the First War,
Churchill's heavy-handed bungling in Greece and the Balkans, in
the service of his decades-old Mediterranean obsession, threw
away all the gains of Wavell's brilliantly successful offensive
of early 1941, and led to a costly sideshow in Syria. Besides
inflicting appalling hardship on the Royal Navy, the result was
heavy losses to two Australian divisions, with a third trapped in
the rathole of Tobruk. Menzies had concurred in all these fiascos
while in London , while failing to win either assurance of
British commitment to the Far East or even guarantee of an
increased level of war materiel that might be used in Australia
for its own defence. Although a dribble of barely trained
Australian troops began to reach Singapore, they had no air
defence, and there were still no ships for the base. More 'penny
packets' were being scattered about the East Indies and
Australian Pacific Territories; again without air or artillery
support. Roosevelt had agreed to transfer part of the US fleet
from the Pacific to the Atlantic, and Australia was still obliged
to obtain war materiel through the British Purchasing Commission
in Washington. Casey, the Australian minister, had thought this a
good thing because it kept Australia in the "empire Dollar pool";
and thus last in line for anything at all.
* Which he evidently found a good deal more congenial than
Canberra. He was there for three months in early 1941, when the
threat of German invasion had passed and the threat Australia
steadily increased. He seems to have spent more time moaning
about Churchill's dictatorial ways (Which strongly resembled
Menzies' own methods of 'Cabinet Control'), and plotting to have
Churchill ousted - in favour of, of all people, himself! See
David Day, The Great Betrayal . Chapters 6&7.
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Australian refusal, after the debacles in Greece and Crete,
and needlessly heavy loses in Syria, to knuckle under any further
to the British in the Middle East caused intense friction with
Churchill 1
,
especially after Menzies did Australia a favour and
alienated enough of his colleagues to lose the Prime Ministership
in August 1941. But Australia did not bring home its troops or
its combat-trained aircrews from the Middle East until well after
Japan struck.
1. Blarney (GOC Australian Imperial Force [i.e., Army Corps] and
nominal Deputy CinC Middle East) demanded withdrawal of the
Australian troops from Tobruk and their replacement by available,
fully trained and fresh troops from South Africa. The health of
the troops had begun to deteriorate rapidly after months of
siege. Churchill threw tantrums by cablegram "I trust . . . you
will weigh very carefully the immense responsibility . . . you
would assume before history by depriving Australia of the glory
of holding Tobruk until Victory is won..". The way things were
going under Churchill's masterly direction of the war, this
looked to be no time soon. Fadden (interim Prime Minister) told
Churchill to get on with it. Auchinleck (General, CinC M.E.) said
to Blarney that he would have to ask for his relief - presumably
to be replaced by someone more complaisant. Blarney's reply: "Go
ahead and do it." See: DAFP vol.V, ppl05-6 & pplll-2. Also





CHANGING HORSES: THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC
The absolute unreality of the British, other allied and
Australian Governments' preparations for what was now an
inevitable war in the Pacific is shown by a submission presented
to the Australian War Cabinet in October 1941. After four months'
haggling with the Netherlands government-in-exile in London, over
the titular definition of an Australian representative to
Batavia, the Dutch had informed Australia that it could not
appoint a minister-in-residence to liaise with the authorities in
Batavia. The Netherlands East Indies were only Crown Colonies and
did not deserve a diplomatic posting of that rank. Contact at
ministerial level would have to be conducted through London.
Cabinet mulled this over for two weeks, and then decided that it
might be alright for the High Commissioner in London to be
accredited to the Dutch government there. The Dutch, with an
admirable disdain for reality, remained unconvinced about the
merits of having an Australian Consul-General appointed to
Batavia; they were "very sensitive of any action which would in
any way suggest that the Netherlands East Indies is anything but
a dependency of Holland" 1 . No-one went to Batavia, and Bruce
finally presented his credentials in February 1942, by which time
1. DAFP, vol.V. pp!37-41 & 174-5.
144
the Netherlands East Indies were already being absorbed into the
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Military preparations
were no more impressive.
Japan Strikes South
On 8 December 1941, Japanese troops landed in Thailand and
Northern Malaya, and Australia declared war. To that point, there
had still been no effective allied consultation regarding the
defence of the Southeast Asian 'barrier'. Three days later,
Australia's special representative to the British War Cabinet in
London, Sir Earle Page, was told by Churchill that, in effect,
nothing could immediately be done to remedy the weakness in Asia.
Further naval reinforcement was impossible (the Prince of Wales
and Repulse were sunk the day before) . More aircraft
manufacturing equipment - but no aircraft - would be sent to
Australia. Two days later (13 December), America had reciprocated
Hitler's declaration of war, and Foreign Minister Evatt sent a
telegram, over the Prime Minister's signature, to President
Roosevelt. It said, inter alia:
"... we [are] heartened and strengthened by the
knowledge that the English-speaking world ... [is] now
arrayed against the common foe. ...
When the risks against Australia were not so great as
[now], we sent some [all!] of our naval and air forces
as far afield as Britain and we have three Army
divisions in the Middle East. We have also contributed
several thousand men to the Empire Air Training scheme
and hope to be able to continue our part in it.
1. DAFP, Vol.V (July 1941-June 1942). pp305-6
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This last was an extraordinary thing to say when all along
Australia's greatest worry next to the fabled 'main fleet' had
been the inadequacy of air defences in Malaya at least, even if
their block-headed British Chief Of Air Staff insisted that
fighters need not be got for the defence of Australia. He
apparently believed that 'something would turn up' to sink
Japan's aircraft carriers and destroy their land-based air
fleets. But what was needed at once was, indeed, modern combat
aircraft and more warships; the lack of torpedo-gunboats and
destroyers was as critical as any lack of heavy warships in
impeding the Japanese advance in Malaya and the islands . Curtin
sent in a shopping list, it appears, but mentioned no specifics
in his covering cablegram, merely pointing out that "our Military
resources are insufficient" and asking the President and his
"Service Authorities [to] consider what help you may be able to
give in providing forces to deny these bases [in Australia's
Pacific territories and in New Caledonia] to the enemy."
Roosevelt's reply was non-committal; the "Question is ...
now being studied ... In the meantime", Roosevelt felt sure,
* The Japanese were able to outflank the British in Malaya by
sea as well as on the land. There were almost no craft of shallow
draft able to intercept their coastal troop movements. The
potential value of destroyers as a means of countering both
invasion convoys and logistic support efforts, in conjunction
with aircraft, was borne out by the near-successes of Admiral
Glassford's ancient "four-pipers" in the NEI, and most
dramatically in the battles around Guadalcanal. The British also
rued the lack of vessels able to get into the shallows off the
coast of Burma, and efforts at defence and offense in the ill-
charted waters of Papua-New Guinea suffered similarly from lack
of the appropriate naval units. The same would have applied no
less in the event of a Japanese attempt to effect landings in the
north of Australia.
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Australian "forces are taking all possible steps to protect these
areas against enemy attack." 1 But there were no steps to take:
Curtin needed for once (probably once only!) to take a leaf from
Churchill's book and make not plaintive noises but determined
growls: "Give us the tools and we'll finish the job"! Without
them, Australia could not even get started. And Britain had
already arrogated to itself the role of Imperial spokesman in the
staff discussions with the United States that finally were to get
underway on 15 December. Evatt insisted to Casey that Australia
must be separately represented at these:
"
... or our great needs will be overlooked. It is
obvious that in some respects the views of the United
Kingdom representatives will differ from our own both
in relation to supplies and forces. The Government is
far from satisfied with the results of the policy of
subordinating our requirements to those of others."'2
Evatt, now galled by the danger to his country, perhaps
forgot that Australia had for most of the past 27 months (during
which he had been a member of the bi-partisan Advisory War






3. As had Labor Leader Curtin, who had declined to enter into a
'national unity' style of government like Britain's; he thought a
loyal opposition might be of more service, and undoubtedly
figured on Menzies losing the support of the Independent members
who gave him his slender majority in the House. Curtin and his
colleagues asked a lot of the right questions, and expressed
sensible concerns at Australia's denudation of troops and the
gross imbalance in its development, structure and employment of
especially the Air Force - but they were not any better than
Menzies at resisting the both the palliative phrases of the
British and the belief that it would "all come right on the
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it would remain one, but less willingly. Curtin telegrammed
Churchill, expressing concern at the paucity of Malayan air
defences and the lack of sea-air cooperation that had contributed
to loss of the Prince Of Wales and Repulse. He was evidently
shocked by the gross inaccuracy of an earlier appreciation of
Japanese fighting capability and materiel guality. "There is no
reason to believe that Japanese standards are even comparable
with those of the Italians" - a reference to the derisive
assessment of the British Chiefs of Staff given to (and swallowed
by) Menzies in April 1941. It was the product of unwarranted
"complacency" and the Italian comparison further invited the
equally unwarranted assumption that inferior numbers (and
inferior aircraft such as the "quite adequate" Brewster Buffalo)
were acceptable. 1 Churchill did not reply, and the Dominions
office promised little more than "urgent" discussions with the
United States to "re-examine" the situation.
In Washington, Casey was worried by Roosevelt's non-
committal reply to Curtin, and went to see the President and
"reminded him verbally of the principal points in the Prime
Minister's telegrams ... which I had got to him [four days ago]".
. . .Continued. .
.
night." And being of the same racialist cast of mind, were it
seems quite happy to believe (without any questioning) the
ridiculous assertions that the Japanese were "not air-minded"
(nor were they air-headed!), or that they were short sighted, and
so-on. It is extraordinary that these people, who had fostered a
fear of the Yellow Peril, which they had used as the basis of
national security policy for so long, were now so willing to
believe that the peril was a 'paper tiger'.
l.DAFP vol. V. pp317-8.
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Roosevelt told Casey to "please tell your government we have
already started", but cautioned that "he regarded the South-west
Pacific as one area and that it was necessary to concentrate
attention and support on the most important areas. The war had to
be regarded from a geographical rather than a national point of
view" (my emphasis) 1 . Thus within ten days of the eruption of the
crisis in the Pacific, it was apparent that even the forcing of
America's hand by Japan's strike at Pearl Harbour brought little
prospect of a real US effort to defend Australia. 2
By 19 December, the Australian government had an honest and
presciently accurate evaluation of the Malayan situation from its
representative in Singapore: "the air strength here [is] not
adequate for protection or attack" and no more Australian troops
should be committed unless it could be assured that "they will
not be abandoned with those already here". Penang had already
been "virtually abandoned", but the British were suppressing the
news for 'morale' purposes. Unless modern aircraft and
operationally trained aircrew and troops were sent immediately,
1. DAFP, Vol.V, pp323-4.
2. And in truth its retention as a military base area does not
seem to have been essential to the strategy pursued by the US in
the central Pacific. MacArthur's loudly publicised campaigns in
the southwest Pacific were largely a waste of time after the
Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, the successful 'turn of the
tide in New Guinea, and the securing of Guadalcanal. As it was,
Australia needed the Air and Naval support that American forces
could provide, but the campaigns in New Guinea in particular
benefited little from American ground troops that might have been
better sent elsewhere.
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the position looked hopeless 1 . Curtin finally laid it on the line
with Roosevelt. Lack of air support threatened a "repetition of
Greece and Crete", and the fall of Singapore, said Curtin, would
mean the isolation of the Philippines; although knew, via Casey,
that they were as good as written off already:
"The reinforcements earmarked by the United Kingdom
government for despatch [to Malaya-Singapore] seem to
us to be utterly inadequate especially in relation to
aircraft [and] especially fighters. ... small
reinforcements are of little avail . .
.
It is in your power to meet the situation ... [and
Australia] would gladly accept [a] United States
commander in [the]Pacific area." 2
Churchill was sent a duplicate of this cable, which brought
forth a wounded response 3 from Atlee (Churchill had gone to
Washington) , but no immediate and practical result. But as Bowden
reported from Singapore, "anything that is not powerful, modern
and immediate is futile... [otherwise] ...Singapore must fall."
He was telling the government that if the fight was not be
conducted properly (with powerful, modern, immediate air
support) , it should evacuate its troops, not send more raw
reinforcements. Decisions had to be made in "hours, not days" 4 .
1. DAFP vol.V, pp328-9.
2. DAFP vol.V, pp341-2.
3. DAFP vol.V, pp348-9. It concluded: "Any judgment ... on the
conduct of operations must await a full report of the facts,
which we have not yet received." The cable was sent on 23
December; if they didn't know the facts a after 15 days of
operations, it was a poor reflection of their commanders and
their faith in them.
4. DAFP vol.V, pp349-50. Report also sent on 23 December 1941.
Someone knew what was going on!
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On Christmas Day, Evatt wired Casey, and told him to set up,
under the Australian trade Commissioner, Australia's own War
Supplies Procurement organisation, which would absorb the staff
presently working under the British Purchasing Commission. But he
was too late; Churchill and Stalin had already cornered the
market, and neither would let go of his share. In London, Bruce
spoke to Ambassador Winant, warning that Churchill was "over-
insuring" Britain against a diminished threat; Winant
sympathised, but nothing came of it. Casey was also told to
address the "lack of urgency" being shown by both the US and the
British chiefs of staff (they had not even met until 14 December;
as Casey had then observed, "you are probably wondering why [not
until now]") with regard to the air situation especially. He
reported back that "there are no British aircraft of any [use]
closer than the Middle East." They could not fly direct to
Malaya because the Japanese already controlled the air in
southern Burma and over the Peninsula; and there was no British
aircraft carrier available that would not take a month to arrive.
The Americans "cannot be induced to risk sending one of their
aircraft carriers from Honolulu to Singapore or even Australia." 1
Curtin Turns to America
Both Evatt and Curtin were getting "twitchy"; Evatt accusing
his representatives abroad of not pushing hard enough for
Australian interests, Curtin commencing an acrimonious
correspondence with Churchill that reviewed the whole sorry
1. DAFP Vol.V, pp369-70.
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progress of the Anglo-Australian alliance since the 1937 Imperial
Conference. Churchill was especially upset by Curtin's public
remarks on 27 December, in which the Australian Prime Minister in
effect stated his belief that Britain had hoodwinked Australia
and the only hope now lay with America:
"... we refuse to accept the dictum that the Pacific
struggle must be treated as a subordinate segment of
the general conflict. ... there must be a concerted
plan ... determined upon hurling Japan back.
The Australian Government therefore regards the Pacific
struggle as primarily one in which the United States
and Australia must have the fullest say in the
direction of the democracies 1 fighting plan.
Without inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear
that Australia now looks to America, free of any pangs
as to our traditional links or kinship with the United
Kingdom. m1
Churchill, and a good section of the Australian press,
regarded this as close to imperial treason; The Sydney Morning
Herald sent copies of its own adverse editorial response over to
America, where it was reproduced to give the impression that
Australia, the idle and ungrateful, was simply offering a
transfer of colonial stewardship to America from Great Britain.
And to some extent it was. Curtin was acting at least five years
too late. But so was the public: "Wake Up Australians" pleaded
the New South Wales Premier in early January. McKell railed
against the attitude that had been allowed to develop "there has
arisen ... a slackness that seems to say : let the other fellow
do it". Did Australians want to wait until they were scratched
1. Crowley, vol.2, pp50-2.
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before revealing the tartar within, he asked? 1 They surely did,
and moaned all the time that the other fellow wouldn't do it for
national defence 2 . By the fall of Singapore, Curtin had finally
steeled himself to tell his countrymen what they did not want to
hear: "hours previously devoted to sport and leisure must now be
given to duties of war." 3 What a dreadful thing to say! What a
dreadful thing to do!
The agitation increasingly displayed by himself and Evatt
at lack of consultation in Allied war plans was reflected in
their early proposal for a Pacific War Council. Neither Churchill
nor Roosevelt felt they really had the time or the inclination to
be bothered with Australian views. Curtin and Evatt - all of them
in Canberra- knew why. None had demurred, in opposition or in
government, with the basic soundness of the policy being pursued
up to late 1941, by which Australia sent comparatively fewer
1. Crowley, vol.2, pp 53-4.
2. But by this time the public must hardly have known what to
think. They had been alternately scared and soothed almost since
the beginning of the war by politicians and newspapermen
struggling to reconcile their wishes with reality. Menzies had
told them that the Empire Air Training Scheme was putting
Australia "well on the way to being a great air power". All those
it was training in the country and in Canada could be "organised
at relatively short notice into an effective striking force" -
flying what? But no-one asked. (see: David Day, The Great
Betrayal . pp33-4) W.M. Hughes (still alive, and now Navy
Minister) told Australians in early 1941 that those, like Curtin,
who declared the situation in the "Far East" to be grave, were
"nervy", "whatever happens in the Far East", he said,
"...Australia will be fighting for her life ... with the rest of
the Empire against Germany. ... If Germany wins, then the dark
cloud in the Far East ... will cover the whole heavens." Like a
cracked record. (See: DAFP, vol.11, pp415-6. Document 3 03.)
3. Crowley, vol.2, pp58-60.
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forces overseas (than in 1914-18) to fight for Britain 1
,
pursued
a policy of appeasing Japan to cover its nakedness at home, and
tried so far as possible to both reap a commercial profit and
maintain domestic life as usual. Australia was squawking about
Singapore now precisely because it had been content for so long
to play a passive role in determining its own affairs. And now it
lacked the power, even if it had suddenly discovered the desire,
to do more. On 12 February, Australia's able servant in
Singapore, V.G. Bowden, reported that "except as a fortress and a
battlefield, Singapore has ceased to function". Three days later
it surrendered, and 17,000 Australians went into captivity.
Japan was supreme at sea and in the air; the East Indies must
inevitably fall too. And then Australia would be alone. The
government did not appreciate quite how alone.
Australia: Desirable But Non-Essential
In an appreciation written for General Marshall in February
1942, Brigadier-General Dwight D. Eisenhower noted that both army
and Navy "have consistently agreed that . . . the US should adopt
the strategic defensive in the Pacific and devote its major
1. They nonetheless saw a good deal more fighting,
proportionately, than did the British after 1940. As Cadogan (War
Cabinet Secretary) despairingly soliloquised on 9 February 1942:
"Our generals are no use, and do our men fight? We always seem to
have 'Indian Brigades' or Colonials (that word, still!) in the
front line. ... what will happen if Germans get a footing here?
Our army is the mockery of the world." See David Dilks (ed.), The
Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan. 1938-45 . p433.
* And sadly, Bowden himself was captured whilst trying to escape
Singapore, and summarily executed. This was not learned until
after the War, despite the fact that Bowden 's name figured
prominently amongst those whom the government was attempting to
repatriate in an exchange of diplomatic personnel.
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offensive effort across the Atlantic." He more or less assumed
that the continental United States and Hawaii would be free of
threat of major attack. He observed that the US must distinguish
between the essential and the desirable to accomplish its war
goals. The critical areas thus became Britain, Russia and the
Middle East and India; "less critical advantages [would] accrue
to [the Axis Powers] through conquest of Australia and the
islands to the east thereof." Amongst the "things that are highly
desirable and approach the necessary, listed in the order of
their importance", the security of Australia ranked fifth of
seven 'important' areas 1 . "We know that Australia can go and
Britain can still hold on" said Prime Minister Curtin in December
1941, as he sought to install the United States as Australia's
new protector; but he omitted to note that America could more
than hold on whether or not the entire British Empire collapsed -
and the latter event was anyway one of its long-standing aims.
Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, disagreed
with Eisenhower's stark view of US priorities, primarily because
he was not one of the "Europe first" group in US strategic policy
circles. But he did not advance any really convincing strategic
argument for giving Australia and New Zealand any higher priority
amongst the 'desirable' objectives of US strategy, other than the
observation that they were "white man's countries" which the US
should "not allow to be overrun by Japanese because of the
1. Barclay & Siracusa, Australian-American Relations Since 1945 .
ppl3-14.
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repercussions among the non-white races of the world." 1 White
Australia would have heartily endorsed these words, the very
essence of yellow perilism and "blood-brotherhood" so long and so
hopefully used as the justification for hiding under the skirts
of mother England.
COLD COMFORT FROM UNCLE SAM
As the Japanese set about swallowing up the rest of the
Netherlands East Indies, Evatt and Bruce tried to encourage
Stafford Cripps to lead a palace coup to depose Churchill 2 while
Curtin demanded the return to Australia of the Australian troops
remaining in the Middle East and those in transit via India.
Churchill wanted them all to go to Burma, and another fight
developed. The Australian government was more than a little
surprised to find that FDR supported their bete noir. Casey
informed Evatt on 17 February 1942:
"Harry Hopkins asked me privately today whether ... if
the United States undertook to send [considerable]
forces to Australia, Australia was likely to agree to
two Australian divisions from the Middle East being
diverted to say India or Burma, which the President
naturally regards as of very great importance to hold." 3
[Doubtless based upon Eisenhower's memorandum].
1. Barclay & Siracusa, pp 15-16.
2. DAFP vol. V. pp525-7; 530-2. Interestingly, Harold MacMillan
in his Memoirs says that "Evatt ... was brilliant, but, as it
seemed to me, somewhat undependable. He reminded me of Stafford
Cripps." Harold MacMillan, Riding the Storm. 1956-59 . New York,
Harper and Row, 1971. p405.
3. DAFP vol. V. pp533-4.
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Casey seemed to think this a good idea, and offered a few
ideas on how shipping might be made available for the 50 to
60,000 GIs it was proposed should sometime arrive to defend
Australia in the absence of its own (battle-tested) troops. It
was a poor deal, though Bruce in London, who was by now more
openly sceptical than ever of Churchill's inspirations, still
thought it might build up Australia's stock of brownie points
with an otherwise rather unsympathetic U.K. government (though
Bruce also praised the Dutch government's "statesmanlike"
judgement that further reinforcement of the collapsing NEI was
futile) . Curtin, overwhelmed by the looming conseguence of a
quarter-century's dubious promises and false assumptions,
declined - emphatically:
mainly owing to our efforts overseas, the home defence
position is, in the opinion of our Chiefs of General
Staff, not satisfactory. Therefore we cannot approve of
the proposed diversion.
The pressure came on. Cranbourne (Dominion Secretary)
pleaded for Australia to "leave open the destination" of the 6th
and 9th Divisions. "More troops might be badly needed in Burma".
Would Australia be prepared to give up one of its own divisions
in exchange for an American division? 2 It was a silly question
with a simple answer: Not on your life! Cranbourne must have been
too sympathetic to Australia's views. He was replaced in the




"your greatest support in this hour of peril must come from the
United States" whose "President attaches supreme importance to
keeping open the connection with China without which his bombing
offensive against Japan cannot be started" 1 . Unless Australia did
as Churchill wanted, Attlee went on, "a very grave effect will be
produced upon the Washington circle on whom you are so largely
dependent." All the veils were lifted: do what London wants or
get stymied with your alternative protector. Australia didn't,
and it was. Hopkins tried it on with Casey again on the 20
February; so did Frankfurter, and Roosevelt followed up the next
day with a message to Curtin. 2
FDR" assured Curtin that 27,000 American troops "fully
eguipped in every respect" were on their way. So what?, an
Australian might have asked. The Americans were not that good in
the first war; why would they be any better in the second?
Roosevelt now called Australia the "right flank" of the allied
position in the Pacific (it wasn't; it was the 'underbelly' in
much the same way Churchill's obsession, Italy, was to Europe).
"We Americans can better handle the reinforcement of Australia
and the right flank" he said. Fine, but by now Australians wanted
to fight for themselves for a change. Give us the tools! Without
reservation as to any ties of kinship, Roosevelt went on: "if .pa




that of Australia, will be extremely strained." 1
All of a sudden, Australia was important again - because
Churchill had complained to Roosevelt, who already had plighted
his troth to getting Hitler first. The same sentiments which
Roosevelt had not too long ago been prepared to use as his excuse
for avoiding war, he now refused to recognise as Australia's
motivation for wanting its best soldiers back home: the public
wanted them, and not to avoid something, but to deal with it. In
contrast to his insipid, nine days delayed reply to Curtin's
appeal of late December for aircraft, guns and credit, Roosevelt
now discovered that "your men have been fighting all over the
world" and he now knew "full well of great sacrifices which
Australia has made." All that aside, he got to the sting: please
"reconsider your decision and order the division now en route to
Australia to move with all speed to ... Burma." 2
Australia, for a few precious moments, grew up. To Atlee: Mwe
have every right to expect [our men] to be returned as soon as
possible with adequate escorts to ensure their safe arrival". 3
(The latter no problem; many of the "British" escorts in the
Indian Ocean were manned by the RAN) . To Roosevelt: his message
had "affected us profoundly" - and he could read the message
sent to Britain4 . Evatt followed up to the Third Secretary -
1. Ibid, p550.
2. Ibid.
3. DAFP, vol. V. pp551-3.
4. Ibid, p553.
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obviously a confidant - in Washington, with a message to Justice
Frankfurter. Evatt clearly had trust and disciple-like confidence
in his (Frankfurter's) ability to influence events (and "Casey ..
does not appear to have been at all useful") , enjoining him to
"try and explain to Hopkins that the President's good will should




Frankfurter's replies to Evatt were short and to the point -
typical of a busy man with more on his mind than an Australian
Foreign Minister trying to change the past and interfere with the
future. 2 Evatt still poured his heart out:
".. we are anxious about the President's attitude.
Already promises of deliveries of aircraft here have
been greatly whittled down . . . and it is feared that
the pressure of the U.K. against aid to the Pacific is
still too strong. ... we are very worried . . . over the
side-tracking of our plan for direct contact with the
USA in plans for the prosecution of the war.
Churchill's elaborate machinery has prevented us from
meeting the USA as a partner on any council or
committee whatever." 3
Evatt had now, under the great pressure of war, discovered
nationalism. His ambition undoubtedly did not go onto a back-
burner; but he had it seems actually found something bigger than
mere politics. He concluded his cri de coeur to Frankfurter with





ever since -as conceived by its promoters, if not necessarily as
seen or practised by its parliamentary supervisors.
"At present we are informed of decisions and have
little or no effective voice in their making. Yet we
are an allied country whose contribution and losses are
proportionately far greater than any other Dominion or
even the UK. The President should realise that the only
basis of democratic control is participation by all in
the general plan. As it is the main military advisers
lead us from one disaster to another . . . [with] a
combination of Conservatism, incompetence and lack of
valour. It is not only Australia I am thinking of, but
your country and Britain which I love deeply." 1
It hardly mattered, any of it. Rangoon was becoming a ghost-
town only nine days later, and within a fortnight fell overripe
into the hands of Japan; before the Australian troops (of
infinite importance to us, said the Governor2 , in a tribute to
the mythic reputation of the Digger, and a swingeing slight at
the performance of the - atrociously under-equipped and under-
prepared - British forces) would even have arrived. Churchill and
Roosevelt both probably felt that, even if Burma were lost before
the Australians could arrive and somehow strike the enemy dead in
his tracks, the troops (experienced and cohesive, and above all
well-led) could be diverted to India.
By mid-March 1942, it was becoming very clear that despite
the unceasing efforts of Evatt, neither Roosevelt nor Churchill
was interested in giving Australia any real say in the direction
of the war, although Roosevelt now seemed to believe in "the
l.Ibid.
2. Louis Allen Burma - THe Longest War . p47
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imperative necessity" of holding Australia 1 . Hopkins believed
that there would be set up a south-west Pacific Council, but it
would be largely superfluous to the conduct of the war. The
Australian government would be invited to comment on decisions
already agreed between Washington and London. 2 At about the same
time, Australia became aware that General Douglas MacArthur had
handed over the starving remnant of his command in the
Philippines to General Wainwright, and escaped the beleaguered
islet of Corregidor, headed for Australia. He reached Darwin on
17 March, and four days later was in Melbourne. While MacArthur
was in transit, Roosevelt appointed him Supreme Commander of
Allied Forces in the Australian (later amended to South West
Pacific) Area; thus prematurely acceding to an Australian request
for the same action. It reached the President the day after his
decision.
The Time of the Hero - MacArthur Takes Command
Had Admiral Ernest King come to Australia, he would have
received a rapturous reception, and probably an honorary
(British) knighthood for services to racial purity - as it was,
the rapture was expended wastefully on a beaten American general
(or Filipino Field Marshal, according to taste) whose conduct to
that point should have made him a prime candidate for a sideways
l.DAFP, vol. V, pp640-l.
2. Ibid.
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move, if not retirement. 1 Australia thought it was getting
America's finest: on 25 March, after some cynical political
calculus by Marshall, Stimson and Roosevelt, the President had
awarded MacArthur the Congressional Medal of Honour for 'morale
reasons'. The citation claimed bravery in personally supervising
operations on Bataan: MacArthur had visited his sorely afflicted
troops there just once. 2 There was a marked contrast between the
hero's reception accorded MacArthur, and the dark mutterings that
were heard regarding the similar conduct of Australian Major
General H. Gordon Bennett . But "since January [1942] a
'MacArthur craze' had swept over America" involving not only the
yellow press but the hysterical response of in particular the
1. It was not merely MacArthur 's conduct of operations in the
Philippines after the outbreak of war. He could rightly have been
held no less responsible for the fairly poor disposition and
campaign tactics of the American-Filipino forces, not to mention
his unimpressive performance prior to that. There is evidence
that Quezon was fed up with him and was prepared to have him
replaced. See Michael Schaller, Douglas MacArthur. the Far
Eastern General . New York, Oxford University Press, 1989.
Eisenhower, who admittedly had no affection for MacArthur, but
who showed himself guite able to suffer the antics of brilliant
soldiers such as George S. Patton, sternly guestioned Mac
Arthur's performance in the Philippines, and considered the
decision to order him to leave Corregidor was a political cave-in
to "editorials and public opinion", in which the General had been
lionised, due mainly to the fact that his troops were about the
only Americans anywhere in contact with an enemy, leaving aside
the 'forgotten Navy' of Admiral Hart's Asiatic Fleet.
2. Michael Schaller, MacArthur . pp62-3.
*Who on his return from Singapore was roundly criticised for
"running out" on his men, and despite some tactical victories
over which he had presided, was 'kicked upstairs' to command of
forces in Western Australia, from which he eventually retired,
having had long enough to 'take the hint', in 1944. The big
difference was that Bennett left on his own initiative, and
MacArthur got ordered. But one wonders what he would have done
had the order not come.
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Republican party, some of whose more senior members already had
decided MacArthur could be presidential material in 1944 if he
"[got] out alive". Roosevelt, and his administration, wanted to
'bury' MacArthur in Australia, which Interior Secretary Harold
Ickes believed was the "right place . . . thousands of miles away
from American newspapers" 1 . They reckoned without the General's
press machine; by June, MacArthur' s staff had already managed to
portray him as the Saviour of the South. Roosevelt belatedly
observed that MacArthur 's record in the Philippines up to and
including the "day of infamy" differed little from that of
Admiral Kimmel and General Short, who "face Court-Martial charges
of laxity at Pearl Harbour". His subsequent conduct, said FDR,
was "criminal" rather than heroic.
Australia's terrified politicians, their willingness to
accept a foreign messiah finely tuned by Japanese air raids in
northern Australia 2 , were only too happy to strew palm leaves in
the arrogant American's path; worse, they were only too willing
to virtually abdicate direction of the war in the South Pacific
to him and his truculent and sycophantic staff, until the time
1. Ibid, p64.
2. Darwin was attacked on 19 February 1942, in two separate
raids, by 81 aircraft from Nagumo's carrier group and 54 land-
based aircraft of the (Navy) First Attack Force. This heavy raid
was the precursor of numerous - but sporadic, and often light -
strikes across the whole of northern Australia, from Broome in
the west to Townsville in the east.
164
when intercession was too late . Roosevelt naturally encouraged
the belief that Australia had been granted the services of one of
America's military wunderkind; but things worked rather
differently. What FDR had done was remove to the antipodes a
potential rival; where with luck, the insignificance of the
campaigns to be waged would render him publicly invisible and
politically impotent in America. Roosevelt was still not too
worried what happened to Australia which he "would rather
lose ... than have the Russians collapse." 1 By this time Russia
was getting in a month more aircraft, tanks and other materiel
than Australia thought it would need to run an entire war.
Initially, Curtin saw MacArthur almost as the Aztecs saw
Cortez: a white god come again to lead his people to a better
life. The American may been self-promoting and self-deluded, but
he was no fool, and played cleverly to the obsessions of his
audience in Canberra. He maintained, to the Government's great
satisfaction, a ceaseless barrage of complaint that materiel
* Interestingly enough, MacArthur also seems to have got the
support of the Permanent Secretary of the Department of Defence,
Sir Frederick Shedden, who apparently had little time for
Australian officers who he regarded a his intellectual inferiors.
Perhaps they were, but they knew a lot, especially by 1942, about
fighting wars; and apart from the Churchill-induced debacles of
Greece and Crete, they had mostly brought in winners. Perhaps, as
with so many, apparently, MacArthur' s regal postures and florid
phraseology were what convinced Shedden that here was a man of
destiny. Admiral Hart, ridiculed to the limits of forbearance
pre-war by MacArthur ("get yourself a fleet, Tommy, then you'll
belong") thought "Douglas is ... no longer altogether sane [and]
may not have been for a long time." See Michael Schaller, Douglas
MacArthur . pp49-50.
1. Ted Morgan, FDR, a Biography . New York: Touchstone, 1985.
p637. Indeed, he would rather have lost "anything else" at all.
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shortages and lack of troops were thwarting his plans to save
Australia and liberate the Pacific Islands and return to the
Philippines. Until March, Curtin and Evatt had still been
lobbying for materiel mainly in the wrong direction - toward
London. But Evatt' s own pointed observation that Churchill was
claiming lack of shipping "yet shipping comes here from the
United Kingdom in ballast" should have made it clear once and for
all that British assurances of support would remain largely the
promise of "jam tomorrow". Evatt now thought that
if MacArthur fights hard and he receives strong
support from the Government - if necessary by carefully
considered public statements - the flow of supplies to
Australia could be made reasonably satisfactory. 1
The Australian government was volunteering to become part
of the MacArthur chorus, in the hope of material benefit for its
forces. But it was mainly the Americans who got reinforced;
Roosevelt evidently had no illusion that it was essential for
America's self-image (and for his public image) that America, not
Australia, be seen as the successful "great white hope" of the
Southern Hemisphere.
MacArthur seduced the government's strategic ingenues
into belief in his omnipotence, while demonstrating few other
redeeming gualities in practice. Certainly his performance as a
theatre commander was fairly average - the main practical virtue
of the SWPA command was the fortuitous appointment of General
George Kenney as the Army Air Force (and hence Allied Air Forces)
1. DAFP, vol.V, p756.
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commander. It was his efforts, prodigious when compared to
Brett's 1 , that allowed the Australian troops in New Guinea to
gradually get the better of their enemy (rather than just grimly
hold out against him) , and eventually inflict upon him his first
clear defeats on land. The first of these, in August 1942, was
the repulse of the Japanese landing at Milne Bay, during which
the Australian commanders were subjected to ceaseless and
pointless harassment from MacArthur's ignorant staff, among whom
he had ensured that not one Australian would be included.
For none of which was any credit given by the publicity-
crazed potentate, who however seemed to expect, not
unrealistically, that Australian commanders would make more
effort to publicise their own successes; after all, MacArthur
announced 'his' weeks before they occurred. 2 But Australia's Army
CinC (and titular commander of Allied Land Forces) , General
Blarney, had no instinct whatsoever for public relations. This may
have suited him, but it left Australian troops feeling pretty fed
1. See Lex Macaulay, Battle of the Bismarck Sea . Chapter 1.
Kenney's first and most vital contribution was to "energise" the
well-manned, under performing maintenance and support staffs of
both American and Australian air forces. This had the vital
effect in the USAAF, which had most of the modern transport and
combat aircraft, of drastically improving serviceability rates
and therefore actually getting some effort out of the hundreds of
aircraft already available but not being properly used.
2. And that indeed was part of the problem. The Australians were
infuriated by fatuous communigues from MacArthur that wildly
exaggerated not only what had been gained, but what was expected
to be gained by 'rapid advance' across perhaps the worst fighting
terrain in the world. And even the good men on MacArthur' staff
admitted their inexperience. See: D.M. Horner, Crisis of Command .
Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1978. Chapters
6&7.
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up. 1 Their feelings were not helped by the knowledge in the upper
staff levels - which as ever went down the 'grapevine'- that
MacArthur had early on stated that Australians 'would not fight' 2
(where had he been in France?) arid he needed more Americans; who
performed abysmally on their first few outings. Australian
soldiers quickly went sour on Dugout Doug, and in time so did
their commanders and even the politicians. But it was not only
the idiosyncrasies of the American commander that led to a
situation in which, the worst already having been overcome,
"trans-Pacific disharmony was indeed overt and flourishing by
late 1942." A good deal of this disharmony originated not in the
military command but in the contacts between the two governments.
A key factor was the abrasive personality of the Australian
1. Norman Carlyon, ADC to General Blarney for much of the war,
openly has stated that "one of the few blind spots in [Blarney's]
nature was his failure to see the need for public relations." I
Remember Blarney . Melbourne: Sun-Papermac, 1980, pl35.
2. The American headquarters, frankly, panicked as the Japanese
advanced. General Kenney • s air force commanders moaned to him
that they might lose their airfields - Kenney never went to see
General Rowell, who had already told the Americans there was no
danger of any of the strips then being used having to be yielded
to the enemy. He did decide against defending one strip which had
been prepared but was not in use. MacArthur seems to have got the
wind up. He sent his "would not fight" message to Washington
chiefly as a means of justifying a greater allocation of American
troops to ensure he could eventually go it alone without the
Australians - he would not assign Americans to their command
unless absolutely necessary (as when after they got beaten in
November)
. MacArthur was also trying to justify getting a greater
permanent slice of US Navy support when he once again libeled the
Australians: "The enemy's defeat at Milne Bay must not accepted
as a measure of relative fighting capacity of the troops
involved. The decisive factor was the complete surprise (this was
hogwash!) gained over him by our (and the royal plural!)
preliminary concentration of superior forces." See: Horner, op.
cit. above.
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Foreign Minister, Dr Herbert Vere Evatt, whose "great gualities
did not include the gift of empathy." 1 .
To The Limits of Mateship:
Evatt Attempts to Capture the U.S.
Evatt had a fine forensic mind, as well might a man who had
been a high court justice before entering politics, and he was
(or became) much more of a nationalist than most of his
predecessors - and colleagues, for that matter. His performance
was in some ways a forewarning of the stance that would be taken
by the leaders of many newly-emergent nations in the post-war
era. He was prepared to blame just about anything on the perfidy
of the great powers (and he had no shortage of valid reasons for
this) , but he failed to see that their attitude was basically
predicated on the belief that you get out what you put in; and
the value of both input and output were assessed by large allies
in terms rather different from one's own.
Evatt the Lawyer wanted the major league to perform the
works that would give substance to the words he provided; this
was not much of a bargain either for them or for his country. His
postwar successors were mostly lawyers too; like Evatt, they
perpetuated the tendency noted by Paul Hasluck2 to argue about
1. Barclay, pl3.
2. Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939-41 . p49.
Hasluck observes that they were to argue more about technical
interpretation of "constitutional principles rather than . . . the
practice of politics. . . . [the lawyers only rarely] considered
the political tasks proper to an autonomous nation or the
immediate responsibilities of an egual partner, both to itself (my
emphasis) and to its associates." Hasluck observes that Evatt
himself had written a "learned paper" on the subject of notional
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Dominion (i.e. alliance) status from a legal rather than a
political point of view: there was more concern about Binding
Obligation than enduring interest. Palmerston would have laughed
at them; Washington, have berated their servility; Adams, been
appalled by their simplicity. As Hasluck observed, " Dominion
(national) status is to be found not in a declaration of rights
but in [autonomous action taken] in exercise of those rights." 1
Australia stuck to its "characteristic tendency to avoid
definitions and to do what was [domestically] politically
advantageous". 2 This was a polite way of saying that Australia
held little dear - it would compromise on demand to satisfy the
wishes of others, eventually, in the services of the nation's
. . .Continued. .
.
autonomy (in this instance, as related to British Dominions after
the Statute of Westminster) and made a distinction between having
the right to autonomous power and the "actual exercise of that
power". It seems that what he was arguing was that failure by the
Tributary to exercise to the full the complete autonomy bestowed
by the Statute meant that the Suzerain held real responsibility
to perform such functions as the tributary neglected. This was a
powerful (and wholly spurious) argument for blaming all but
oneself for every failing or neglect of national policy -
especially foreign and defence policy. Evatt professed, as noted
earlier, "profound love" for the U.K.; presumably love of British
Justice; but perhaps also love of ultimate irresponsibility
"under the law". It is no wonder then, that as events wrenched
the scales* from his eyes, he over-compensated; nor that he was so
truculent toward those whom he considered had failed in respect
of their 'legal' obligation. He probably also had an attack of
Courtroom syndrome, thinking that mere words, well chosen and
trenchantly pronounced, would sway the opinion of the great
powers; but in the end it was only deeds and effective counter-
pressure that could force them from their own preferred courses.




only universally held belief: White Australia. It could be said
too that Australia carried over from its alienating experiences
with the British Empire the same attitudes towards its
relationship with the world's new great power - a mixture of
abject dependency combined with overt resentment of the fact that
patrons displayed a rather less well-developed sense of noblesse
oblige than their clients thought they should. At least some of
the realities of the situation began to penetrate the
consciousness of the Australian and New Zealand political
establishments, as evidenced in their decision to unilaterally
announce the formation of an "ANZAC Pact" in early 1944. It
provoked a storm of derision and righteous protest in both London
and Washington, and not only because the wording lacked finesse.
The ANZAC Pact:
By Frustration, out of Delusion
The idea for an Australian-New Zealand agreement on regional
security may have begun to germinate in the minds of the
Australian government in the crisis of the early months of the
Pacific War, during the arguments over boundaries of operational
areas and on the need for a Pacific Council. It was probably
fertilised by Evatt's rather shocked realisation in late May 1942
that neither he nor Curtin knew that Roosevelt and Churchill had
already agreed five months before that regardless of Japan's
entry into the war, their strategy was to "beat Hitler first". 1
Australia had been neither consulted (this always the most
grievous sin - the opportunity to sound important was not lightly
l.DAFP vol.V, p788.
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foregone) nor even informed; and subsequent public statements
alluding to that strategy had been followed by disclaimers and
evasion. Evatt was enraged by this duplicity; he probably
expected it of the British, but clearly was deeply wounded by the
secrecy of the US government. Even his good mate Frankfurter had
said nothing. He was also downcast by the obvious intent of the
major powers to use Australia as little more than a granary,
barracks and stores dump in the future prosecution of the war,
and could see the inevitable result. No glory, no influence. And
at the same time as his discovery of Anglo-American perfidy, he
was informed from Washington that it was "American policy [to
place] American personnel in American aircraft". 1
This struck right to the heart of any illusion of Australia
emerging as an "equal partner" in the South Pacific; its ground
and naval forces would remain dependent throughout on American
air support: which meant that Australian war plans, even local
ones, would remain subordinate to the desires and directions of
Washington. Insult was added to injury when Churchill announced
l.Ibid, p800.
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the "magnificent gesture" 1 of sending one RAF fighter
squadron to Australia, and "releasing" from the Middle East two
squadrons of the RAAF.
MacArthur now chimed in to tell Curtin that "the strength
necessary for the security of Australia as a base exceeds our
maximum potential". This was not quite true, but the distrait
Curtin swallowed it whole. Australia, if relieved of the burden
of board and lodging for a swelling number of still largely
useless American troops, and of the continuing foolish commitment
of thousands of aircrew to Churchill's costly and unproductive
bomber 'offensive', could more than defend itself - given modern
equipment for its Air forces especially, and the assistance at
one remove already given by the US Navy. But MacArthur, having
already taken what his colleague Joseph Stilwell would have
described as a "hell of a licking" had no mind to find out why -
he wanted only to "return." This meant offensive action; and this
meant more forces. And not Australian ones.
Whatever factual inaccuracy MacArthur might have been given
to in service of his own ambition, he still gave Curtin a crisply
l.Ibid, p806. Curtin used this phrase at Evatt's urging (while
Evatt was in London. Bruce privately lamented (pp802-5 & pp811-6)
that Evatt, too, had been 'got at' by Churchill and the trappings
of influence) . Curtin would have done much better to tell
Churchill just what he could do with Pommy pilots, and demand the
return of the rest of his own; as suggested by MacArthur. Part of
the problem at least, for Curtin, was that Bruce was not telling
him what he truly thought of Evatt's performance - and seduction
(see p833) . Bruce came from the 'other side' of politics, and
presumably thought he would be sacked if too frank about Curtin 's
colleague. But Evatt was more tolerated than liked even in his
own party, and might well have gotten reprimanded himself.
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accurate, largely dispassionate appreciation of where Australia




The United States, said MacArthur, had "no sovereign
interest in the integrity of Australia. Its interest was from the
strategical aspect of the utility of Australia as a base." It was
not, as was Britain, bound by any tie of "blood, sentiment [or]
allegiance to the crown". Americans might be "animated by a warm
friendship" for Australia, but the strategic interest in it as
useful base from which to strike the Japanese was conceived
"irrespective of the American relationship" to whoever "might be
occupying Australia." And he pointed out that Evatt's constant
hectoring of Churchill had been the efforts "of a great pleader"
but that the beat Hitler first strategy was "a high hurdle to get
over". He rightly poured scorn on Churchill's "magnificent
gesture"; it represented the return of one sixth of the RAAF
fighter squadrons abroad. And he observed that the 9th Division
was still in Syria.
The return of Australia's forces overseas was not a favour,
as Churchill constantly implied or even stated outright.
Australia's obligation was to itself; it should insist on its
right to have all its forces back. How strange that an Australian
Prime Minister should need to be told this by an American
general. It was sound advice nonetheless. Three weeks later,
Churchill went back on his own word and held the fighter
l.Ibid, pp818-823.
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Squadrons in the Middle East; Rommel was again (as usual) scaring
the wits out of the Empire's greatest Generals ("I wish de Gaulle
were C.I.G.S." , wrote Cadogan) , and panicking the King's First
Minister. The 9th Division went not to Australia but to the front
being clung to 60 miles from Cairo. So much for blood ties and
common loyalties; and for national sovereign rights.
The strategic absurdity continued, with the 9th still
committed in the Middle East long after the crisis had passed.
Curtin protested regularly (starting in July) and in vain;
Churchill evidently thought he could wait him out and exhaust him
by continued evasion, and threats of long-term British (and
American) resentment. He was aided once again by the American
President, who said could he could "appreciate [Curtin 's] anxiety
concerning the absence of forces in the Middle East", but it
would (yet again) be possible to send an American division from
Hawaii, although then again it might be employed somewhere else
"of greater advantage to the defence of Australia." Roosevelt
assumed that this offer "will obviate the necessity for . .
.
[recall of the] 9th Division" back to Australia: "I cannot too
strongly stress that leaving the 9th Division in the Middle East
will best serve our common cause". 1 Only a month before,
Roosevelt was pleading lack of shipping (as usual) as the reason
why "it is not possible to move additional troops to Australia
now or in the immediate future." 2
1. DAFP vol. VII, ppl40-l.
2. Ibid, ppl02-4.
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How quickly things could change, though Churchill's
petulant obstruction continued: now he pleaded lack of shipping;
due he said, lying barefaced once more, to the need to continue
the "Trans-Atlantic buildup for the invasion of the Continent"
(twenty months later!). No one suggested sending more American
troops to North Africa in the interests of beating Hitler first.
Curtin, by now accustomed to Churchill's mendacious pleading, and
perhaps now alert to Roosevelt's ulterior political motives,
besides having his own public to consider, was unmoved.
Eventually, Roosevelt acquiesced (with an uncharacteristically
Churchillian lack of grace) , and Australia got its men back - in
February 1943, nearly eight months after they first had been
asked for.
Relegation
By the end of 1943, Australia's role in the war was already
very much that of a relegated second stringer, increasingly
required only to provide cannon fodder for the Royal Air Force
(and to a lesser extent the Royal Navy)
,
garrison troops in the
Pacific, and common fodder for the American forces in SWPA. Much
earlier than that, MacArthur had sought and got Lt-Gen Walter
Kreuger to come out with the staff of what was to be the US Sixth
Army; signaling the intent to diminish the role of Australian
troops in his future plans. It was clear that this lack of
front line participation by the Army, the virtual absorption of
Australian Air and Naval units into the "allied" forces in SWPA
and elsewhere (where they were given almost no public
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acknowledgement, as had been the case with the Army's
considerable achievements in PNG) would severely limit
Australia's claim to an effective voice in the peace councils at
war's end, and thus in determining the post-war order in the
Pacific.
The major allies increasingly avoided even the pretence of
consultation with Australia, which having been 'saved' from Japan
by the Grace of God, Roosevelt and MacArthur (and they would have
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to argue amongst themselves as to order of merit) was
expected to show the appropriate humility to the masters of its
destiny.
Winding Down
Australia's efforts to overcome its marginalisation centred
mainly upon establishing itself as Britain's chief partner and
subcontractor in the Far East, and in attempting to prevent the
nascent United Nations from becoming a body that would simply
impose 'big power' solutions to world problems. Neither did much
for its relations with the United States, whose patronage
Australia also continued to court, though with less ardour than
in the years of crisis. The last couple of years of the war were
noteworthy for the increasing effort made by Australia to "bring
in" British forces for the finale of the Pacific War; reunited
under the Union Jack, it seems Australia's leaders believed, they
would show the Americans that they, too, counted for something in
the world. Politicians and generals alike were attracted too by
the notion of Australian servicemen finally commanding expanded
•Empire' forces.
What Evatt, his government and the generals had failed to
realise was that reference to past effort, however meritorious,
on behalf of others or even for oneself, had virtually no effect
on the deliberations of those plotting the future - for which
even Britain, let alone Australia had little to offer in terms of
real power.
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As noted earlier, Evatt's performance, attitudes and
language were in many ways forerunners of the style of
international politicking adopted by the more prominent members
of the Third World 1 during the postwar rush to decolonisation and
assertive nationalism on the part of newly liberated colonies.
But Australia itself had no such powerful incentive as
decolonisation to push it off the path of dull certitude into
adventurous experiment; although a rudimentary analysis would
have shown it had a lot more intrinsic strength than many who did
attempt such a course.
Australia's problem was not so much the effect of Evatt's
hectoring but that it would not assert its nationalism to a
sufficient degree by matching words with deeds. And in trying
simply to play off two great powers against each other in an
attempt to improve its own position in and influence over their
policies, it overlooked the fact that it was little more to
either than a moderately conveniently located piece of real
estate, and useful place for Britain to deposit its excess
unemployed. 2 Australia's inability to stress its difference from
1. During the 194 5 San Francisco Conference, Cadogan (Diaries .
p74 5) wrote that he thought Evatt "the most frightful man in the
world; he makes long and tiresome speeches on every conceivable
subject, always advocating the wrong thing and generally with a
view to being inconvenient and offensive to us, and boosting
himself. However, everyone by now hates Evatt so much that his
stock has gone down and he matters less."
2. As in 1917, the British enquired in 1944 if Australia would be
prepared as before to take "demobilised service personnel" post-
war; "we are under considerable pressure here . . . for a
declaration of our policy" again in recognition of economic
reality. DAFP, vol. VII, p231.
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the principal western allies -in fact its insistence on its
sameness to alternately Britain or the US (depending upon what it
was trying to wheedle out of whom) cut little ice with either
partner of the Atlantic "special relationship". There was not
going to be a contest between these two for Australia's
affections - its strident racialism put it "in the bag" anyway,
so far as being a part of "the West" was concerned; and there was
no chance that it would fall into the clutches of the world
conspiracy of godless communism. Australia did not need to be
"wooed" into alignment with the west - it was desperate for it.
The main thing was to prevent any hot-headed Australians with
minds of their own from upsetting the international apple cart by
failing to concur and participate in the grand design being laid
out in Washington and to a lesser extent in the capitals of
western Europe. Australia would be dependable because it was
dependent - still a colony.
Eine Kleine Schmalt zmusik
This reality was made clear by the turbulent Evatt in an
extraordinarily (and unnaturally) smarmy paean of praise to
Australia's "saviours", which he delivered in early 1945. After
opening up with a few evasions of fact ( such as Australia's
supposed calm acceptance of the 'beat Hitler first' strategy) and
a few exaggerations (Australia's navy, he said, had suffered
losses "proportionally greater than those of any other nation" -
which glossed over its inconseguential strength in major
warships) , Evatt ladled out the syrup to his American audience in
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a fashion that must have amazed those at the State department who
had anything to do with him up till then 1 . He assured them that:
"... seldom if ever has history evidenced a better
example of military cooperation between a greater power
and a lesser one that between Australia and the United
States forces in the area of the South-West Pacific.
That spirit of comradeship and cooperation will go on
to the end. The whole of our Pacific forces have been
assigned to General MacArthur's command under the
directive [agreed to with the United States], and they
are used as and when and where it is most advantageous
to the common cause." 2
This was in backwaters. There was no employment of large-
scale Australian forces in the invasion of the Philippines or the
subsequent campaign to retake the group. By early 1944 MacArthur
seemed to have overcome at least some of his earlier disdain for
the fighting qualities of his erstwhile allies. In March, he told
Curtin that he (MacArthur) "contemplated" that the "spearhead of
his advance to the Philippines" would be three Australian
divisions and an American paratroop division. Soon afterward,
politics seems to have intervened. An integrated Australian Corps
under national command could not now take part. MacArthur now
decreed that Australian divisions fight separately under American
corps commands, or not take part at all. Australia wanted to
field (and had ready) a full army corps for operations in Leyte
1. Cordell Hull ( himself hardly Roosevelt's right-hand man on
foreign policy, despite being nominal Secretary of State, but
good enough for Australian Prime Ministers to meet with) told
Curtin in 1944 that "we frankly do not appreciate the attitude of
Dr Evatt on this - the ANZAC Pact - and other matters." See
Barclay, Friends in High Places . ppl7-18.
2. Harper, pl62.
3. DAFP vol. VII, pl74.
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and afterwards; but under its own national commander. He fully
appreciated the anxiety of Australia's military leaders in
particular that their men should not be committed and chewed up
piecemeal, the way they so often had when fighting for the
British in both world wars; and therefore must have anticipated
that his demand to split the available Australian forces could
not be accepted.
Although the Corps would clearly have come under the
overall operational command of the American invasion force
commander, with no objection from Australia, MacArthur could not
agree to this alone. 1 . It was do as I say or stay out of it. It
may have been solely his decision, but it seems likely that
Washington had more than a small part to play. As the First
Secretary reported from Washington at the end of February 1944,
it was essential to distinguish between "the attitude of
Americans as a whole toward Australia and the attitude of the
American Administration." The public, despite increasing
newspaper criticism which could provide " a background which
could probably be developed to Australia's disadvantage" in
official or influential press circles, remained generally well-
1. He used the familiar excuse of shipping, in the end; not
enough to transport all the Australians together. So he shipped
an American army corps all the way from Hawaii, and later shipped
it back. Blarney's ADC, Norman Carlyon (whose book is one of the
least hagiographic, but fair, accounts I have ever read from a
person in such a position) says that Sutherland told Blarney
outright "at a conference at the Brisbane GHQ" (no date given)
that "it was impossible for political reasons to use Australian
troops in the Philippines." See: Carlyon, I Remember Blarney .
ppl36-7.
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disposed toward Australia. But the Administration's attitude was
a "different thing altogether". 1
Nelson Johnson, the US Minister to Australia, had it seems a
fairly low opinion of his hosts, and especially of their noisy
Foreign Minister. The President himself was aggravated by Evatt's
ham-fisted style of indiscreet 'diplomacy'. The Far East Affairs
section of the State Department wanted nothing to do with the
minor league. And some of the press was scathing indeed. A
significant section of US public opinion seemed to have come to
the view, fuelled by the MacArthur publicity machine, and by
influential sections of the press and officialdom, that in the
Pacific as elsewhere America by its efforts had earned the right
to become dictatress of the world's post-war fate. It was a
vision of a post-war pax Americana that would depend upon the
creation of an American global imperium, founded in and enforced
by a worldwide distribution of American forces, based in
locations of their choice. According to the Chicago Daily
Tribune, which was controlled by the Secretary of the Navy
Colonel Frank Knox, the United States would
need more than bases around Northern Australia, New
Guinea and ... in New Caledonia. She will also require
bases in the Philippines, Formosa or the China coast,
the Kuriles, Marshalls and Carolines in order to
properly contain Japan. 2
1. DAFP vol. VII, ppl33-8.
2. Barclay & Siracusa, ppl8-19.
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Australia had no particular objection to this prescription,
although traditional distrust of American expansion and fear of
the potentially suffocating power of American economic-industrial
capacity caused renewed effort to be made to prop up the British
position and expand British participation in the Pacific war, as
a means of providing a counterweight to American hegemonic
tendencies.
The past was catching up to Australia, at least in the view
of Colonel Knox's self-righteous correspondent:
When General MacArthur took command the Australians
were scarcely even trying to keep New Guinea. General
MacArthur recovered it ... without our efforts
[Australia] probably would be a Japanese possession.
The American nation saved the Australians from the
Japanese cut-throats.
These intemperate and rabidly inaccurate comments were
reported in the Melbourne Herald, no doubt to the considerable
chagrin of its readers and their relatives in the Australian
armed forces which, in addition to their achievements in the two
years prior to American entry into the war, had been the first
white troops to inflict even local tactical defeats on the
Japanese on land, and which had done the bulk of the effective
ground fighting in New Guinea. As the Herald observed:
l.Ibid. The authors give the date of the article as 2 March 1943.
This is clearly a misprint, given the reference to the ANZAC
Pact, which only surfaced in December 1943. I presume the correct
date is 2 March 1944.
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...the Tribune's leader might be discounted as [typical
Anglophobia (inadvertently revealing the Herald's view
of Australian autonomy) ] ... but the fact that Colonel
Knox's own paper adopts [this] line indicates the
growing unanimity in America on the question of
achieving security. America, in fact, in determining as
Russia to push her frontiers forward, advances much the
same reasoning [as Russia] in support of her
policies (my emphasis)." 1
With regard to Australia's desires for a say in the shaping
and the administration of the postwar order in the South Pacific
and the 'rampart' to the north, the Herald noted "the
Administration's studied silence concerning the [ANZAC] Pact",
and that it had "not rejected Mr Curtin's proposal for a Pacific
Conference but has simply ignored it." America would act in its
own time, as it saw fit - others were to comply. Australia could
talk all it liked, but it had not the power or influence to get
results it desired if America decided otherwise. In this, the
United States was supported in the spirit if not the letter by
Great Britain, whose great power amour propre was much offended
by the presumptuous unilateralism of the south sea Dominions when
together they agreed to define a "regional zone of defence . .
.
based on Australia and New Zealand, stretching through he arc of
islands north and northwest of Australia, to Western Samoa and
1. This is an interesting comment, revealing the truth of many
smaller "aligned" powers view of the behaviour of the two future
•superpowers'. Had it not been for the strength of British
sentiment, still, and the egregious burden of "White Australia",
there would have been a very good case for Australia's becoming
non-aligned after the war. There was anyway, since to all
practical purpose that had been the position of South Africa and
Canada before the war, and pretty well has been for much of the
period after it - albeit in very different circumstances.
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the Cook Islands", and advocated an international conference be
held involving all "governments with existing territorial
interests" in that region. The conference was to be called (and
Evatt probably hoped, chaired) by Australia .
Although in January 194 4 Roosevelt had invited Curtin to
Washington 1
, assuring him that he was keen to talk (now he had
finished dealing with the major league at Cairo and Teheran) ,and
that "Australia is pulling her weight in the boat", the State
Department was "frankly disturbed" at the proposal for an "early"
discussion of "regional security and related matters" 2 . America
hadn't initiated it seemed to be the substance of the complaint,
even though the various "Bigs" (three, four or whatever) had no
difficulty themselves sitting down to determine the fates of
millions over dinner. They clearly wished to avoid having to
discuss with France and the Netherlands the question of the
status of colonies postwar, too, to avoid "bring[ing] into focus
1. Curtin got to have lunch with Roosevelt and that, it seems,
was that. About the only thing that came of the meeting,
according to a sketchy record of conversation by Roosevelt's
naval aide, was that Curtin agreed with Roosevelt that the ANZAC
Pact was all Evatt' s fault, done in a fit of" excess ...
enthusiasm". In response to which Roosevelt magnanimously
(patronisingly) "direct [ed] that the record show [sounds like
some silly courtroom soap opera!] that his present opinion is
that it will be best for us to forget the whole incident." Curtin
fell for it; in the end, despite his ability to be strong 'on the
wire', he could not handle confrontation face to face. The
logical thing to do was stick to his guns, admitting only perhaps
that some aspects might be susceptible to further review. So he
was content to resile and then receive his pat on the head. But
he moaned about it later to Churchill (of all people!). See DAFP,
vol. VII, pp247-8 and 262-4.
2. DAFP, vol. VII, ppl01-3.
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conflicting opinions on matters which do not require decision at
this time." The little folk could wait; Curtin could talk in
Washington, and that would be plenty, thank you. 1
Britain regarded the ANZAC Pact as regrettable but not
punishable lese majeste; nothing to be taken seriously, simply
yet another attempt by the minor league to have a say "in all
major international decisions on an equal plane with the Great
Powers." The plain (diplomatically, rather arbitrary) language
of the ANZAC Pact came across as unseemly arrogance, even
"megalomania" from a small nation which had yet to learn that
even this rudimentary attempt at power politics was, given that
it had no real power, just another example of Australia's
penchant to play "music without instruments." Under the
stewardship of the trenchantly abrasive Evatt, Australia's
diplomatic orchestra was all too often a cacophony, which left
its intended audience stone cold - though it clearly fulfilled
some emotional need on the part of the players. The pattern would
continue until the end of the war, and into the post-war years.
Australia reduced its army manpower (and its public standing
in the United States; no doubt contributing to the sort of
1. In his pre-visit briefing to Curtin, MacArthur once again
provided some incisive wheat with the self-serving chaff. He
noted that Roosevelt tended to flit all over the place during
discussion, interlarding reference to the "essential questions,
in order to obtain expressions of agreement. This method
frequently took [people] unawares . . . Having secured [apparent]
agreement to what he wanted, the President instantly sought to
nail people to their answers." - DAFP, vol. VII, p!75.
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twaddle being pushed by Knox's newspaper) 1 to meet the burgeoning
demands being made on the domestic economy by the US forces.
Curtin was alive to the danger, but hamstrung by both traditional
loyalty and present reality when it came to formulating a policy
response; he could only urge Churchill to 'get a move on' with
sending more British naval forces to the Pacific. In August he
cabled the man who had done so much to enforce Australian
subservience to the political needs of its "friends", asking for
help out of the predicament by appealing to British self-
interest, and repainting himself as a loyal son of empire:
You will recall my discussions regarding the
importance to the British Empire of flying the Union
Jack in the impending operations in the Pacific and
[for] a British Naval Force [taking part under SWPA
command] in the Philippines attack. . .
.
There is developing in America a hope that they will be
able to say that they won the Pacific war by
themselves, even though they seek the maximum aid
hoping to keep the publicity regarding the British
forces limited.
1. A diplomatic report from Washington stated: "original reaction
from American press this morning which carried Army Minister
Forde's announcement was very adverse and there is no doubt this
will be [against us in other areas]. We realise, of course, that
these reductions are entirely due to the necessity of getting
more manpower onto the food production front to feed the US Army
in [SWPA]. [But] the explanation never quite catches up to the
original statement." (On 10 April the Washington Post noted that
the report had shocked senators on the Military Committee. As
usual, it was a bit late by then.) American pique at the ANZAC
Pact, the report said, was also hampering procurement efforts.
The Americans, as feared, were becoming as puerile as Churchill.
See DAFP, vol. VII, p229.
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The Prime Minister Continued:
I am deeply concerned at the position that would arise
in our [ ! ] Far East Empire if any considerable American
opinion were to hold that America fought a war on
principle in the far East and won it relatively unaided
while the other allies, including ourselves, did little
towards recovering our lost property.
I put this matter to you frankly as one of deep and
far-reaching consequence to our [whose: Australia's or
'the Empire's'?] future role and prestige in the
Pacific sphere. 1
Nothing was (nor could be) done quick enough, and the
Americans neither needed nor wanted the British around. Australia
committed its still substantial frontline forces to militarily
irrelevant moping-up campaigns in the Pacific Islands, and some
equally pointless joint operations in Borneo. These may have been
of some political value to Australia, but it was slight compared
to the higher profile it might have had, both militarily and
politically, especially in determining the postwar settlement
with Japan, from having a substantial national force involved in
the Philippines or elsewhere in the Northern Pacific.
And in the United States, concluding his ode to the joy of
consensual relations, Evatt would implore of his audience:
l.DAFP vol. VII, p479. Curtin had already raised the matter with
Churchill, by telegram, in July 1944 (ibid., pp433-4) , when the
Americans' intent to go it alone, and designate themselves
•saviours of the world' was already very clear from the open
press and from Embassy advice. Churchill's prime concern was
Europe and the Atlantic; where another of the Empire's 'Greatest
Generals' was making a cock of things yet again, and the
Admiralty still was not confident that the threat to shipping had
been overcome.
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Why cannot similar cooperation and comradeship endure
throughout the post-war period? . . . [The] post-war
problems which will confront our peoples will be most
difficult to solve . . . [but] they can hardly prove as
difficult as [the situation] after Pearl Harbour when,
for a long time, we had so little to meet the enemy's
tremendous effort to establish his new economic empire
in South-East Asia, in Indonesia, New Guinea and
Australia. 1
Unfortunately for Evatt and Australia, he got just what he
asked for: a similar style of cooperation that owed far more to
the reality than to the fond illusion of what it meant to be a
very small fish in the back corner of a very large pond. What he
was saying, in effect, was: "we have completely subordinated our
forces and our fate to your direction. Why don't you let us tell
you what we want - so you can give it to us?" The longing for
patronage was almost palpable. A new stage of the relationship
had been reached - America now was identified as Australia's
•mate' in the Pacific. Washington didn't buy the beer.
War's End - War's Beginning
Despite the views of Frank Knox and others like him that the
United States had "earned control" over just about the entire
surface of the earth, the Truman administration had no special
interest to mind in the South Pacific. Under the pressure of a
breakneck demobilisation of its huge armed forces, and with
1. H.V. Evatt, "Charter Address at the University of California",
March 1945. In Harper, Australia and the United States , pl62.
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mounting domestic unrest at home
,
it quickly lost any enthusiasm
it might have had to maintain any significant force in the
region. Australian attempts to 'tie down' the US, and persuade it
to retain the substantial wartime naval and air facilities built
in the Admiralty Islands, were fruitless due to clumsy diplomacy
from Australia and complete disinclination on the part of the
United States 1 . Australian dependence upon the US for protection
was a "given" so far as the US was concerned - and so therefore
was Australian complaisance with whatever the US might feel
inclined to do (or not) in Australia's area of interest. The
South Pacific didn't count in the grand scheme of things; the
United States had set out its "new frontier' in the northern
Pacific, and had admirable outposts in the Philippines, the
Marianas and in the whole of Japan and its former mandated
territories. Australia's continued obeisance to Britain in many
matters, and its opposition to both the veto power of the "big
five" in the UN Security Council 2 and the autarchic reign of the
US in Japan, both did little to help get Australia more firmly
* One of the great American myths is that it was only its
degenerate allies who suffered industrial problems and related
civil unrest during and immediately after the war. But an
elementary study will show that the US was riven by industrial
disputation during this period, based on all the same kinds of
reasons and emotions as prevailed in Australia, Britain and
elsewhere. The problem as usual is most likely that servicemen
abroad see what is happening in the host country and tell
themselves that it "wouldn't happen at home" - it foes, but when
they go home and denigrate the inferior antics they had
witnessed, only rarely does someone at home point out that the
same was happening there, thus do people preserve their false
image of superiority over others.
1. Barclay, Chapter 2.
2. Barclay, pp21-22
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into the American camp; or from the Australian view point, to get
the US to overtly provide the sort of 'favourite son' treatment
that it apparently expected was the natural outcome of an
alliance with the US.
Once more, at the end of a war there was not a great deal of
mutual regard between officials of either country; Australia
distrusted American "imperialist sentiment" which it was felt was
motivating American diplomacy rather than a genuine commitment to
"internationalism" 1 . Many at all walks of life were glad to see
the back of the Yanks at war's end. They deplored "the financial
degradation to which too many Australians were willing to
succumb" servicing the wants of the "ridiculously overpaid" and
free-spending Americans. The relegation of "Australia's finest"
fighting men to the backwaters of the Pacific war was also keenly
felt. And so, to quote Henrietta Drake-Brockman, an astute
observer of Australians and a noted chronicler of her times:
"the war drag[ed] on. The Yanks, no longer either
saviours or objects of curiosity, are more tolerated
than welcome. ...At the end of the Japanese war, the
gradual withdrawal of the United States' forces [was]
regarded with relief." 2
1. Barclay, p23. This sentiment expressed by Australian diplomat
Sir Frederick Eggleston, who had been Australian ambassador to
Chungking for most of the war. He had seen enough of American
romanticism and their illogical twists and turns to distrust them
totally it seems. And his views on many matters had over time
proven eminently sane. So his view on this would have been
respected and probably acted upon.
2. Quoted in Crowley, vol.2, pl08.
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This was no exaggeration, even though the remarkable
penetration of Australia by American popular culture in the
succeeding decades, and the continued leaning towards America and
away from Britain, might seem to show otherwise. But the point
was that many Australians saw America as a substitute in either
or both their affections and their dislikes for Great Britain.
Perhaps for many it had been seen more as being simply in locum
tenens . The "pro-Empire, anti-English condescension" attitudes of
Australians transferred easily to America in the imperial role.
It did not help that Australia continued to adhere to its
hopeless "White Australia Policy", and that much of the postwar
migrant influx came from a decaying Britain that it seemed had
lost all hope and whose glory was all in the past. Far too many
of these people thought it more important to restore to Britain
some of her former importance in the world, and central position
in the Australian constellation, than to carve a new and
distinctive identity for a new land in a "galaxy far, far away",
But the pre-war status quo was inexorably and irremediably
changing at a pace that left the limited imagination of white,
"British" Australia hobbling along behind.
* The clamour for 'local content rules' on Australian television
for instance, owed rather less to the closed-shop proclivity of
Actors' Equity than to the popular weariness with the networks'
habit of pumping them full of cheaply bought American "family"
programmes and "sitcoms". By 1958, The Current Affairs Bulletin
would observe that "all the TV (sic) stations are asking for
Ausralian scripts... TV is becoming an important source of
culture. [But] Most of the culture it presents is not and is not
likely to be Australian." See: Crowley, vol.2, pp369-70.
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CHAPTER 5
AN ILLUSORY MATESHIP: 1945 - 1972
It always seemed to me that the Australian concept of
mateship entered into the Australian-American
relationship in a way which caused certain
difficulties.
The American . . . does not quite understand the
Australian expectation that mates will always put their
loyalty to one another ahead of other relationships.
The Australian, perhaps quite unconsciously expects to
be given a priority position in American affections . .
.
expressed in terms of military protection, [and]
preferential arrangements in international trade . .
.
However much individual Americans may come to prefer
[Australians] to their other friends and relatives,
Washington policies are conducted with a certain cosmic
impartiality. ... I often could not quite say the
things that I felt my audience wanted to hear. 1
Australian-US relations at the official level were tolerable
but lacked warmth, and developed at an indifferent pace. Postwar
policy of the Labor government under Chifley echoed that of the
"new Jerusalem" tendencies of Atlee's Britain; strong emphasis on
social welfare, fuelled by protected and preferably nationalised
industries. This was, naturally, anathema to the US, although
some socialist measures were undertaken by the Truman
administration, including price controls and farm relief - and
even the attempted temporary takeover of certain industries by
1. Frank S. Hopkins, US Consul-General in Melbourne, 1960-3. In
Harper, Australia and the United States . pp255-6.
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the state. Prime Minister Chifley, a former engine driver, was a
staunch anti-Communist who would eventually use troops as strike-
breakers (as had been done during the war years as well) during
the coal miners' strike of 1949. But he held a deep commitment to
socialist principles, underpinned of course by that old bugaboo,
state control of the means of production and distribution. His
proposal to nationalise the nation's banks was probably the straw
that broke the Labor camel's electoral back, and allowed the
return of Menzies and his clique of do-nothing Anglophiles.
Frozen Out and Frozen In
Although it had some success in improving the role of the
world's minor powers in the United Nations conference in San
Francisco in 1945 1 , Labor remained sceptical that the UN alone
would prove an effective vehicle for maintenance of regional
collective security from armed aggression2 . These fears were
1. Evatt's view of his achievements (he lists no less than 13
amendments and additions to the Charter, besides a few other
matters he was involved in) , and his disappointment at not
preventing the Great Power veto in the Security Council, are
recorded in his press release of 23 June 1945, as conveyed by
cable to the Embassy in Washington. See: DAFP vol. VIII, pp230-2.
2. Stemming from its own disillusioned recognition of previously
excessive belief in the efficacy of the League of Nations and
later disarmament 'agreements'. But the same wish for an
effective world body remains characteristic of Labor to this day.
It is really rooted in its other age-old hostilities, toward
•merchants of death' (building profits on the corpses of 'the
workers') and a general reluctance to spend money on defence,
until an emergency has arisen that cannot be talked away. Hasluck
is pretty objective about this in his Official History (given
that he came most definitely from a more 'conservative-
nationalist' background, and was one of the few outstanding men
in Menzies' ministries), and I think his view of "The Standpoint
of Labour" is as good an explanatory brief as one might find
anywhere. The really fascinating thing is that the 'standpoint'
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heightened by the increasingly dictatorial attitudes displayed by
the US toward its "partners" in the "free world", and by
intransigence shown by the USSR in the pursuit of its own
interests in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. It was clear that
Britain, despite its return to Southeast Asia and Hong Kong, was
too enfeebled and dependent on American money to do much to
offset the United States' ability to do much as it pleased
anywhere in the world. Nor could Britain resume its role as
Australia's military guarantor.
Indeed, Britain was struggling to retain at least
sufficient of the illusion of power to remain in the major
league, and was less inclined than ever to represent or guarantee
the interests of its weaker Commonwealth associates. In fact it
expected them to devote themselves with redoubled fervour and
material commitment to the task of restoring the image of power
of the British Empire; long before an increasingly resentful
America even thought of the term, Britain had already inaugurated
as policy the concept of Imperial burden-sharing .
. . .Continued. .
.
was and is recognisably the wellspring of today's defence policy
- so much for the "revolution" and "conceptual watersheds". See
The Government and the People. 1939-41 , pp20-30.
* And in fact this was the gist of the inter-war Imperial
Conferences, and the root of the whole idea of Imperial Defence.
It was predicted on the same two options as the American
Imperium: indivisibility or fragmentation. It was no more valid
than Douhet's nonsense about the indivisibility of air power, nor
the Mackinder-based notion of geo-political 'heartlands'. As the
Chinese enduringly prove, an ethical -emotional- social base can
be provided chiefly through the power of an Idea, regardless of
location; but overseas Chinese are nonetheless loyal to the
country they reside in, for all their allegiance to the ideal of
196
At the same time, the inability to persuade a rapidly
contracting United States military establishment of the strategic
importance of Oceania generally made it unlikely that any special
favours or assistance would be forthcoming from across the
Pacific. And the US, far from imposing upon Japan the harsh peace
terms that Australia had desired, so as to throttle the pace of
its eventual re-emergence as a major power, was setting about
rebuilding the place and had even maintained on his throne the
Emperor Hirohito, for many Australians the very essence of a
rotten Japanese system.
Australia's favourite American, Douglas MacArthur, became
the United States' pro-consul in Japan, and was as rudely
dictatorial as ever. The Australian and other nations'
representatives on the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) were
occasionally so incensed by US unilateralism in support of its
"perimeter building" that they took sides with the Russians 1 , who
by this time were already viewed as a new threat to the rest of.
the western world. 2 Nonetheless, Australia and the US did find
some common ground in their approach to Indonesian independence.
. . .Continued. .
.
a China that was (is) the centre of the Universe.
1. Kazuo Kawai, Japan's American Interlude , pl8.
2. Michael Schaller. The American Occupation of Japan , p63. The
Australian representative, W. MacMahon Ball thought that US-
Soviet rivalry, as fostered mainly by MacArthur 's paranoid staff,
"cast a shadow" over the ACJ. There were "no problems of Japan";




It was Evatt, after consultation with, inter alia, the U.S.,
who brought the Dutch-Indonesian dispute to the notice of the
Security Council; and Australia was nominated, with no visible 1
qualms on the American part, as Indonesia's representative on the
United Nations' Good Offices Committee. Nonetheless, not all
Australians reacted with unalloyed joy to the sudden emergence of
a populous Asian republic whose territory occupied much of the
sacred northern "rampart" 2 . Australia was moved to do two things:
firstly, to set out a coherent and moderately ambitious defence
programme, in which naval and air forces would be substantially
strengthened, while a small but useful standing army was to be
maintained for the first time in the nation's history. Secondly,
1. Though there were enough less visible ones. America had given
up on de-colonisation in South-east Asia. The State Department
thought "the Australian attitude [supporting Indonesian
independence] is not helpful ... [it] serves to weaken the
democratic [!] front, it has and will prove embarrassing to us."
But by 1948 the US had done a '180', to accord with Australia's
(and a more "naturally" American) position. Evatt got carried
away again, and started on about a "special relationship with the
American people" - shades of Churchill, whom he resembled more
closely than either would have wished to acknowledge. See:
Barclay, pp29-29.
2. Even though it was recognised as inevitable and, really, only
fair. Even in December 1945, Australian W. MacMahon Ball had
reported that despite the arguments of the British foreign office
representatives to "impress me with the wisdom of the Foreign
Office, based on so long an experience in handling the 'Eastern
Mind', [of] the great advantages to Australia of the restoration
of Dutch rule . . . and the . . . ephemeral nature of the Nationalist
Movement...", the Dutch were bound to go. He was unimpressed with
the Dutch leaders in the N.E.I. : "[they] display a muddling
ineptitude in almost every enterprise they undertake. ... Their
Dutch remedy is force and still more force to teach the "natives"
a lesson." But "the real problem is not whether the Indonesians
can govern themselves but whether they will allow the Dutch to
govern." And this they clearly would not. See: DAFP vol. VIII,
pp716-22. Document 458.
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the government set about, with redoubled vigour, trying to
secure a formal military security guarantee from the United
States.
Its ability to do this was undermined not only by the
sometimes schizophrenic manoeuvres of Evatt* - still Foreign
Minister until 1949 - but by Australia's equally schizophrenic
outlook on international relations generally. It continued to
strongly assert its right to be counted and listened to as an
independent nation (an emergent regional power, it thought) , even
as it fell back into the British trap in a multitude of ways.
Though it probably was satisfying to Australian egos to hold the
chairmanship of the British Commonwealth delegation to the Allied
Council for Japan, and the command of the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force (headquartered in Kure) this only helped
submerge Australian identity back into the Imperial pastiche - it
was still being the loyal servant of Empire. It continued,
despite partial agreement to America's goals of free
international trade, to remain in the sterling bloc (effectively
having to beg to Britain for a quota of Dollar credits) and to
give outrageous preference to British manufactures and motor
* Continuing the trend of Australian politicians to criticise
from afar and go to water when confronted with the object of
their pronouncements, Evatt decided after visiting Japan in 1947
that MacArthur in his new role was not such a bad guy after all.
Assistant Secretary of State Robert Lovett wrote of Evatt that he
had "great self-confidence and determination, is anxious to have
a finger in every pie, is slow in giving his confidence, and
insists on receiving full credit for his achievements." Curiously
enough, this accurate portrait just about put a face to American




and financial and freight services, even though after
the war these were even less competetive than before. It tied its
defence forces to British equipment, and its nascent national
industries suffered likewise. Worse, Australia found it
congenial and convenient to continue protection of Australian
industry at ridiculous levels in the name of job creation2 , while
making no real effort to export its products in deference to
Britain, whose need was it seems presumed to be greater.
Australia continued to depend heavily upon agricultural and raw
material exports, and effectively sustained the economic
imbalances and malpractices of the pre-war period with the aid of
abominable industrial relations practices that seemed to be
reinforced by the British-oriented "populate or perish" assisted
immigration scheme. Together with a lack of Australian owned .pa
shipping and financial service institutions, all this helped
1. British motor vehicle imports were still getting preferential
treatment in 1968; the import tariff for them was 35%, versus 45%
for other "most favoured" nations' cars. Even with this kind of
help they were virtually eliminated from the domestic market by
1973, when their local manufacturing and assembly plants also
shut down. See: Crowley, vol.2, pp550-l.
2. There was an obsession, held in common by British and
Australian Labour, with "full employment" policies. It was a
main point of contention with the US during the war, when postwar
policy was being formulated, and afterwards, . The strange thing
is that Australia was easily more able than Britain to sustain a
low rate of "structural unemployment" - the government was
routinely taken to talks postwar when the unemployment exceeded
2-3%. Britain's "New Jerusalem" architects, in contrast, reckoned
on a "structural unemployment" rate of around 8% - that is, full
employment meant about 92% of the workforce (in essence, males
from 15-65) in something like permanent employment. Australia's
expectations in this respect were therefore even less realistic
than those of its mentors.
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produce a round of recurring balance of payments crises. 1
The overall effect of all this was to, as usual, curtail
defence spending and reduce Australia's forces again to token
level. It seems that, despite appointment of some its best
qualified and insightful people to the United States, none of
them had realised - or at least had not convinced the government
- that the cardinal principle followed by the US in its dealings
with its "friends" was that the lord helps those who help
themselves. The long postwar line of non-professional, political
appointees sent to Australia as US Ambassadors, should have
demonstrated even to those in the cocoon of Canberra that the US
did not regard Australia as having any particular importance.
Adding to its woes, the Americans, who seemed to believe they had
just discovered pragmatism in diplomatic relations, criticised
(rightly, nonetheless) Australia's excessively 'academic'
approach to foreign relations, characterised by unrealistic
appreciations of its position and by inflexible conduct of its
relations with especially the US. The Labor government was also
1. Which I think is the main reason for Menzies' long-standing
resort to vote-buying welfare measures and "red scares" to keep
himself in power. Import restrictions, of steadily increasing
severity, were imposed in 1952, 1954, and 1955; all during the
so-called "postwar boom", which came to a shuddering halt in 1957
after a severe drought reduced Australia's lifeblood - primary
exports (still) . Restrictions were lifted briefly in 1959, only
to be reimposed, along with a severe curtailment of credit, the
following year. "Except in 1954, reported the Sydney Morning
Herald (17 November 1960) , inflation has proceeded at a rapid
rate ever since [1949]." Taxation had risen steadily, along with
the size of government and of its "socialist" state-run
enterprises, including the Commonwealth Bank (Chifley must have
been rolling in his grave!). The pattern seemed to continue ad
infinitum. See Crowley, vol.2.
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considered to be "soft on Communism", rapidly becoming the
ultimate expression of righteous American disdain.
The overall view, expressed by the US Charge d' Affairs in
Canberra in 1948, was that the government and the people were
saturated with a "complacent assumption that when [and if] the
next war comes, the United States will [come and] bail them out
just like it did last time." 1 Australia's relationship with the
US was getting caught in a revolving door of mutually
reinforcing, self-fulfilling prophecy. Dependency breeds
disregard, which breeds insecurity. Insecurity breeds dependency.
And yet any attempt to assert independence bred only hostility,
and attempts to reinforce dependent status.
To the considerable relief of the State Department and the
newly returned Truman administration, whose negative attitudes to
Australia had undoubtedly been fuelled by some pretty ordinary
Ambassadors, Labor was defeated in 1949 by the Menzies-led
conservative coalition of the Liberal and Country parties. The US
expected that this group would be less troublesome - "less . .
.
demagogic and . . . more reasonable and [sympathetic] to the United
1. Barclay, p29
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States point of view." 1 This was not too far from the mark,
but it overlooked a couple of things. First, that Menzies,
although possessed of an almost unparalleled capacity for public
groveling to great and powerful friends (his own infamous
phraseology) , had by now fallen complete victim to galloping
anglophilia - he would willingly subordinate the interests of his
own country, let alone those of the upstart United States, to
those of mother England. Secondly, Australians as a whole
remained mortally afraid of a resurgent Japan, and it was
therefore an electoral necessity for any government to oppose an
"easy" peace - unless it could produce an acceptable
international quid pro quo, in the form of a formal military
alliance one or both of the leading western powers. Menzies also
had learned of the importance in domestic politics of what he
called the "hip pocket nerve" - he aimed to stay in office by
1. See G.St. J. Barclay, op.cit., for a concise review of this
immediate postwar period. The quality of US ambassadors was truly
appalling. After the nonentity Butler came the positively
malicious Cowen, who boasted that it was chiefly due to his
efforts that Evatt was to be replaced as head of the UN General
Assembly by Carlos Romulo of the Philippines. After him came a
Alabama politician known in the US as "no friend of Labor", who
asked Truman for the job because, having been voted out of office
and having no marketable skills, apparently, "I really need to go
on the payroll."
* Perhaps, though, the strangest outcome of the change of
government was that the United States proved that, regardless of
the political colour of its own administration, and regardless of
its ability to stomach 'leftist' governments in Europe, it could
not abide them elsewhere. Australia was lumped in with "the rest"
politically; any bunch of subservient right-wingers was
preferable to any bunch of noisy left-wingers (even though in
Australia at least this made not one jot of difference in
practical terms - both were congenitally dependent on external
support to overcome their chronic lack of self-confidence) . Evatt
had been trying just as hard as Spender to get an alliance of
some kind with the USA.
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keeping Australians fat, dumb and happy, introducing a measure of
state welfare and protectionism that would have delighted (even,
sometimes, outraged, as in the later instance of state aid to
church schools) most of the left. He "bought out" his opponents,
and the country paid for it twice, in solvency and in self-
respect. 1
However, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, though well
steeped in the culture of dependency, was one of Menzies' most
bitter political opponents, and more inclined to view Australia's
relationship with Britain in terms of Australia's assuming the
mantle of 'protecting power" in the South Pacific and the
Southeast Asian colonies, than in terms of simply acting as a
prop to a shaky and disintegrating empire. Menzies still held
Britain to be the key to Australia's future status and prosperity
- Percy Spender saw it in the United States, which he thought
might show the requisite gratitude in economic and other areas,
as well as in guarantees of military security in return for
Australia's doing little more than giving a reassurance it was on
the US' side. The problem was to persuade the United States that
this was so, and neither Spender nor anyone else ever really did.
How could they? Dependency created yet another conundrum; to
justify it to the public, one had to be demonstrably weak. This
1. One MP, learning that Spender was going to become Ambassador
to Washington in mid-1951 (and thus leaving the Parliament)
,
pleaded with him to stay: "You are the only hope, Percy" he
wrote, "This country will be ruined by Bob [Menzies] and his
spineless, gutless acting ...". How right he was. See Barclay,
p54.
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was easy enough for any Australian government to achieve. But on
the other hand, to justify expected favour, one had to "show
willing" for one's external guardian-patron; this not so easy in
a condition of congenital weakness. 1
Had it not been necessary for Australia to sign the
Japanese Peace Treaty then being negotiated, and the added
urgency given this matter by the outbreak of the Korean War,
Spender would probably have gotten even less than what John
Foster Dulles was eventually prepared to acquiesce to; and what
he gave was virtually an echo of the supposed guarantees of the
1937 Imperial conference. Yet this insipid brew is what
Australian governments have become addicted to over the last
four decades.
Salvation II - anzus
As late as mid 1949, when the assured triumph in China of
Mao Zedong's communists gave rise to something of a "global
communist conspiracy" scare in Australia as well as in the United
States and in Great Britain, Secretary of State Dean Acheson had
categorically rejected the idea of a Pacific Pact for collective
military security, based on the NATO model. NATO was enough for
the United States, which did not contemplate entering into any
further arrangements of this nature. NATO was the product of a
1. The corollary was, though, that so long as not much needed to
be done, the patron liked its clients weak as well; it kept them
controllable. The real difficulty arose when the patron himself
felt weak or insecure, as had already been shown with Britain,
and with the US in Korea. It was already complaining about being
left to carry alone the burden which it had imposed upon itself.
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special set of circumstances "peculiar to Europe and the Atlantic
community - the logical culmination of a series of developments" 1
which included the Marshall plan, the extinction of popular
government in Eastern Europe, and the Berlin Blockade. Numerous
internal conflicts in Asia would also have to be resolved to
provide even the basis for consideration of a security pact.
Although several 'non-colonial" Asian nations had shown interest
in the idea (Thailand, Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines) , India
was not among these, nor was Indonesia. Initial attempts by
Australia and New Zealand to get both of them interested only
increased US wariness of involvement in a pact it might not be
able to dominate, especially as the emerging non-alignment stance
of these nations made them potentially "unreliable". They could
not be persuaded anyway. 2
Australia then focussed its efforts on obtaining a
tripartite pact, but at the same time US opinion was shifting
toward a multilateral regional pact to contain communism. The US
also wanted to re-arm Japan, which by now was regarded already as
being potentially the key US ally in the Pacific, and whose
release from the shackles of de-militarisation was now seen to be
1. Statement by Acheson, 18 May 1949. Cited by Reese, pll4.
Acheson's remark on the need to wait for Asia's internal
conflicts to subside was based upon a statement by Indian Prime
Minister Nehru a few days earlier. But whereas Nehru was clearly
saying that he did not want the Major Powers interfering in Asian
affairs, Acheson's statement was slanted more to the view that




essential to the war effort in Korea. Despite the view of Menzies
and a majority of his government that " the United States should
be well able to deal with the situation in Korea" 1 there clearly
was a case 2 for Australia to make a significant commitment of
forces in answer to the appeal of first the US Joint Chiefs of
Staff and later of the UN Secretary General. 3 Spender, still
working to secure a security pact with the United States (and in
effect, therefore, against the wishes of his Prime Minister) , was
of course in favour of this, and it was logical from the
"Imperialist" point of view as well for Australia to give
material substance to its still token role of acting in loco
parentis for Britain in East Asia. But the British, though
extremely hard pressed financially and stretched thin across
Europe and the still significant remnant of their Empire, much of
which was now undergoing insurgencies and civil unrest,
volunteered to send troops to Korea, pretty well for the same
reason Spender wanted to send Australians - to curry US favour by
'doing their bit*.
True to type, they warned Australia against doing the same
so that it would not strip itself of forces that Britain might
1. Barclay, p39.
2. On the basis of its vigorous support of the principle of
collective security guaranteed by the United Nations. But
Menzies' preference for Imperial Union (which out of deference to
reality, he had soon to expand to 'Anglo-Saxon' union, as usual)
led him to disdain the value of the UN, comprised of an
increasing number of "unreliable" countries. As Reese observes




want to call upon to defend its interests in a "real emergency"
in the Middle East, or to supplement its forces in Malaya. 1 The
ridiculous illogic of the 1930s all over again. In the end,
Australia committed just one Battalion initially, although the
JCS felt it should be able to provide three. 2 And had it adhered
to the 1947 defence plan, it would indeed have had a Brigade
Group ready for deployment as reguired in support of United
Nations action. As usual, the philosophical-rhetorical commitment
of the Australian government (allowing that the government had
changed, but this meant little in practical force-structure
terms) was not matched by its material willingness 3 . The
practical ineffectiveness of its widow's mite was masked to the
Australian public by the promptness of Australia's commitment and
by formation of a "Commonwealth Brigade"; being part of a larger
collective was superficially more impressive (and may have helped
explain the appeal to Menzies of his extravagant praise for the
guasi-imperial British Commonwealth - it was another cheap way
l.Ibid, p40.
2. Ibid, p42.
3. See Barclay, op.cit. It took some very broad hints from
President Truman to get Menzies to confirm the forces originally
'volunteered' on his own initiative by Spender (Menzies was
absent at the time) . As Barclay observes (p41) ; "Menzies was . .
.
concerned with Australia's role as an ally of the United Kingdom,
rather than ... of the United States." And he was well aware of




out) . The forces in Korea 1 all performed very well; but it was a
very small-scale contribution, even by comparison with some of
the other 'secondary' participants. It was a scenario endlessly
repeated, though the motivations for this were varied.
Truman's appointed negotiator for the Japanese peace treaty,
John Foster Dulles, doubled as his special envoy to the regional
nations. He believed that the US need not enter into any formal
alliance, because it was inevitable (he said, like Churchill)
that an attack on Australia, New Zealand or the Philippines would
involve the US 2 . The former two had their doubts. Spender was at
least credited with improving relations with the United States
(to " a degree of cordiality unknown since the . . . Pacific
War" 3 ) , and this made Dulles willing to talk, if nothing else.
In the end, Dulles was able to get what he wanted (Australian
agreement to the Japan Peace Treaty) by giving away very little
indeed; but still true to form, Australia chose to believe that
it had gained a lot. Spender thought ANZUS his "crowning
1. Eventually two Battalions, besides Australia's only aircraft
carrier, a few destroyers or frigates, and a fighter squadron and
supporting air force units. A full list of all nations'
contributions (including offers not taken up) is given in: Max
Hastings, The Korean War . London, Michael Joseph, 1987; Appendix.
2. This view had already been expressed to Spender by Secretary
of State Acheson. See Barclay, p44.
3. Barclay, p50.
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achievement" - he was easily pleased. 1 The British government,
headed again in late 1951 by the arch-Imperialist Winston
Churchill, was less than thrilled with ANZUS. Once again playing
the role of Jbete noir to Australia's attempts to ease the British
stranglehold on its affairs, Churchill resented Britain's
exclusion from the pact - most likely because he hated the very
thought of Britain's Dominions talking or acting with any other
nation without going through Whitehall. He wanted to supplant it
through a wider agreement, and so, still, did the US.
Even so, there was one matter where Australia's rush to
embrace the US as a security guarantor led it away from following
the very sensible policy of the British government (still under
Atlee at the time) of recognising Mao's men as the de facto
government of China. Australia would have been well served in
this case by following suit. Strangely enough, Menzies was
responsible for this, again in opposition to Spender, who
proposed it - before the ANZUS Treaty had been formally agreed 2 .
Menzies may not have much cared for the United States, but he was
scared stiff of offending Washington, now riven with arguments
over "who lost China?". And so Australia fell in with the fatuous
policy of pretending that Stilwell's "peanut" retained the legal
l.He had got almost nothing that he asked for, and in particular
had failed to secure either a NATO-Style agreement that 'attack
on one is an attack on all'; or an undertaking to establish
permanent political-military consultative machinery and a
combined military planning staff. For Spender's rather self-
congratulatory account of the negotiations, see: Harper, ppl63-
170. The text of the treaty is also given.
2. Barclay, p51.
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right to government of the mainland.
At home, Menzies was using fear of domestic communist
influence to undermine both the internal cohesion and the public
support of the Labour Party. His neo-McCarthyism 1 , and the rising
troubles in Malaya and Indochina, made it expedient for he and
his new Foreign Minister, Richard Casey, to proclaim a wider
ambit for ANZUS; it was now directed mainly against the threat of
a "much more pressing and immediate danger" in the form of
communism. Casey and Menzies also pursued the idea of Australia
playing a 'mediatory' role between, on the one hand, Britain and
the US, and on the other, between these two and various emergent
nations. It was fatally misconceived, if only because Menzies'
biases 2 , and Australia's devotion to racial exclusivity, meant
that Australia was incapable of either acting or being accepted
as an "honest broker" in the developing world, and its dual
dependency on both the US and Britain made a joke of its
pretensions there. It became more shuttlecock than conduit; and
even if it could advise, it could (or would) not act.
1. Though it didn't need the post-war Red Menace to arouse it.
Menzies in 1940 wanted a 'soft' peace deal done with Germany,
which with Italy would have to recruited into "a new alignment of
nations ... combined to resist Bolshevism." See: David Day, The
Great Betrayal , pp42-3.
2. Menzies advised "people [who] venture into the field of
foreign affairs" to "each night ... have a good, long, thoughtful
look at the map and try to realise where we live and where our
friends live." He obviously forgot to look at the distance scale;
Casey at least was alert to the need to develop new friends in
Asia, but even he was a victim of belief that "the survival and
progress of our present civilisation depend substantially on the
English-speaking peoples...". See: Reese, ppl47-8.
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Menzies 1 long-standing resort to the "Red Menace" also
tacitly endorsed the wholly erroneous transposition of the
European situation to the Pacific, something well under way now
in the US. Little attempt was made to determine how Australia
(Indonesia's champion) might best deal with a post-colonial
Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh, and the danger of communism in Malaya
seems to have been seriously exaggerated, in that it would never
get support from the bulk of the people; or indeed, from China.
Australia's misconceived policy of denying recognition to China,
and continuing to support its exclusion from the United Nations,
derived in essence from the perceived necessity of toeing the US
line on foreign policy toward all but the least significant of
the world's nations. Another tragic blunder. Now the ideological
jingoes cheered.
The US "obligation" to Australia was in any event less than
clear 1
,
and Dulles regarded it as being mainly for psychological
comfort, while Australia sent its forces elsewhere if required.
Between them, though for differing reasons, Menzies and Spender
had made a reality of Sir Edward Hutton's dream of 1903 -
Australia was providing an Imperial ready reaction force, and
this apparently unknown to the public, which was encouraged to
believe it had been given a cast-iron guarantee. The ANZUS Pact
1. In print. Dulles testified in the Senate that there was "no
question at all of the United States ever sending any troops to
Australia or New Zealand . . . [but] they have . . . very top secret
[obligations to Britain] .. to send their troops out to the
Middle East (again!!) if there is serious trouble ... [and in all
events] want to have some appearance at least of a shield around
them at home of sea and air power." See Barclay, p53.
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was in fact no more substantial than the woolly prevarications of
the pre-war period.
The signatories were obliged to do no more than "consult"
and "take action in accordance with their constitutional
processes" in the event of an attack upon their metropolitan or
island territories, or armed forces, public vessels or aircraft
in "the Pacific Area" . No-one knew what this meant, and
Australia spent a lot of effort over the next decade or more,
trying to clarify and widen especially the definition of the
"Pacific area". 1 But as Dulles had made clear (at home) the US
was not buying. Article VIII of the Treaty implies that ANZUS was
regarded as an interim arrangement "pending the development of a
more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific
Area"; and this certainly was Dulles' own view2 . During this
period its Council, which was no more than the Foreign Ministers
meeting ad hoc, was "authorised to maintain a consultative
relationship" with other regional associations and organisations
which might be of use to "further the purposes of the treaty."
Individual nations would do this anyway in the process of
1. Spender flattered himself that this was clever; he had
proposed this loose definition in order not to limit the scope
(as he saw it) of US commitment to situations which might be
deemed dangerous to Australia. See: Harper, pl70. Spender paid
rather less attention to the possibility that any attack on an
American ship or aircraft might mean that the US would call upon
Australia to 'pitch in' in accordance with its "obligations".
2. In the Department of State Bulletin of 23 July 1951, he wrote:
"this [draft treaty] is one of a series of arrangements . . . now
being worked out by the United States to strengthen the fabric of
peace in the Pacific." It was only one of number of "initial
steps" to the development of the "more comprehensive system of
regional security". See: Barclay and Siracusa, pp28-9.
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developing and tending their regional relationships - thus
article VIII seems to have been inserted more as a signal to the
Junior Partners that Anzus was expected to have a finite,
possibly quite brief, existence. However the signing of the
Manila Pact in 1954 did not put an end to ANZUS, as might perhaps
have been expected. Trevor Reese 1 suggests that this was because
it was already seen as more manageable due to its smaller
membership; the complaisance and 'Anglo-Saxon' identity of its
junior partners no doubt helped as well.
As the French position in Indochina continued to crumble,
President Eisenhower and his globe-trotting evangelist Dulles
found renewed interest in the idea of a regional security
alliance in Southeast Asia. Eisenhower, despite his view that the
defeat of communism was not necessarily synonymous with "always
blocking national aspirations and supporting the status quo",
was apparently persuaded by the Joint Chiefs and Dulles that the
actions of the Viet Minh were directed by the "Chinese
Communists . . . apparent desire to extend [their] political
system ... to South East Asia." 2 Eisenhower now believed that a
communist victory in Indochina would threaten the whole of the
US' Asian flank, from Japan to (non-aligned) Indonesia, and he
gave birth to the now-infamous Domino theory to explain why
proximity to a communist led nation in Asia was more or less the
1. Australia. New Zealand and the United States . pl81.
2. Leonard Mosley, Dulles . New York, The Dial Press/James Wade,
1978, p355. Quoting Dulles' responses to questions at a press
conference.
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same as shaking hands with Typhoid Annie. Why this was not so in
Europe was not explored. At any rate, the message now preached by
the US "was tantamount to saying that victory in Indochina was
vital to American national security, and that the allies of the
United States should be prepared to respond accordingly." 1 Few
were. Australia saw little virtue in intervening in such a manner
that might induce a similar Chinese reaction as in Korea, and
thus make matters worse. The Chinese themselves, seemed to be
•settling down 1
,
and Ho Chi Minn could probably be accommodated.
On 7 April 1954, Casey told the House that:
Mr Dulles' statement [of 29 March] clearly implies
United States readiness to participate in joint action
to secure South-East Asia. He has warned the Vietminh
that they can no longer base their hopes on a defeat of
French forces or even a withdrawal of French
forces. . .
.
It is obvious, however, that the line of thought put
forward by Mr Dulles needs further elaboration and
exploration before any new statement of Australian
policy can be made on this point. 2
Australia wanted to see what would come of the talks in
Geneva. Nothing could have been more calculated to send the
Chinese back into their imperialist-baiting shell than Dulles'
amazingly boorish conduct at the start of the Geneva Peace talks
on 26 April 1954, and reason seemed to flee out the door along
with any regard held for the United States by a visibly
1. Barclay, op.cit., p65.
2. In Barclay & Siracusa, pp38-9.
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embarrassed and insulted Zhou En-lai. 1 Australian Foreign
Minister Casey thought the whole US position that was emerging
toward China and Vietnam was unsound and inadvisable 2
, but at the
same time he had to contend with the need to stay on the right
side of the Americans, and make some obeisance to the electoral
tactics of his boss, who liked to call general elections whenever
he could whip a Red Scare into being to exploit the now-permanent
split in the Labour Party. After the talks, Casey used the excuse
of the impending Federal election to beg off making any
commitment to any proposed action in Indochina. Somehow, despite
Dulles' earlier strong-arm tactics, Casey's excuse was accepted
and the full wrath of Dulles and his President was turned upon
the "woeful unawareness" of the British to the looming red
menace. 3 Australian concern mounted at the increasingly evident
friction between its two protectors.
However, Australia was also not achieving much in its self-
appointed role as mediator between the now sharply divergent
world-views held by the US administration and Great Britain,
whose foreign Secretary (and later Prime Minister) Anthony Eden
1. Mosely, pp 360-1.
2. Casey wrote in his diary in April 1954 (no date given), that
"A prominent Frenchman said to me a year ago that there was no
military solution to Indo-China's problem but that the only
solution was a political one. This visit to Saigon has renewed
this statement in my mind and I tend to believe it is largely
true. . . . There seems to be little doubt that the majority of
Vietnamese tend to be pro-Vietminh when they have any political
views one way or the other." See: Graham Freudenberg, "The
Australian Labor Party and Vietnam", Australian Outlook . August
1979, vol.33 no. 2.
3. Barclay, pp67-8.
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was cordially detested by both Eisenhower and Dulles. This 'duty"
was imposed largely by the Australian conservative political
establishment's continued belief that Britain should not threaten
its slender grasp on 'great power' influence by repeated
confrontation with the United States - which of course would
threaten the other cherished notion of a worldwide Anglo-Saxon
alliance extending into perpetuity. But "there was not the
slightest evidence that anything Australia did or said had any
influence whatever on British or American policy." 1
A good deal of its lack of weight with America at least
stemmed from Menzies absolute lack of commitment to anything but
buying votes at home and maintaining through his devotion to the
crown his self-image as an international statesman. Australian
defence spending now stood at 3.9% of GNP in 1953-4 (already down
from a fairly miserly 5.2% 2 at the time of the Korean Armistice),
and its contributions to the Colombo Plan aid scheme the lowest
per-capita, by far, of any of the major donor nations. 3
Thus when the time came for discussions on the nature of
the Manila Pact that was signed in September 1954, Australia
found it was signing something that imposed obligations while
1. Barclay, p69. A view strongly supported by Trevor Reese,
Australia. New Zealand and the United States. 1941-68 . ppl46-49.
2. It should be borne in mind that this was in time of,
supposedly, war of vital interest to national survival. Compared
with 38.5% of GDP in the crisis year of 1942-3 (up from 24.8% the
year before, which shows just how quickly the government could
'get interested' in a real threat).
3. Barclay, p70.
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offering no benefits. Dulles wanted no consultative machinery
established, and the pact was to apply only to instances of
Communist aggression - cold comfort in the event of any other
form of regional clash, such as later occurred with Indonesia. In
the end, the treaty looked not much different from Anzus, except
that the signatories granted themselves the right to intervene in
the affairs of Indochina as and where they saw fit, and Australia
took it to mean that it now had some form of security guarantee
operative on the Indian Ocean side of the continent. And the US
still added a unilateral reservation against involvement in any
regional conflict that had not been initiated by the dreaded
commies. Perhaps fortunately for Australia, it had no forces of
any consequence to commit to anything, except later, to Malaya
and Borneo.
The latter commitment of course was made by Menzies, in his
customarily florid style, claiming that the fight against the
communist threat to Australia had to be conducted "as far from
our own soil as possible" 1 . Thailand or South Vietnam would have
seemed more logical places to start the fight (the use of
diplomacy seems not even to have been considered) , not the next
to last Domino - which already had been promised independence,
something that neither the French nor the Americans seemed to
find significant with regard to the shambles in Indochina. But of




Menzies told the world that "there is no country in the
world more completely British than Australia"; the man had not
sense nor shame, nor a sense of shame. Casey despaired that
Australia's tangible contribution to either of its alliances with
the Americans was "so nominal there is no need to take our
cooperation seriously into account" 1 , and this, certainly, was
so. "The triangular relationship was not working out very well"
because Australia was more concerned with demonstrating
(alternately, depending upon who spoke) loyalty to two, often
diametrically opposed, powers than with pursuing its own course.
Whilst it struggled to reconcile an even greater strategic
absurdity, Australia satisfied neither patron 2 ; and the
Australian position on matters of direct interest to itself, such
as the Indonesian claim to Dutch New Guinea was not taken
seriously into account by either of its supposed protectors. But
1. Barclay, p81.
2. As with the commitment of Australian forces to Malaya: the
Americans totally disagreed with this, and so did much Australian
opinion, including that of Casey, who felt that Australia should
have the forces available and trained, but kept at home for
deployment as necessary. This was in keeping with the United
states Joint Chiefs' own view of "flexible response". JCS
Chairman Admiral Radford warned Casey that "Congress would regard
Australian forces committed specifically to . . . Malaya as being
employed to support and maintain British colonialism." This only
goes to show the absolute impenetrable density of a good part of
congress, the administration and perhaps the JCS; Radford and
Dulles both had been prepared not long before to go the whole hog
in Vietnam to support (infinitely more intransigent) French
colonialism; but they were still willing to stick it to the
British. See: Barclay, p82. But then again Radford could have
just been talking through his hat; no-one would accuse any
American of candour in his dealings with Australia during this
period.
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then again it was hardly getting serious consideration from its
own parliament. "The tragic figure of the minister for Foreign
affairs" was accorded more respect from the other side of
politics than from his own; for the simple reason that he was
trying to serve Australia, whilst his leader was interested only
in serving Britain and soothing America.
However, Australia managed to blunder so badly in its
attempts to prove its loyalty to Britain that it effectively
paved the way for an equally disastrous attempt to curry favour
with America. Menzies was skating on thin ice at home, and
looking for an opportunity to either quit politics on a high
note, or reestablish his dominance of the dispirited conservative
coalition. Having been "carpeted by Eisenhower and Dulles for
failing to speak of Chiang Kai-shek with adequate enthusiasm"
(nice to discover some redeeming quality in Menzies!), the
Australian Prime Minister cancelled a scheduled visit to Japan
and fled for comfort to the bosom of the Empire; just in time to
be recruited as an 'intermediary' for the Suez fiasco. In fact it
seems he volunteered; 2 and made a botch of it. Far from acting as
1. In the wake of the Petrov spy case Menzies called a premature
election, hoping once more to capitalise upon a new 'Red Scare'.
The conservatives scored only 47.6% of the popular vote, which
was still enough to allow them somehow to cling to power. Spender
was once more being "implor[ed] ... to re-enter politics to save
the Liberal Party before Menzies finally destroyed it." Barclay,
pp84-5.
2. As an indication of just how unreliable memoirs can be, Harold
MacMillan (Riding The Storm. 1956-59 . pll4) claims that Menzies
"happened to be in England in . . . July for some trade
discussions" and "reluctantly agreed to accept this task. His
chief anxiety was naturally to get home as soon as possible; but
great pressure was brought upon him to stay in England, and we
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an impartial go-between to Nasser from the United Nations,
Menzies simply conveyed to the Egyptian Premier a series of
righteous British threats, and after the ensuing shambles
continued to attempt to justify Britain's actions. Eisenhower
refused to see Menzies when later he attempted to call. Casey's
attempts to keep things sane and patch up the damage were
continually undercut by his purblind boss. Against this
background, Australia sought the support of the US in staving off
Sukarno's continuing claim to Dutch New Guinea. This unhappy
sequence of events helped pave the way for Australia finally to
make some attempt to rectify the disrepair into which its forces
had fallen, and later to make an effort to get visibly (but still
not too materially) involved in the war in Vietnam. Not for
itself - but to try and win favour from the "great and powerful".
Not now another blunder; just the usual one.
American policy on the issue of West New Guinea, or Irian
Barat as it was called by Sukarno's government, was one of strict
non-involvement on behalf of either side. The Indonesian claim
had no basis in history or ethnicity or religion, but the US
. .Continued. .
.
were indeed fortunate that he yielded to the demands of patriotic
duty." To whose patrie? And the account given seems very
"economical with the truth". Barclay (p85) gives the lie to this
nonsense, with an entry from the diary of the wife of Australia's
then Commissioner to South East Asia: "Nothing could alter the
fact that the sudden cancellation of the tour was a rebuff to the
hypersensitive Japanese, and it did not make things better to
feel, as Alan [her husband, Sir Alan Watt] did, that the P.M. was
being used to pull other peoples' chestnuts out of the fire, and
[had] showed again his attitude to the East." Menzies did not
even try the Bush excuse of pressing domestic problems.
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would not overtly oppose it, even though the two Dulles brothers
did concoct one of those covert action fiascos in an attempt to
get rid of Sukarno in 1958, which Foster reasoned might result in
a more moderate Indonesian attitude to the issue of Irian Barat's
absorption into Indonesia. Allen presumably regarded it as just
another day out for the boys. But the operation was a flop, and
Sukarno ever more strident. Eventually, he commenced overt
hostilities, which the Dutch resisted with some ease. Australia
was willing to cooperate militarily with the Dutch, to stave off
Indonesia, and to gain time for a gradual decolonisation of the
territory, perhaps in concert with Australia's territory which it
bordered to the east. But both realised the status guo, or
something close to it, was untenable without overt support from
the United States. This never came.
The US, embarrassed by the obvious evidence of its
complicity 1 in the rebellions put down by Sukarno, was now
1. In what was to become close to standard form for CIA
adventures, a "private" attack bomber was shot down and the pilot
caught alive. He naturally identified his sponsors, reckoning
himself more likely to be freed by their intercession than by
his denial of any employer at all. The motivation for this mess
was that Sukarno "scornfully rejected American advice and
resisted the pressure that went along with US aid." Hardly unique
in the world. See: Mosley, Dulles . pp436-8. Interestingly enough,
the otherwise exhaustive study of George McT. Kahin, Major
Governments of Asia acknowledges that "American military supplies
to the rebels continued to arrive in considerable quantities" but
skips around mention of direct American involvement "several
Americans described by Secretary Dulles as "soldiers of fortune"
but "regarded by the Indonesians as CIA agents, flew planes for
the rebels..". Kahin then goes on to talk about how the
Philippines government was accused of being at fault for allowing
"the rebels" to fly out of Clark Field. Which only proves what a
joke Filipino independence was - no better than Australian. But
the edition that I read was published in 1967, when it presumably
was considered inconvenient to say such things. Kahin' s study is
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attempting to buy him off with weapons and the British seemed
ready to follow suit. Australia protested to both; the British
backed off, the Americans simply said that what they didn't sell
(or give away) the Communists (type unspecified) would. The US
position on New Guinea now underwent a series of twists and
turns, at least in private discussions with Australia, as Dulles
sought to mollify its ally. He wanted its unreserved support for
the stance being taken with regard to Quemoy and Matsu, which
China again was demanding should be evacuated and returned by the
Taiwan government.
But the situation in the offshore islands calmed, and
Australia was back to square one in its dealings vice New Guinea.
Worse, the US and the USSR were now at the competetive bidding
stage for Indonesian affections: the Russians supplied their
first load of arms to Indonesia in early 1959, and Kruschev was
to pay a state visit in early 1960. At this critical point,
Australia's capable but much undermined (by his own leader and
his clique) Foreign Minister finally resigned (in January 1960)
and "Menzies solved the problem of finding a worthy successor by
taking the job on himself." 1 It was not one of his better
decisions. Within months he had managed to make a fool of himself
and humiliate his country in the United Nations by "attempting to
humiliate the Indonesians and curry favour with the Americans at
. . .Continued. .
.
still worth reading, for all that. He understood his subject much
better than most of his political masters did.
1. Barclay, pll6.
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the same time" by a fatally misjudged amendment to an Indonesian
resolution for rescheduling the aborted Eisenhower-Kruschev
summit. Menzies of course wanted to include Britain and France.
But all he did was "raise serious doubts" 1 about his judgment,
compounding the folly of his Suez fiasco.
Fortunately for Australia, Menzies' ineptitude as Foreign
Minister was accompanied by a good deal of understanding from a
new US administration that, though it was still inclined to
support Irian Barat going to Indonesia, was also prepared to
state unequivocally that Australia had its guarantee of support
in the event of hostilities subsequently breaking out if
Indonesia decided to perhaps go further east into Australian
administered territory. Secretary of State Rusk was willing to
give these guarantees 2 because it was already apparent that any
increased involvement in South Vietnam would best be made in
concert with as many of the SEATO allies as possible showing some
visible support for the Saigon Government. 3 This would help
justify US actions, whilst presenting the image still of a common
front against communist aggression.
In 1962 Menzies made a token offering of Australian combat
1. Barclay, pll8.




advisers - the US CINCPAC said he could use a few patrol boats. 1
But these Australia's Navy did not possess, and the minesweepers
that might have been used were all sent to work in Malaysian
waters to counter Indonesian infiltration. It seems not to have
occurred to the government that it could have built and manned
such craft in a fairly short time had it put its mind to it; but
it did not and when the Navy did get purpose built patrol boats
later (1968 onwards) , they were not sent. Eventually, a somewhat
larger team of army advisers than originally proposed was sent to
Vietnam in late 1962. But by then the fate of Irian Barat had
been sealed, and it was a long time before an Australian combat
unit was made available.
In the meantime, it became apparent even to Menzies, who in
his dotage was becomingly even more nauseatingly devoted to
Queen, and (her) country, that Britain really was on the way out
of Asia, and on the way in to Europe. Britain's entry into the
European Economic Community (and thus a considerable disruption
to Australian trade patterns) was averted thanks to France, which
blackballed Perfidious Albion's membership nomination. But it was
only postponing the inevitable; and Britain's share of Australian
overseas trade was falling rapidly. 2 Britain sent out Queen
Elizabeth and her husband in 1962 to stir the (outraged) loyal
1. Barclay, pl26.
2. By 1966-7, it was no longer Australia's largest export market;
that title now belonged to Japan, as it still does. In 1966-7,
too, the United States displaced Britain as Australia's main
source of imports. See: T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War f
pp220 & 272.
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hearts in the land it had tried to 'abandon', but despite the
Prime Minister's public protestation of undying love at a state
dinner ("the Queen faltered as she began her address in reply.
The nation squirmed") it was clear that Australia had given up on
the idea of a dual protectorate, and had finally cast its lot
unreservedly with the United States.
Most new equipment for all three services was being ordered
in the US; and the US navy was about to construct a
communications station on Australian soil, to enable it to
communicate with submarines and surface ships in the Indian ocean
and Southeast Asia. This did more than provide grist for the mill
of the "Australia is a nuclear target" lobby; it also permitted
Australian governments ever after to mouth the conceit that
Australia was, just by being there in the Southern Hemisphere,
making a substantial - and very passive - contribution "to the
mutual purpose of the ANZUS pact and ... to the security of the
free world generally." 1 But at the same time, even with some rise
in defence expenditure due to new programmes, the defence budget
only inched up from 2.65% (it lowest postwar level) to 2.9% of
GNP. Despite the increasing tension between Sukarno and the
newly-formed Federation of Malaysia, and the very real
possibility of the need for a significant contribution, both
civil and military, to be made in Vietnam, there was no great
1. Barclay, op.cit. pl29. Quoting the announcement of the
agreement in May 1963 by Foreign Minister Garfield Barwick,
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sense of urgency in any of the government's actions 1 . This alone
however, could not undermine the evident determination of the new
Foreign Minister, Paul Hasluck, for Australia to demonstrate its
resolve and commitment to American policy by getting more
involved in the war in Vietnam.
American officialdom remained studiously polite, even
encouraging: Secretary Rusk was nothing if not a gentleman;
President Johnson was sure Australia would come round eventually.
But even Rusk saw Australia's development and military aid
efforts in South East Asia as too narrow in scope and too little
in amount; and TIME magazine, probably more influential then than
now, ridiculed Australia's decrepit armed forces and miserly
spending on defence, which made the nation, "a SEATO member and
often hopefully regarded as the West's anchor in the South
Pacific, woefully unable to back up its brave intentions." 2
The "bravery" of these intentions existed only on one side
of the House Of Representatives. The Labor Party, still in
opposition (but not by much) was utterly opposed to Australia
getting involved in the war. Menzies and the Catholic Church-
1. Some detail of the measures taken is given in: Reese,
Australia. New Zealand and the United States . pp290-300. The
motivation seems to have come as much from Sukarno's success in
West Irian and the start of Confrontation of Malaysia, as much as
anything else. The increasing likelihood of a British withdrawal
from "east of Suez" also played a major part.
2. "Australia: Poor Military Posture", TIME . 29 May 1991, p27. The
article also observed that: "Australia's air force is obsolete,
its navy a memory, its 2 3,000 man army smaller than Cambodia's.
The country has no draft [soon remedied by Menzies], spends less
than 3% of its [GNP] on defence [compared with] nearly 7% in
Britain and more than 9% in the U.S."
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backed 1 Democratic Labour Party (which had split from the parent
in 1955) conspired to whip up another Red Scare to overcome the
very reasonable objections to Australia's (or anyone else's)
intervention, which later were put by Labor leader Arthur
Calwell:
We talk about the lesson of Munich as if we had never
learnt a single lesson since 1938. Preoccupied with the
fear of a military Munich, we have suffered a score of
moral Dunkirks. ... we have channelled the great bulk
of our aid to Asia towards military expenditure.
Preoccupied with the idea of monolithic, imperialistic
Communism, we have channelled our support to those
military regimes which were loudest in their
professions of anti-Communism, no matter how
reactionary, unpopular or corrupt they may have been. .
.
Preoccupied with so-called Western interests, we have
never successfully supported nationalism as the mighty
force it is against Communism. We have supported [it]
only when it supported the West . .
.
We have committed ourselves to the propositions that
Communism can be defeated by military means alone and
that it is the function of European troops to impose
the will of the West upon Asia. These are dangerous,
1. In many ways, in a strange turnabout from the days of
Archbishop Mannix' fervent and successful opposition of
"imperialist' Labor under Billy Hughes. Mannix, now a Cardinal,
now fought against communism, via what were known as the
"Industrial Groups" that sought to overcome (undermine might be a
better word) communist domination of union executives. It is a
story worth a few books on its own. A great flavour of the times
is captured in Frank Hardy's "Power Without glory", regardless of
his "Left-orientation", which I don't think shows through
excessively in his "factional" novel, but is nonetheless
sufficiently evident for the doctrinaire right to reject it out
of hand as a misrepresentation of what seems on balance to very
well state conditions of the period he writes about.
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delusive and disastrous propositions. 1 .
Although intelligent and sincere, and eloquent in print,
Calwell was cursed with the charisma of a cabbage and the voice
of an untuned violin, and could not compete with the masterly -
if empty - public speaking and debating skills of Menzies, nor
with the easy charm of Menzies' likeable successor Harold Holt.
Foreign Minister Paul Hasluck, an altogether more formidable
figure than any of the leaders, was firmly on the side of the Red
Menace brigade, and said so repeatedly in public. He could put a
forceful argument, and his view was undoubtedly reinforced by
unremitting pressure "from the end of 1962 to the beginning of
1965 [from] our Embassy in Washington". In what seems to have
been pretty standard vein, one cable stated:
South Vietnam is an area in which Australia can,
without disproportionate expenditure, pick up a lot of
credit with the United States. Our objectives should be
to achieve such habitual closeness with the United
States and a sense of mutual reliance that in our time
of need - such as a crisis in our relations with
1. For Calwell' s speech to the House, on 4 May 1965, see: Harper,
pp203-210. Calwell said, too, that the government had
"grotesquely oversimplified" the problems in Vietnam, and its
action would neither help the fight against Communism nor benefit
the Vietnamese people. America, he said, would most likely be
"humiliated"; through either outright defeat, or by becoming
"interminably bogged down in the awful morass" of the war. It
seems he had a point or two. Calwell also took care to assure the
Australian troops that "our hearts and prayers are with you."
Although he could not support the government's decision, the
Labor Party would "do our duty to the utmost in supporting you to
do your duty ... we shall never deny you the aid and support that
it is your right to expect in the service of your country ...".
And thus pre-empted the specious charge made in later times that
policy disagreement was equivalent to betrayal of the men in the
field. Hard to believe this is the same man who once said "two
Wongs don't make a White".
229
Indonesia - the United States would have little option
but to respond as we would want, (my emphasis) 1
Shortly before the Gulf Of Tonkin incident in August 1964
changed the whole course of Southeast Asian (probably, world)
history, Menzies assured the United States public that whatever
might happen in that region, "my little country and your great
country will be together through thick and thin." 2 This doubtless
was a great comfort to the citizens of Chicago. The following
1. Quoted in Freudenberg, op.cit., pl61. The cable was sent in
May 1964; no further detail given.
2. In a speech to the Australian-American Association in Chicago,
Cited by Barclay, pl42.
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year brought the first commitment of Australian infantry to
Vietnam. In the House, Menzies excoriated Arthur Calwell and his
Labor Party:
I do not understand how my friend, the Leader of the
Opposition, can delude himself on this matter. ...
I would hate to be the head of a government which had
to say to the United States on an occasion like this
[South Vietnam's solicited 'request'] : 'Sorry, we can
do nothing about it. We will help you with debate in
the United Nations. We will offer some fine words and
some good sentiments. But, as for practical action, no:
that is for you. American soldiers from the Middle West
can go and fight and die in South Vietnam, but that is
not for us.' I think that is a disastrous proposition
for any Opposition to put forward. 1
Menzies so successfully obfuscated the real issue that the
Opposition's stand was electorally disastrous; but the
government's actions were more in keeping with the sentiments,
implied by innuendo, which Menzies had lambasted Calwell for
adhering to. Menzies' 'commitment', of a single battalion, itself
showed little more than a "good sentiment". It was nowhere near
enough to earn much appreciation 2 - the Joint Chiefs had
1. Quoted by Freudenberg, op.cit., pi 62. As Freudenberg observes,
"it is difficult to convey the force of his sweeping simplicities
except to those who also have been under the wand of the
magician.
"
2. Except from President Johnson, who was "delighted at [your]
decision", and probably saw it as the start of something bigger.
Johnson's message to Menzies concluded: "... this action proves
again the deep ties between our two countries in the cause of
world peace and security. As you know, my personal experiences in
association with Australians during World War II have made this a
particularly deep and abiding feeling for me. I am confident that
our two nations, working together, can ... [bring] about the
peace that South Vietnam and South-East Asia deserve." See:
Harper, Australia and the United States . p203. Johnson was in
Australia for about a month in May-June 1942, going on a bombing
mission on 8 June. The next day, on his way out of the country,
Johnson's aircraft got lost and had to land in "El Paso desert
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complained that things would probably go just like Korea, where
most of the support given the US had been "verbal", while the US,
they lamented, "took all the casualties and paid all the bills" 1 .
Australia might, as new Prime Minister Holt cheerily said, be
going "all the way with LBJ", but it was doing so more in spirit
than in substance. The Australian forces in Vietnam never
amounted to more than a half-division's worth of men, including
the aircrews committed either with the Australian ground forces
or scattered amongst the Americans. The Navy provided one
destroyer in Vietnamese waters, and some diving teams and a
helicopter flight. What they did was well done - they just
couldn't do very much of it. Was this enough "to be regarded and
to remain as a valued ally of the United States"? No: Secretary
of State Rusk himself thought Australia (along with the other
SEATO "allies") should have done more. 2
. . .Continued. .
.
country" in western Queensland. Johnson got out and began
•working' the locals. One of the aircrew recalled "Johnson is
shaking hands all round, and he comes back and tells us these are
real folks - the best damn folks in the world, except maybe the
folks in his own Texas ... there's no question he swung that
county for Johnson before we left. He was in his element." See:
Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent .
p44. Perhaps it was Johnson's 'electoral' success in this
Australian El Paso that did not allow him to see that Australia
had quite deliberately been working to "lock-in" the United
States in Southeast Asia.
1. Mike Gravel (ed.), The Pentagon Papers vol. Ill, p625. Cited
by Barclay, pl45.
2. Dean Rusk, as told to Richard Rusk, As I Saw It . New York,
Penguin, 1991. p455.
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Although the Australian defence budget almost doubled
between 1963 and 1968, much of it went on new equipment that had
only limited application to the war. The army was nearly doubled
in size by the introduction of selective military service, but
even then its strength was less than 40,000 - a far cry from the
efforts of the World War. Not long after he had informed
President Johnson 2 of his magnificent gesture, Menzies quit the
political stage, more fully to pursue life as an Englishman. His
political epitaph, as written by the Sydney Morning Herald^,
acutely summarised Australia's international performance up to
January 1966:
Menzies succeeded [in 1949] and has succeeded since
because he sensed and knew well how to clothe and
dramatise the fundamental fear in the electorate. [He
promised] safety from within by exorcising Communism;
safety from without by firmly committing Australia to
"her great and powerful friends" . .
.
[but overall, in foreign relations] He has given the
form, but failed lamentably in achieving the
substance. . .
.
The Herald seemed to think that Menzies had done well in
resisting the "isolationism that the Labor opposition would have
1. The new ships and aircraft on order had in the main been
authorised to counter the Indonesian 'menace' of the early to
mid-1960s. By the time most of these things had been delivered,
confrontation was ended and Suharto was pursuing a policy of
regional 'reintegration', domestic ant i-Communism and globally, a
superficially more scrupulous non-alignment.
2. Johnson's cable of thanks arrived even before Canberra
received the "request" from South Vietnam for the military
assistance it now had offered in purported "response" to that
request. See: Freudenberg, op.cit., pl61.
3. See Crowley, vol.2. pp498-500
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forced on the country with its antipathies for ANZUS, ANZAM and
SEATO alliances"; but this misrepresented the facts. Labour under
Evatt and Calwell had been all for all three; and like Menzies
had been against any substantial commitment to any of them.
Menzies' legacy was more serious than that of a cheapskate
groveller, though:
He has humiliated Australia with his intervention in
the Suez crisis; alienated Australia from the Afro-
Asian bloc with his [white supremacist outlook,
including] seeming support of Verwoerd • s apartheid
policy; and left Australia looking weak and foolish
[over] the West New Guinea issue, [in economic and
social policy] his failure was only less than it was on
matters of defence and foreign affairs....
This same man was described by former President Nixon as
having a "sensible, comprehensive outlook on foreign affairs that
centred on Australia's growing role as a Far Eastern power." 1 But
Menzies had embarked, more deliberately and more consciously than
Billy Hughes, upon a policy of subservience to great powers that
won Nixon's admiration only because of Menzies' stalwart anti-
communism. In fact, Menzies and his party had survived in office
as long as they had not due to electoral appeal, but due to the
1. Richard M. Nixon, Leaders . New York, Touchstone, 1982. p313.
* And is the more surprising given Nixon's own pragmatism; but
perhaps it was just that, with an eye to Australian readers,
which affected his comment. However, Nixon was not entirely
incorrect about the sense of 'debt'. In Canberra, there is an
annual "Coral Sea Day" marked by a brief ceremony and the usual
speeches reiterating the usual platitudes. Without in any way
dismissing all that was done by the US, I wonder how much longer
we have to go on giving thanks for Australia's 'salvation'. The
event is largely a diplomatic exercise that nowadays gets little
attention; but I still think it is one of those things that helps
overdo the illusion of 'solidarity in war and peace'.
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vagaries of the Australian electoral system and a fractured
opposition that lacked leaders with mass appeal 1 . Even then,
Labor regularly scored close to or over 50% of the popular
primary vote. Menzies may well have looked great to Nixon - he
was an inveterate flatterer, the cultural cringe personified. He
was in short a great follower - just what the US wanted. And just
what Australia least needed. As Nixon more astutely observed,
Menzies was "in a way, paying back a debt with his active support
of the United States in Vietnam." But Nixon thought it was the
United States" salvation of Australia during the Second World War
that Menzies was indebted for; not the free-ride to partial
prominence on the coattails of the powerful. 2 Part of Menzies'
survival technigue had been to gut his party of talent; the
results now really began to show.
Not Quite All The Way
President Johnson visited Australia in 1966, to demonstrate
his support for (Menzies' successor) Harold Holt, whom he was
sure would respond in a more practical way than had Menzies. Holt
did, but with a drop (another 1800 men, followed by a later
1. Evatt became Labor Party leader after Chifley's death in March
1952. He did not much better with Australians than he had with
Americans. The Labor Party split of 1955 was directly responsible
for its failure to gain government until 1972. The 'offcut' of
the Democratic Labor Party was devoted to nothing other than
fighting Godless Communism and preventing a Labor Government in
Australia. Its preferences were always directed to the
conservative coalition. Harold MacMillan (Riding The Storm . p405)
"...could not help remarking to Menzies ... that I thought he was
uncommonly lucky in his principal opponent."
2. Ibid., p318.
235
increment of another 1100) in what was becoming for the US a very
big bucket. Johnson's visit proved popular, but also drew some
highly visible protests from among the growing number of people
who believed that Australia should not even be sharing a carriage
with the US, let alone staying aboard regardless of ultimate
destination. Holt's maladroit use of an American campaign slogan,
meant to please an American audience, enraged many Australians,
even among those who supported the war. He had committed the
unforgivable sin of exposing to Australians themselves their
status as a great-power lackey. Opposition to the war began to
grow, and neighboring nations in Southeast Asia were beginning to
think that involvement on the US side -even support for its
position - carried more political risks than it did benefits.
The government of Johnson's good friend Harold Holt ran out
of commitment - it was already looking for a means to gracefully
disappear when Clark Clifford came begging for more troops in
1967. In his report to the President, Clifford observed that:
either the Australians do not believe that their vital
interests are at stake to a point requiring immediate
sacrifice, or they believe that we [the US] are so
deeply involved that we must carry through to a
conclusion satisfactory to them as well as to us.
* I know it offended the hell out of me, and I was only 14 at the
time and thoroughly indoctrinated with "ANZAC spirit". If we
discussed it at all at school (usually in the context of someone
we knew getting 'called-up' ) , we usually agreed that being in the
war was more or less "doing the right thing" - and we had after
all been on the winning side in Malaya (we didn't understand the
gaping chasm of circumstance separating the two conflicts) . But
Holt's words were too obviously subservient, too much an echo of
Menzies' public grovelling to Queen Elizabeth and the hated Poms
only a few years before. Few of us dared put these views before
our elders, I might add.
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Clifford was "puzzled and troubled, dismayed by our failure
to get more support from our allies . . . shocked at the failure of
the countries whose security we believed we were defending to do
more for themselves. Australia, which had given so much during
World War II [acknowledgement at last!!], dismayed us the most."
The President, Clifford relates, had "counted on more from his
good friend Harold Holt" 1 , and from a country for which he
apparently did feel some personal affection - even if it was an
affection, as Ambassador Marshall Green said in later years,
rooted in a view of Australia as "the next large rectangular
state beyond El Paso". 2
Clifford's guick analysis of Australia's position was fairly
close to the mark, but it was not a question, as his lawyer's
mind suggested, of "either, or", earlier, it clearly had been
Australia's intention to 'entangle' America in Vietnam and thus
in Southeast Asia, for the reason that Clifford suggested. But
his observation that Australia did not really believe its vital
interests to be at stake was equally valid. There had never been
real agreement on just what the threat was in Vietnam; just a
vague feeling that Australia ought to "show willing" to stay in
the good graces of its ally and protector. Ambivalence about the
whole relationship with the US was beginning to spread, with
1. Clark Clifford, Counsel to the President . New York, Random
House, 1991. pp450-l.
2. Marshall Green, speech to the Asia Society of New York, 12
March 1975. Barclay and Siracusa, Australian-American Relations
Since 1945 . pll3.
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increasing fears of cultural and commercial domination becoming
apparent 1 . After the Sino-Soviet split demolished the idea of
'monolithic' communist conspiracy, the successful conclusion of
the Malayan 'emergency', and the overthrow of Sukarno and the
subsequent purge of the PKI 2 by the Indonesia Army, fear of
Chinese expansionism had just faded away. Absorption into an
amorphous mass of Americanism seemed as big a danger, almost, as
had once the yellow peril - and that old bogey was at last
entering its death throes, as was support for the abominable
White Australia Policy. An Australian expatriate journalist,
writing for the London Times in January 1968, observed that:
Some Australian nationalists find a painful irony in
the circumstance that, having fought against British
influence all their lives, they have won their battle
only to find that American influence has taken its
place. Will Australia never be independent, they ask?
Certainly, there is something disturbing in the
apparent eagerness of many Australians to accept the
1. Australia was not alone in this. It is easily forgotten -
perhaps nowhere more than in America besieged by Japanese
commercial acumen and fragmented by endless dispute over the last
piece of pork in the nearly exhausted barrel - that only in 1968
(the depth of Johnson's slough of despond) Europeans were being
warned that : "Today's generation faces ... a clear choice of
building an independent Europe or letting it become an annex of
the United States. The sheer weight of American power is pushing
our countries along the path of annexation, and the point of no
return may be reached [within a decade]." See: Jean-Jacques
Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge . pl89.
2. Parti Komunis Indonesia. By this time it was definitely
"Beijing oriented"; the Indonesians had found the Russians too
overbearing; just like the rest of the "west". I base this
observation not on Sukarno's reputed performance, nor upon
contemporary interpretation, but on my own observation, weak as
it may be. Indonesian officers of enough seniority to have worked
both sides of the fence have told me that they felt their Russian
instructors and advisers were too pushy - just like Americans,
really.
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status of Uncle Sam's favorite satellite.
To balance this is a new cosmopolitanism, with a
special stress on Asia, that is wholly good. 1
This mood was filtering through the electorate, and though
it was less anti-American than pro-Australian (leavened with a
greater sympathy for Asian self-determination, perhaps) , it was
given a powerful boost by the increasing evidence of American
self-doubt and social division over the war and indeed the role
of the US abroad. As another contemporary observer noted, the
very fact that since the Second World War, Australians had begun
to take America more seriously, meant also that they tended to
look at it with a more critically appraising eye 2 . The public
held the government responsible for getting them into this mess,
and though few were in favour of simply 'running out on your
mate' in Vietnam, the whole issue of Australian dependency upon
and policy subservience to the great and powerful was becoming
one of the chief indictments leveled against the government. The
conservative coalition was going down in the polls and set fair
to lose the next general election when John Gorton succeeded the
deceased Harold Holt in January 1968.
Gorton had to be plucked from the Senate and found a seat in
the 'Lower House ', so short of leaders had the Liberal Party
become. Within a month (during the Tet offensive) , he stated
flatly that Austalia would not increase its comitment in
1. Crowley, vol.2, p54 3.
2. Harper, p2 64. Bruce Grant is the author of the article from
which the comment was taken.
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Vietnam. 1 He continued publicly to support the American position,
but with a "distinct lack of enthusiasm". More than any
conservative Prime Minister before or after him, Gorton was a
'man of the people'; and his unease reflected that of the public
at large. 2 So too, however, did his belief in the necessity for
the presence in Asia of the 'Great Powers'. He tried to persuade
Britain not to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore, without
success. And he continued to profess his belief in the
"guaranteed security we and New Zealand enjoy under the ANZUS
Pact". 4
As the White House, under increasing stress, cast
desperately about for ways to end the fighting and start useful
negotiations to end the war, it perhaps understandably omitted on
occasion to inform the Australian government what was going on
,
and what it intended to do. Gorton found himself continually and
publicly wrong-footed, supporting, or at least defending, one US
policy even as it was supplanted by another. 5 The opposition,
1. Barclay and Siracusa, p87.
2. See: Barclay and Siracusa, p89. Also, Manning Clark, A Short
History of Australia. pp237-8.
3. Millar, pl91. This decision by a Brtish Labour government was
partially reversed by the Conservatives in 1971.
4. Barclay and Siracusa, p89.
5. The stop-go policies with bombing halts and cease-fires left
Gorton adrift on a stormy political sea. And Hasluck actually
came out supporting continued bombing even as the White House had
decided upon a halt, which he and the government found out about
virtually as it took effect five days later. There were more
instances like this, culminating in Nixon's visit to China. See a
series of documents in Barclay and Siracusa, pp86-108. Part of
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under new and very loquacious management, made political hay from
the fact that Australia, the US' valued ally, was being kept in
the dark. Labor policy moved from advocating bombing halts to
complete Australian withdrawal - ending conscription, a
traditional Labor stance, was already on the books.
It should have come as no surprise to either side of
Australian politics when President Richard Nixon announced a new
"doctrine" for the employment and commitment of American forces
abroad. Coming on top of Britain's stated intention to withdraw
completely from east of Suez by 1970, it should have galvanised
Australia into a thoroughgoing review of its security objectives
and relationships, especially in Southeast Asia. New ideas were
called for, but nothing really bubbled to the surface. The Labor
party was coming (reverting?) to the view that it was just plain
immoral and unproductive to deploy or station Australian forces
overseas, and Gorton himself, though he had publicly undertaken
to ensure that British withdrawal from Malaysia would be at least
partially balanced by an enhanced Australian commitment of air
and naval forces, was still toying with what was basically a
•fortress Australia' defence policy. Labor also reaffirmed its
faith in ANZUS, although it started to endorse a wider and
. . .Continued. .
.
the reason may been the chronic 'leakiness' of both governments'
supposedly loyal and impartial bureaucracies.
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somewhat fuzzy conception of it as "an instrument for justice and
peace and political, social and economic advancement in the
Pacific area." 1
Overall, US-Australian relations just seemed to drift as
each became increasingly preoccupied with domestic political
events, and the US turned its attention to wider agenda of
normalisation of relationships with China, and the prospect of
some kind of reduction of tensions with the USSR. Internal party
tensions saw Gorton relieved of the Prime Ministership in March
1971. His successor, William McMahon, could not arrest the slide
from public favour of the conservative parties. Like Gorton,
McMahon was continually put on the 'back foot' by American
initiatives of which he knew nothing in advance. President Nixon
had told Gorton in 1969 that "Australia and the United States can
1. Harper, pp247-9. Taken from the Australian Labor Party,
Recommended New Platform on Foreign Affairs, endorsed at 29th
Federal Conference, 20 June 1971. One might observe that, in a
Bush-like swipe at the US Government, the Conference decided that
"Labor seeks close and continuing cooperation with the people of
the United States..", implying that only the government was the
problem. Perhaps it should have invited them to rise up against
their rulers.
* The catalyst for the party vote on the leadership was the
resignation of the Army Minister, John Malcolm Fraser. This
stemmed from a dispute between Fraser and the Chief of The
General Staff, LtGen Sir Thomas Daly, who himself had tendered
his resignation because he could not abide Fraser' s style. Gorton
sympathised with the CGS; Fraser accused him of "significant
disloyalty to a Cabinet Minister", and things progressed from
there. The party vote on the leadership was tied, and Gorton as
Parliamentary Party Chairman used his own casting vote against
himself.
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both be proud of the contribution we are making, as partners" to
the "security and progress of the Pacific region". Partnership
clearly had its limits.
Having taken office halfway through a parliamentary term,
McMahon was in the unenviable position of being regarded almost
from the outset as a 'lame duck 1 Prime Minister. His party was in
increasing disarray, and in the 1972 Australian general election,
the voters agreed with Gough Whitlam and his Labor party that it
was time for a change, after 23 years of decreasingly adequate
conservative rule. Relations with the US were not spared from the
new broom. It was heralded by an abrupt termination of the
residual Australian involvement in Vietnam, of which the US was
given little notice. Relations did not prosper over the next
three years, although the US was sufficiently alarmed by Labor's
performance on gaining office to appoint at last a professional
diplomat to the Canberra Embassy.
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CHAPTER 6
PARTNERSHIP: WHITLAM TO HAWKE
My Government wants to move away from the narrow view
that the ANZUS Treaty is the only significant factor in
our relationship with the United States, and the
equally narrow view that our relations with the United
States are the only significant factor in Australia's
foreign relations. 1
THE WHITLAM SHOCKS, 1972-75
The new Labor Government was sympathetic to and supportive
of the general reluctance increasingly being shown among the
ASEAN nations to have much in the way of an overt defence
relationship with any non-regional nation of either ideological
bloc. It embraced with considerably greater fervour than its
1. Gough Whitlam, reported in the Sydney Morning Herald . 31 July
1973. In Barclay and Siracusa, pllO.
2. The idea of "neutralising Southeast Asia" seems to have
originated in Malaysia, which proposed it in April 1970 in
Dar-es-Salaam, and elucidated the proposal of "neutralisation of
not only the Indo-China States but of the entire region of
Southeast Asia, guaranteed by the three major powers [USA, USSR,
China], against any form of external interference, threat or
pressure" at the Lusaka Non-Aligned Conference in September 1970.
Malaysia said this desire was not incompatible with the impending
're-write' of its defence relationship with Singapore, Australia,
New Zealand and Britain (the Five Power Defence Agreement,
effective 1 November 1971) since the FPDA was intended for
"current defence needs" whilst neutralisation was seen as a "long
term solution". Indonesia was against the notion of "external
guarantee" of neutrality; not unreasonably, given all the major
powers' interventionist records and Indonesian xenophobia. The
compromise was ASEAN 's adoption in 1971 of a resolution calling
for its members to work to secure "recognition of, and respect
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predecessors the notion that Australia must, as in the days of
Curtin, Chifley and Evatt, stand up for the rights and
aspirations of all nations weak and small. Perhaps taking a too-
literal interpretation of the rhetoric emanating regularly from
its Asian neighbour Indonesia, and encouraged by the increasingly
regionalist, non-aligned (or neutralist) stance of Malaysia,
Labour sought to rapidly establish its regional credentials as a
nation that would be:
. . . [taking] a more independent . . . stance in
international affairs and . . . will be less militarily
oriented and not open to suggestions of racism; an
Australia which will enjoy a growing standing as a
distinctive, tolerant, co-operative and well-regarded
nation not only in the Asian and Pacific region but in
the world at large. . .
.
1
. . .Continued. .
.
for, Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality,
free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers."
In Moscow in 1972, Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak
expatiated upon this statement, saying that ASEAN now saw that
"the responsibility for [implementing neutralisation] now rests
with the countries of Southeast Asia themselves"; but he hoped
for Soviet "sympathy and understanding", and by implication that
of the USA and China. See: Roy Allison, The Soviet Union and the
Strategy of Non-Aliqnment in the Third World . Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1988; ppl32-5. Also: Michael Leifer,
ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia . London, Routledge,
1989. The latter book is especially valuable, as its title
implies, for understanding of the currents and eddies within a
decidedly non-monolithic grouping of very different nations
within what "the West" is all too ready to regard as the 'blob'
of Southeast Asia. Allison, too, deals very well with his wider-
ranging subject.
1. As stated by Whitlam in his first speech as Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister. Cited by T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and
War . pp405-6.
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Whitlam was signalling that Australia would no longer look
only to the west, and specifically to the US, for its cues on
foreign policy. This was made clear by the abruptness of the
announced withdrawal of the advisers remaining in Vietnam, and
the egually abrupt cessation of all other aid to the governments
of both South Vietnam and Cambodia. A few days later, Whitlam
fired off a formal protest to Washington, deploring President
Nixon's resumption of bombing of North Vietnam. This showed
little understanding of Nixon's ultimate objective, which was to
bring the North Vietnamese back to the negotiating table 1 . Worse
than this though, was the hysterical public comment of some Labor
Ministers, including the Deputy Prime-Minister , whose
ideological biases got the better of their senses of propriety
and proportion; the Americans were, variously, "brutal,
indiscriminate", "maniacs" and "mass murderers", according to
this august trio.
Washington was furious: "the State Department wanted to
know what had happened to Australia which they had always
1. I have not, however, discovered any evidence that the
Australian government was aware either of the intent or the
motive of the American President. Perhaps it was no less in the
dark than those it had so recently derided. And American press
reaction was hardly restrained in tone.
2. Dr J.F. Cairns, whose rise to public prominence was fuelled
chiefly by his anti-Vietnam protest activities. The others were
Clyde Cameron (Labour and Immigration) and Tom Uren (Urban
Affairs) . See Barclay, op.cit. pl85. Interestingly enough, Uren,
by now long out of the Parliament, claimed that he had achieved
the release of Australians held hostage by Saddam Hussein in late
1990, by the expedient of denigrating the actions of the
Australian (Labor) Government in supporting UN Sanctions, and
accusing his Prime Minister of being an American lackey.
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considered to be a loyal ally." 1 This reaction told the whole
story of the American view of relations with its minor ally - its
value lay solely in its acquiescence, and in swelling the numbers
in the US international chorus of support. President Nixon hinted
at economic reprisal, displaying a fine instinct for his
detractor's weak spot, and his Secretary of State complained that
even countries unfriendly to the US had not reacted so
imtemperately. But then none of these (Rogers mentioned China,
India and the USSR) had suffered the embarrassment of being so
closely associated politically with a course of action that to
many, home and away, had seemed ill-advised in concept and
indefensible in execution. Nonetheless, Whitlam and his men might
have eased into matters a bit more carefully; they were now the
Government of Australia, not just a political party. And
Australia's Vietnam involvement had been a dilemma of its own
making.
Furthermore, even as Australia renounced the idea of
"forward defence" and a "militarised' foreign policy, it remained
psychologically dependent upon the United States to guarantee its
ultimate physical security; a problem that Whitlam apparently
recognised but was of no mind to rectify. He sought instead to
placate the Americans, resorting to a peculiar amalgam of
contrition and bluster. He wrote a "circumspect and courteous"
letter to Nixon, and told American Ambassador Rice that he
(Whitlam) personally supported the ANZUS Treaty and thought the
l.Ibid.
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US got good value from its facilities in Australia; but the
latter were at risk if the US were seen to be trying to lead
Australia around by the nose. 1 He was clearly trying to expiate
his government from accusations of "anti-Americanism" by
resorting to the claim that he was hostage to public opinion that
favoured a more visibly independent stance vis-a-vis the US. To
an extent he was reverting to the "domestic political
circumstances" used in 1954 by Casey to evade making a commitment
in favour of Dulles' wish for allied intervention in Vietnam
during the battle for Dien Bien Phu. But the Government's
performance had brought upon it the wrath and apparently the
lasting distrust of the United States administration - and
probably of a large section of Congress as well. Even the
American Trade Unions had vented their spleen on Australia. 2
As ever, Australians failed to calculate upon the depth of
American chauvinism, which even as the country was embroiled in
bitter internal dissension did not prevent Americans from equally
passionate resentment of external criticism and "disloyalty".
Nixon's reference to a supportive 'silent majority' was no hollow
claim, as proven by his landslide victory in 1972. Australian
espousal of Zones of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, and Nuclear
Free Zones, besides a significant departure from the Atlantic
1. Barclay, ppl85-6.
2. Ibid. Australian maritime unions "placed a ban on US shipping"
and longshoremen on the US east coast retaliated with bans on
handling Australian cargoes. It was not only this issue, either.
The CIA was concerned that Labor's zealous and none-too-discreet
ministry would 'blow' a lot of information that had been given in
good faith to its Australian opposite numbers.
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position upon South Africa and matters of decolonisation
generally, certainly did not help relations with the United
States - but they gained Australia precious little
internationally as well. Australia could have given substance to
its rhetoric by calling for a review of ANZUS; even by serving
its one years' notice of intent to abrogate. But it did not.
Australia had let its mouth lead where its body would not follow.
Whitlam said that the he wanted "to move away from the
narrow view that the ANZUS Treaty is the only significant factor
in our relations with the United States", but diplomatically,
this was still the case. Despite mounting tension over the lack
of Australian oversight of and participation in the activities
conducted in or via the US facilities in Australia, Australia was
not willing to give up its ANZUS "guarantee". The administration
knew it, and itself could raise the spectre of walking out of
ANZUS if the Australian government threatened to get completely
out of hand and "do its own thing" internationally.
Whitlam and his braves could not bring themselves to make
such an assertion of sovereignty - probably because they feared
that this would finally snap the slender threads of public
support keeping them in power. The effect of nearly two
centuries' brainwashing about the "indefensible continent", and
the concerted propaganda of Menzies and his successors, could not
be lightly dismissed. Further, the government's political naivete
and technical ineptitude was driving the economy under and
inflation ever upward. It held itself hostage to the totally
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unreasonable demands of some of the world's most rabidly selfish
trade unions, and added to that had completely mismanaged the
currency in a way that was helping to kill domestic industry.
Some ideologues spoke hopefully of a post-industrial society, but
what they were creating was a pre-industrial one that was
becoming less, not more, self-reliant.
Whitlam's government also failed to see the reality that the
"non-aligned" were so more rhetorically than substantively. Large
sections of the NAM, including its largest member in India, were
actively subsidised and supported by the USSR, and tailored their
own international positions accordingly in image if not
in substance. Similarly, the governments of Southeast Asia found
it advantageous domestically and amongst themselves to proclaim
their independence from external dependencies, even as they all
by their actions acknowledged their need for foreign assistance
and guarantees of support. Whitlam's conspicuous reduction of
Australian military forces based in Malaysia and Singapore played
well to the left-wing galleries at home, but not so well where it
mattered - in Asia. Cultivation of Indonesia brought few real
benefits, given the mutual antipathy of their political cultures
and the continuing suspicion that Australia's public reassurances
to the US really meant that it was still a tool of the west and
thus, in the paranoiac consciousness of Southeast Asian politics,
devoted to keeping the Asians in their place. Australia's past
record in this respect did not help; nor did its protectionist
trade policies.
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Most significantly, the government was doing a good job of
alienating the very middle class voters who had brought it to
power in 1972, and along with them, a good deal of the moneyed
establishment that had grown simply fed up with the old order.
The durability of any of the changes being so precipitately
wrought in Australian foreign policy, and in society as a whole,
had to be guestionable. The Liberal and Country parties simply
refused to believe they were out of government, and mounted a
tendentious, carping opposition to Labor the like of which had
hardly been seen before or since. After forcing Labor to a
premature election in early 1974 by repeatedly stalling
legislation in the Senate, the defeated Liberal party leader
(Billy Snedden, who was regarded as a decent man) observed 1 that
winning an election did not necessarily mean a mandate to govern
Snedden, to keep his position, had succumbed to the demands of a
parliamentary rabble.
The tenor of the opposition's campaign to regain its
"rightful" position in government was that everything Labour did
was bad, and the way of the future was to go back to the past.
Aided by the continuing indiscipline of the Labor Ministry, the
unwholesomely high political profile being taken by the Unions2
,
and growing popular despair at the thickening tarnish covering
1. This based upon my recollection of a televised impromptu
interview. Snedden was deposed in March 1975 by Malcolm (life
wasn't meant to be easy) Fraser.
2. Under the leadership of one Robert James Lee Hawke. The name
may be familiar.
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the bright promise of less than three years before 1
, Labor was
doomed to electoral defeat. The underhand manner in which it was
brought about, however, caused much dark muttering for years
afterward of a plot orchestrated between the opposition, the
Governor General and the CIA. Some still worship at this altar.
Postscript: Too Much Too Soon
The single greatest failure of the Whitlam Government in
foreign policy, and especially in its relationship with the
United States, undoubtedly was the political immaturity of its
ministry. They may have been virtuosos in the dark corridors of
domestic Labor Party faction-fighting, but internationally they
were babes in the woods. Most had no idea that what was
emotionally satisfying to them personally, or to the
ideologically 'correct' cligues of constituency parties and vocal
pressure groups, was viewed abroad with suspicion, alarm, or
contempt. Some, like Whitlam himself and his successor as Foreign
Minister, Don Willessee, knew the world was changing fast and
that Australia had to change with it. What they did not
appreciate, or simply could not see through the fog of 23 years'
political frustration, was that the United States too was now
working for this change. Not always as they might have wished,
1. The government's amateurish efforts to raise loans of Arab
"oil money", and its egually inept efforts to protest its
competence, caused considerable dismay, regardless of the mud-
slinging tactics used by the opposition to exploit the matter for
political gain. Inflation had rocketed to nearly 15% per annum,
unemployment was rising, and the world economy as a whole seemed
to be suffering "stagflation". See Russell Ward, Australia Since
the Coming of Man . New York, St Martin's Press, 1987. pp229-30.
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perhaps, but nonetheless it was and President Nixon, that much-
maligned man of the right, was one of the principal agents for
change.
He was trying to reduce the scope of American entanglements
worldwide. This reflected both economic necessity and Nixon's
belief that unending confrontation between the superpowers was as
futile as, potentially, it was lethal. Capitalism was buckling
under the pressure. 1 So were its adversaries, although the signs
were not so obvious then. The Nixon Doctrine, announced as far
back as 1969, had made clear what the direction of future
American policy would be, as had Nixon's opening of a more normal
relationship with China and his pursuit of detente with the
Soviet bloc. He was supported in this by the Ostpolitik of
Germany and France, even if each had its own good reasons for
courting Soviet goodwill. There would have been more benefit
working, quietly, with America, than vocally and superficially,
against it. Whitlam, eager to reverse the image created by his
predecessors, lost his point by using the same tactics: altering
the image and not the substance of Australian foreign policy.
1. It should not be forgotten that Nixon had administered his own
"shocks" to the world system; ending the ready convertibility for
gold of the US Dollar, and imposing a 10% surcharge on US
imports. This in addition to his sudden announcement of his China
initiative. And all done in 1971. In 1972 he had commenced the
process of detente with the USSR and coined the term "linkage";
of economic-technological favour from the USA in return for 'good
behaviour, politically, from the USSR. This last ought to say
something to those dreamers in Australia who would have us
believe that the economic relationship with a country can be
divorced from other areas of the relationship, as should the
development of American and European relationships with the Arab
nations and Israel since the first "oil shocks" imposed at around
the same time.
253
The events and aftermath of the Vietnam involvement
undoubtedly helped shape Labor's attitudes. It had been vilified
and arguably kept out of office mainly due to its opposition to
Australian involvement. Its case had been well-reasoned but
poorly presented, and the message overwhelmed by Conservative
scare monger ing. Over a time, Labor had gone from reason to raw
emotion on the subject, and its actions upon first taking office
were ill-executed even if purely conceived. As did the United
States, it over-reacted to an ill-starred overseas excursion; but
how different it all from was the "glory" of ANZAC Cove and being
"over there".
The big difference, which Labor did not see, was that the
United States could guite properly choose to disengage from, or
not become embroiled in once more, conflicts in various parts of
the world. But South-East Asia was still and always would be on
Australia's doorstep. It could not simply emulate both American
revulsion and the consequential actions of its government.
Australia's situation was not that of "the west" writ small. It
was "writ" entirely differently; but Australia seemed not to
grasp this. It also overlooked, conveniently, the fact that the
US still kept large forces in the Philippines, Korea and Japan;
and Labor was in large part still relying upon American
engagement in East Asia as its guarantee of security if its own
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'ten year rule* proved as foolish as Winston Churchill's.* In
addition, the United States had not helped trans-Pacific
relations by its initial stubborn refusal to make even a cosmetic
concession to Australia over supervision of its communications
and intelligence-gathering facilities there. Both the US and the
Australian governments allowed rumour and innuendo to supplant
rational discussion on the subject, which deteriorated into a
farce of wild public accusation followed by obscurantist official
denial.
In the wider context of international relations, both sides
misread the changing environment. The US was still looking at
things in a cold war context, for all that it was attempting to
ameliorate the effects of that conflict of wills and propaganda.
And in 1973 it was involved in a succession of events which
Walter LaFeber has described as "detente' s turnaround" 1 . US
relations with, and its attitude toward, the Third World,
approached their nadir 2 . Labour overestimated the ease with which
* It is hard to believe, given his Cassandra-like performance in
the 1930s, that Churchill was the first proponent of this idea.
But as Chancellor of the Exchequer in the early 1920s, he was the
one who proposed it.
l. The American Age . pp619-39.
2. The 'crippler' for Nixon-Kissinger, as with past and future
administrations, was fear of the new; they could not admit their
perceptions on which they had acted were based mostly in domestic
propaganda (that all nations engage in) to convince themselves
they were the world's most wonderful people; those not under
American control would act in "un-American" ways. Nor could they
face the fact that the yielding of coercive power meant having to
work harder and along more complex paths to sustain or improve
American influence. As Robert Dallek says of Nixon (perhaps the
most pragmatic, internationally, of modern American Presidents)
:
"He believed sincerely in this principle of autonomy or self-
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a white nation with a long history of racial supremacist policy,
and scant real links to the bulk of the emergent nations, could
make an international volte face into the ranks of the third
world, whilst insisting on its strong ties to the bastions of the
old world - of which America had become part. Neither nation gave
sufficient credence to the determination of the majority of
nations in Asia and the Indian Ocean to maintain and strengthen
the sovereignty they only recently had won. Both were still
inclined to view nations such as India and Indonesia more as
clients of one or other of the world's major blocs, although
Australia less so than the US. But the Australian government
never successfully explained to its own public why it had a more
optimistic view of, say, India's stance in its region than did
the US. It contented itself with criticism of America rather than
cogent articulation of its own point of view. Had it stayed more
with the latter course, it may have gained more respect and
acceptance in the developing world and in Washington both.
ANZUS was a major stumbling block throughout. Whitlam was
mesmerised by it, his pronouncements notwithstanding. As T.B.
Millar observed 1 , it is likely that Whitlam and his colleagues
did not feel that they would need to invoke it, at least during
. . .Continued. .
.
determination for nations, But it also frightened him; the risks
of true diversity were just too great. ... Nixon could not let go
of concentrated power and organised togetherness in his time.
Indeed, the pattern was to preach autonomy and then find reasons
why it could not work." Sounds like Australians defending ANZUS.
1. Australia in Peace and War
. p407.
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their time in power; giving them carte blanch to 'stick it' to
America at will. If this was so they should have said it plainly.
But they were not willing to genuinely tackle the unpleasant task
of deciding what the nation had to do on its own account to
ensure its future security and prosperity. The inherent
contradictions of Labor's position only undermined its
credibility as an expression of independent national policy-
making. Australia was still 'wedded to the west' psychologically
and materially. This was plain to all of Asia, which still
regarded Australia as a last bastion of the white world whose
presence could be tolerated but need not be welcomed - as was the
case with the larger whole.
Labor further contradicted itself by its odd actions vis a
vis Britain, whose Governor General put Whitlam in his political
coffin in 1975 (an action, it was pointed out, that the British
Queen would not have dared take in her own sceptered isle) . It
was Whitlam, to the confusion of many in a period of heightened
nationalism (for all that its expression was often boorish and
chauvinistic) , who formally asked Queen Elizabeth to accept the
formal title of Queen of Australia. The legal nicety of this
move, which was supposed to end the notion of Australia's being a
Dominion of the United Kingdom, as opposed to a sovereign nation
with its own (absentee) sovereign, was lost on both the
Australian public and one presumes, all those abroad who even
took note of the event. Outwardly, it only confirmed Australian
subservience to the British crown.
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It must have puzzled America's Ambassador, who was not
unsympathetic to Whitlam's desire to more forcefully assert
Australian distinctiveness from the mainstream of the
geographically distant 'west'. Green's speech to the Asia Society
in New York, in March 1975 1 , reflects the optimism of a man who
had worked hard with Whitlam to hold the relationship together
despite the many strains imposed by both their governments, and
sometimes by Whitlam himself, whose "frank" speeches managed to
extol American virtues whilst simultaneously describing a picture
of America that looked like the portrait of Dorian Gray. Green
claimed that "relations are as healthy as they have been in a
long time." Views in both capitals had undergone a "maturation
process", he said, implying that they were overcoming "this
danger in our relations ... of taking each other for granted, of
assuming and presuming too much." He also hit unerringly on
another reason - the perpetual one: "with less and less of
Australia's GNP going to defence" Australia needed, he believed,
to preserve its defence "lifeline" to the US. But this was not
necessarily so; only if one believed in common jeopardy. Which
implied common interest, and a common source of threat.
The Ambassador went on to virtually repeat Admiral Sperry's
warning to Deakin of almost 70 years before, that expressions of
l.In Barclay & Siracusa, ppll2-4. Green was well-respected on
both sides of politics, and his departure, much regretted. A few
more men of his calibre may have done much to develop a genuine
regard between the two countries, and cut down on the usual
exchange of platitudes which, like the Chinese meal of once
popular myth, leave one afterward still wanting something more
substantial.
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mutual regard were no basis for a lasting relationship, which
"cannot be built on the shifting sands of sentiment". He reviewed
areas of divergence of approach, and pointed to some regional and
global issues where he saw Australia and the United States as
"having so much in common." But the truth of the matter was that
relations were still strained, and likely to remain so for some
time, if only because of the Australians' penchant for "thinking
out loud" on international affairs, and the Americans' preference
for presenting their associates with the fait accompli. Things
were certainly getting bad when the Soviet magazine International
Affairs could refer in laudatory terms to "Australia's transition
to a more active and independent foreign policy . . . accelerated
by the coming to power ... of the Labour Government" 1 .
Whitlam and Ambassador Green both had tried hard to
preserve at least the illusion of a cordial working relationship
between their two governments, but such there was not. Whitlam
had wanted to have his cake and eat it; diplomatic relations
choked on it. The US undoubtedly was relieved to be on more
familiar ground when Malcolm Fraser and his inaptly named
Liberals returned to their "rightful" place on the treasury
benches. But the change brought few practical benefits, apart
from Fraser 's willingness to embrace once more the cold war
rhetoric of his political ancestors.
1. Barclay & Siracusa, ppl22-6.
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"CERTAIN CORRECTIVES": FRASER, 1976-83
International Affairs' correspondent noted that in its dying
years, the previous Conservative government had begun to
"introduce certain correctives in the country's foreign policy,
with account taken of the national interests and the real
situation in the world." Though it entered in a veritable blaze
of pro-Americanism the Fraser Government did not undo many of
its forebears' nor Labor's "correctives", and relations were more
let stand than actively promoted. Even worship of the venerated
ANZUS slipped into perfunctory attendance at annual meetings,
where on at least one occasion the talk seems to have been more
about beef export guotas than defence. Even this odd fact
illuminates the primary value of the association as perceived by
then in Australia; the expectation of economic benefit in return
for its stalwart (verbal) adherence to the alliance with America.
After the usual "new broom for defence" White Paper released
in 1976, which plugged the old theme of greater self-reliance,
by 1978 defence spending had slid back to the post-Vietnam low,
under Labor, of roughly 2.5% of GNP. 1 Australia's Foreign
Service, rightly described as the country's "first line of
defence", endured administrative reviews and staff and budget
1. This is lower than the figures guoted at the time. The
difference lies in the gap between budgeted outlay and actual
expenditure. My reference for the guoted figure is the 1987 White




cuts. 1 Fraser introduced a measure known as "world parity
pricing" for domestically produced oil, and squandered the
dividend on "middle class welfare" expenditure rather than
funding productive assets or reducing federal debt. He clung to
protectionism which generated a storm of derision from the ASEAN
countries, even as Australia proclaimed its wish for a closer
relationship. 2 By the time he was ejected in 1983, it had become
a common criticism of the stern-visaged and tough talking Fraser
that he was just that - all front. Action seldom matched the
words of the Fraser government, which did poorly in relations
with Southeast Asia and in its own special way also succeeded in
aggravating the Americans.
Fraser visited President Carter in 1978 (the year of the
beef) , and was welcomed by the President as his good friend John;
which was Fraser* s first name. But it seemed strange to
interested Australians that the President of the USA should be so
poorly briefed; what did it say about the regard in which their
country was held? Carter gurgled a few trite, standard, "common
heritage" phrases, and that was that. What else was there to say?
The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, China's not so successful
riposte, and later in 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
all breathed new life into the defence relationship, although
Australia abstained from the US' unilateral trade embargo on the
1. P.J.Boyce, "The Foreign Policy Process", Independence and
Alliance: Australia in World Affairs. 1976-80". pp!4-15.
2. See: J.R. Angel, "Australia and Southeast Asia", Independence
and Alliance". pp223-244.
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USSR and, eventually, from the boycott of the 1980 Moscow
Olympics as well.
The ANZUS Council of Foreign Ministers, however, still had
managed to have an "emergency meeting" in late February 1980; the
"Pacific Pact" was now used to provide the rationale for
heightened Australian naval activity in the Indian Ocean 1 - and
for heightened US military activity on, over and around
Australian territory. Not much else changed, and Australia
(sensibly) declined an American suggestion that it commit units
to the Rapid Deployment Force. The Australian naval forces that
operated in the Indian Ocean had limited contact with US and
other western forces. This was quite sensible too: Australia was
still getting beaten regionally with the "western lackey" club,
and was trying to foster economic and diplomatic relations with
countries in the Gulf and with India. New Delhi made it quite
clear that visits by Australian warships would not be welcomed if
they were acting in effect as part of a western naval task force
in the region. Fraser was sensitive to these views, yet he still
offered the US an option to home-port warships at the newly
opened naval base just south of Fremantle, in Western Australia.
This action probably was just a sop to a venal state
government's desire to fleece American sailors on a steadier
1. Just what this was supposed to demonstrate is not clear; the
principal benefit for Australia seems to have lain in the regular
calls subsequently made to Mombasa by units of the RAN, which
were well received and provided a useful complement to Fraser'
s
own interest in settling the difficulties in Zimbabwe and
Namibia; besides acting as some indirect evidence of Australian
support for an end to apartheid in South Africa.
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basis.* It held no attraction to the US Chief of Naval
Operations, for purely naval reasons 1 . But US marines and naval
aircraft did make use of the western Australian coast for
training exercises, and B52 bombers were staged through Darwin
for Indian Ocean "surveillance" flights and later for low level
flying training over the northern Australian hinterland. It was
all pretty marginal stuff, and the Australian Government,
satisfied that the US was doing whatever it was that made it
happy in the Indian Ocean, offered no more. It was more or less
in the position that Australia occupied near the end of the
Second World War - providing leave, recreation, training and some
logistic facilities, and no forces at the coal face. It has to be
said though that the two nations took more widely divergent views
of developments in the Indian Ocean over time, and Australia had
been spared the Iranian troubles of the Great Satan.
Australian non-response to the issue of a Multi-National
Peace-Keeping Force (MNF) to oversee the practical implementation
* I was on the staff of the recruit training establishment, HMAS
Leeuwin, in 1978-9. I well remember the press heralding visits by
USN carrier groups to Fremantle in these sorts of terms: "7,000
American sailors will visit Fremantle from [whenever to
whenever] . They are expected to spend $5 million during their
stay." No-one gave two hoots what they had been doing, or why.
Some years later, when I was operating out of Darwin, I can
recall that there was a similar desire for American warships to
be home-ported there, based upon hopes of stimulus to the local
economy; but the idea made no sense, strategically, whatsoever.
1. Admiral Hayward, in testimony to the House Armed Services
Committee, observed that Subic Bay is "the same distance from our
Indian Ocean op area [the Arabian Sea] as Perth ... so you need
not make a big investment in Perth when you have got a pretty
substantial capability at the same distance away." Cited by
Barclay, Friends in High Places . p205.
263
of President Carter's most luminous achievement, the Camp David
Accords, was a different matter. Thanks to its scrupulously
observed (albeit self-interested) policy of "even-handedness" in
the Arab-Israeli disputes, and its position as a democratic
middle power with at least an early history of support for
international mediation of disputes, Australia was a logical
candidate to contribute to such a force. It studiously avoided
commitment: "Fraser was as determined to be last in the queue for
Sinai as Spender had been to be first in the queue in Korea." 1
And he was last. Australia still participated in the end, but in
a small way, and without reaping the rewards diplomatically and
perhaps then economically that it might have. Its vacillation
could hardly have impressed the US, and probably (and more
importantly) few others as well.
Perhaps Fraser was trying a bit too hard to avoid being
accused of simply following the US around the world again, and
there would have been some criticism to this effect for sure. He
would not have thanked his parliamentary colleague, former Prime
Minister William McMahon, for putting to him in the House a
question on the subject which inferred that participation in the
MNF was required by virtue of "our special relationship with the
United States; the need to strengthen the bonds that keep the two
nations together, including recognition of our obligations under
ANZUS". It was an extraordinarily inept way for McMahon to raise
the subject of participation, especially as he prefaced these
1. Barclay, p207.
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remarks with talk of the need for Australia "as one of the real
leaders in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations area" 1 to
lead the way in volunteering its participation in the Sinai MNF.
It was no form of leadership to be acting simply out of
obligation to the United States, as McMahon should well have
known, and it was altogether the wrong context for talk of ANZUS
obligation especially. McMahon had put Fraser in a position where
he would be damned if he did and damned if he didn't - and he
was, both ways. This may have been what McMahon wanted; there was
no love lost between the two. If so, it was yet another of those
lamentably frequent instances where Australian domestic
politicking was allowed to take precedence over the wider
national interest, damaging its image both in the region and in
the world at large.
Fraser at least shored up Australia's image by taking the
lead in negotiating an end to the Smith regime in Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe) and providing Australians as part of the monitoring
group overseeing the transfer of power from the white minority to
a majority government headed by former "freedom fighter" Robert
Mugabe. Unusually for people of his political stripe, Fraser
demonstrated a genuine commitment to oppose racialism in all its
forms, wherever found, and he was a strong opponent of Apartheid
in South Africa. He supported independence for Namibia, which had
1. Barclay, p207. This must have gone down well in Jakarta and
Kuala Lumpur!
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been under South African suzerainty since 1919, when Smuts
(assisted by Hughes) had gained the League of Nations Mandate for
the former German territory of Southwest Africa. In both matters
his position did not differ significantly from that adopted by
Whitlam. It had become part of 'mainstream' Australian foreign
policy. So had Fraser's policy of unreserved acceptance of
Vietnamese 'boat people' as immigrants. Australia accepted over
110,000 refugees after 1975, and it really was Fraser who 'got
the ball rolling' on this policy which has since been adhered to.
Fraser's humanitarianism may have been what eventually
brought him undone. He was still widely hated for his tactics in
gaining power in 1975; and despite his tough talk, had not done
what he promised, which was to administer a shock to the
Australian system and kick it out of its complacency. In 1982,
Australia entered another of its recurring economic slumps (due
again largely to drought and collapsing mineral prices) , and
inflation and unemployment rose in tandem. By this time, the
once-promised 7% annual growth in the defence budget was but a
fond memory. Australia's good intentions had gone to seed once
more.
THE DROVER'S D06: HAWKE, 1983-91
By the time Fraser brought on his own political demise in
1983, by a fatally mistimed early General Election, "morning in
America" showed many signs of taking the world on a long day's
266
journey into night. Though President Reagan was proving highly
successful in restoring America's faith in itself, he was making
a lot of other people nervous. This was a time when there was
much talk of the Soviet Union making the most of a closing
"window of opportunity" to exercise the supposed massive military
advantage it reputedly enjoyed, according to a (purportedly)
gloomy CIA 1 and a gleeful Pentagon, resurgent defence industries
and a stern-faced Administration. Two bellicose geriatrics
glowered at each other over their respective nuclear arsenals,
and people were reading books with titles like The Third World
War, 1985. 2
The incoming Labour Government of former Trade Union boss
Robert James Lee Hawke 3 was in something of a bind; many of its
1. Which had nonetheless, it seems, correctly appreciated that
the Soviet economy was sinking fast.
2. In 1982, Professor T.B. Millar (hardly a political radical),
wrote: "We [in Australia] should be troubled by the Reagan
administration's threshing around for a foreign policy based on
strength without subtlety, which is not much better than subtlety
without strength and may be even more dangerous...". Six years
later, Desmond Ball would write: "Many aspects of recent
developments in US warfighting plans and capabilities are
profoundly disturbing" - he was referring to what seemed a
philosophical shift within the US Strategic Planning
establishment from 'deterrence' through mutually assured
destruction, to 'warfighting' - a concept of using nuclear
weapons tactically, to win battles. See: Australian Defence
Policy For the 1980s . pl7; and Australia and the World , pp81-3.
It seems this was the only conceivable 'logical' response to
Soviet doctrine, which already embraced nuclear 'warfighting'.
3. Hawke had taken over the Labor Party leadership just
prior to the election, supplanting the more ideologically sound
but (so deemed the party fixers) less electorally attractive Bill
Hayden, who went on to be Minister for Foreign Affairs and then
Governor General (in 1988) . Hayden remarked, justifiably given an
economic slump and rising unemployment, besides general public
disenchantment with Fraser and his team that the election of 5
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supporters at the local party level were also strong advocates of
"anti-nuclearism" . This extended from wanting to ban uranium
mining to banning visits by nuclear powered or armed ships and
aircraft. There was more vocal (though still by no means a
preponderance of) support for declaring Australia a neutral or
non-aligned country, and for joining in with a renewed call for a
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone 1 .
The government itself it was pledged to a 'Nuclear Free'
South Pacific and divided on the guestion of uranium mining. One
of its first acts was to appoint an "Ambassador for Disarmament"
to the United Nations. The "Joint facilities" operated by the
. . .Continued. .
.
March 1983 could have been won by "the drover's dog". See Russell
Ward, Australia Since the Coming of Man . p2 38. (Be warned that
the author himself admits this is a highly ideologically biased
account of Australian history. But the bias is in the
interpretation of fact; the facts themselves are undistorted.
)
* A common graffito was "Ban Uranium"; this appeal to revise the
periodic table of the elements went unheard, it seems, by She who
controls the cosmos.
1. Though it should be appreciated that the SPNFZ idea was
motivated as much by dislike and fear of French Nuclear testing
at Mururoa atoll (in French Polynesia, centred upon Tahiti), as
by any other consideration. And there was the anti-colonial
factor to consider as well, with New Caledonia being considered a
'way-station' for forces en route to Polynesia; and with
Polynesia itself becoming ever more dependent upon the financial
largesse accompanying the testing programme. In the twenty years
since 1966, there were 81 nuclear tests, both above and (after
1975) below ground. By 1985, in Polynesia "exports covered 6% of
imports". See: Mort Rosenblum, Mission to Civilize: The French
Way, New York, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1986. p57 and Chapter
16. The United States' unwavering support for France and French
interests, in the service of the US' deterrent posture in the
North Atlantic, did not go un-noticed; except, perhaps, in
France.
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United States in Australia made the country a certain target, it
was widely believed, in the event of war between the nuclear
superpowers, in which Australia otherwise had little need to
become involved 1 . What price ANZUS, then?
"Concerned to do Nothing"
The Prime Minister hastened to plight his troth to Uncle
Sam: "we are concerned to do nothing to endanger our alliance
with the United States" said he within two months of taking
office2 . US warships would not be asked "the question", nor would
the B-52s still operating through the Northern Territory. Both
were welcome to come and go as they pleased - unions willing. The
latter had other ideas, as was made plain when the British
aircraft carrier Invincible developed stern gland troubles and
requested to enter the Garden Island Drydock that had been built
in World War II mainly to meet the requirements of allied fleets.
This time the Defence Minister asked "the question", to which the
British Captain gave the standard answer - he could neither
1. And according to the authors of the "Third World War", it
scarcely was. In 1988, Professor Desmond Ball asserted that only
one of the US facilities in Australia - the satellite ground
station at Pine Gap - was essential for arms control verification
and monitoring purposes. The remainder were becoming unnecessary,
due to technical developments, for either war-fighting or arms-
control purposes. Pine Gap, Ball considered "irreplaceable" for
arms control verification; but this leaves open the need for
continuing operation of others such as Nurrungar. See: Desmond
Ball (ed.), Australia and the World
. pp84-7.
2. Barclay, p208. In the same address, Hawke also expressed
Australia's support for a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, though
specifically stating, as would perpetually be repeated to
congenitally deaf members of the Reagan Administration, that
Australia did not hold with restrictions upon transit or port
calls of nuclear powered or armed vessels and aircraft.
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confirm nor deny that his ship had nuclear weapons on board. Then
you cannot dock, said the Minister. The Invincible went to
Singapore, amid much scratching of heads by those who wondered
what the government meant when it said that these restrictions
would not apply in a "real emergency" - regardless of the fact
that refusal of timely repair could itself eventuate in a "real
emergency". It was a stupid position to be in. The Minister was
replaced shortly afterwards; the Union leaders remained.
In the meantime, the Australian Defence Force seemed to be
wallowing through a period of mental stagnation and bureaucratic
impotence. This was as usual accompanied by severe inter-service
backbiting and loud complaints over the unwarranted influence of
Department of Defence civilian officials who constituted "the
best-funded disarmament lobby in the country". Defence Minister
Scholes had fulfilled his party's pre-election commitment to
disposal of the nation's sole identifiable (to labour
ideologues 1 ) tool of expansionist militarism in the ageing
* It was described to me thus by a senior officer who declared
that Canberra was the scene of the "real war" - between
servicemen and bureaucrats. And it certainly seemed that way for
a while.
1. Another view with its roots in the 1920s, perhaps earlier.
Labor then "consistently opposed any Australian [purchase of]
cruisers" . Their long range made cruisers "offensive" rather than
"defensive" it argued; besides the fact that they could be
integrated into distant campaigns waged by Britain. Labor would
have done better to question the underlying policy of regarding
the RAN as part of a global Imperial Navy, which caused, over
time, increasingly unbalanced development of the RAN. It came
increasingly to be seen as a unit meant simply to dovetail into
larger British or other allied forces. This was far from the
vision of 1911. Also by 1920, "the advocacy of air force and
submarines became the central point of Labor defence plans." See:
Hasluck, The Government and the People . p23.
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carrier Melbourne, which was not to be replaced nor some
substitute naval capability found. The Navy would take a manpower
cut equivalent to her Ship's Company and air group. At its senior
levels, the Navy was shocked into something close to paralysis;
the Air Force indulged itself by claiming to be the panacea for
all defence needs; and the Army simply said that everything it
had was essential to maintain the right base for 'general
mobilisation' against an invasion threat that sounded
suspiciously like the Yellow Peril of old. The forces seemed
inadequate for independent 'conventional' operations in support
of purely national goals, and irrelevant to conduct of global
(inevitably, nuclear) war. National security goals were the
subject of much disagreement, but little rational debate. Most
arguments revolved endlessly around the stark alternatives,
neither of them satisfactory, of continental defence
(isolationism) or the need to support the Western
Alliance (presumed to mean 'forward defence ', as practised by
Menzies.). Debate on force structure focussed on endless, ill
informed and wholly erroneous comparison between the various
merits of different force elements, conducted along lines that
would have been familiar to the defence chiefs and bureaucrats of
the inter-war period. There was but little talk of the underlying
weakness in the economy, and almost none of broadening the
framework of Australia's diplomatic contacts.
Some revolutionary thinking was called was for, but nothing
much arose: all could agree, though, that changing anything at
all would be difficult and demanding; and should therefore be
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avoided if possible. The drift, dogmatic pronouncements and
general inactivity continued, until the whole question of defence
policy and military alliances was given a welcome boost by the
unwelcome actions of a newly elected Labour Government in New
Zealand.
"Brave Little New Zealand"
Within months of gaining office, New Zealand's government
under Prime Minister David Lange managed to stand ANZUS on its
ear, by the simple expedient of carrying out its pre-election
policy of denying entry to nuclear powered or armed vessels and
aircraft. "The question" would be asked for every proposed visit.
"The Answer" (by now reduced for convenience, so regularly was it
reiterated, to NCND) would not be accepted: it had to be either
yes or no. The US was outraged, the Australian government
cringed. New Zealand's action added grist to the quite
considerable mill of Australia's own herd of anti-nuclear
zealots. A 'single-issue' political party (the Nuclear
Disarmament Party) , was formed to advance the cause, and got two
senators elected on the strength of it.*. Of course the two
* It should be understood that election to the Senate in
Australia is decided on a proportional-preferential basis. Each
state has allocated to it ten senate seats; the Territories, two
each. To be elected, each candidate has to secure a "quota" of
votes, which are allocated on a preferential basis, i.e., a
successful candidate in a half-senate election typically would
require about 14% of the vote to secure a seat, allowing that
some candidates will surpass this figure on the primary vote. The
votes of candidates who secure a quota on the primary vote are
obviously not redistributed as preferences to other candidates.
The power of single issue parties and other pressure groups stems
largely from the ability to influence the allocation of
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nation's circumstances could hardly have been more different. But
perhaps New Zealand had a more finely developed sense of the "art
of the possible" than did Australia. It had clung more tightly to
the Imperial skirts than its larger neighbour, and had suffered
correspondingly greater economic pain, and moral outrage, when
Britain deserted it for the Common Market. Yet it had kept its
. . .Continued. .
.
preferences, which make the difference between winning and losing
for many a candidate of a mainstream party if he is placed low
on his party's ticket. An a couple of minority senators can often
hold the balance of power in the senate. They rarely, for obvious
reasons, get people into the House of representatives, where a
simple majority (after preferences) is required to gain a seat.
But by 'directing' preferences from the faithful, can still have
a major influence in the result.
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semi-Battalion of troops in Singapore even as Australia
decided to take its own out; and they were still there in 1984*.
Over time New Zealand had come to reflect perhaps more
deeply on the costs and benefits of what it was doing in the
military as well as in other fields affecting its ultimate
security. It was geographically isolated, and of no great moment
in the world contest for territorial dominion or influence. It
offered no glittering prizes in resources; unless you had a lust
for sheep and their products. There was no particular reason for
it to be targeted in the event of superpower conflict, which
would be waged, if at all, almost exclusively in the northern
hemisphere. Being "nuclear free" was an 'easy' domestic political
issue: much to gain in kudos, at little practical risk. All that
was at stake was the American 'nuclear guarantee' implied by
ANZUS: and what, realistically, did that matter?
The US pronounced - it was solidarity that mattered;
standing together against the common foe. This was pretty
ridiculous too, from a solely national perspective. New Zealand
had no reason to embrace Russia or Russians 1 - who were about as
far removed ethnically and ethically as the were geographically
from New Zealand. Well, said the US, you might want us for
* But they are gone now, though their departure was by no means
sudden. It did not happen until 1989-90, and a residual presence
is still maintained.
1. And Lange went out of his way to warn the Russians, publicly,
against trying to exploit his action by willful misinterpretation
of its import and implications. See: Camilleri, The Australia.
United States, New Zealand Alliance: Regional Strategy in the
Nuclear Age , pl37.
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something else; and the New Zealand service chiefs joined in. The
government decided that militarily, there was not too much that
it could think of; more importantly, New Zealand public opinion
was firmly behind a "nuclear free" New Zealand. 1 If ANZUS could
be salvaged, well and good; if not, so be it. This appalled the
Australian government; it was being upstaged by "brave little New
Zealand", whose own unique security circumstances were falsely
being made analogous to Australia's by the local anti-nuclear/
anti-America lobby. 2
Nonetheless, pertinent questions were raised, even as Hawke
and his ministers strove to reduce the danger posed to the
alliance by both New Zealand's hardening stance and the strongly
adverse reaction of the senior partner. The main US concern was
global, not regional. Other 'waverers' might emulate New
1. Yet the majority remained in favour of maintaining the
Alliance. Why? I can only surmise, out of habit; both New Zealand
and Australia were accustomed to believe that an external
alliance with a Great Power was part and parcel of the national
heritage, and by inference a necessity.
2. Perhaps what most turned up the heat, though, on both sides of
the Tasman, was the sinking of the Greenpeace vessel "Rainbow
Warrior" in Auckland harbour on 10 July 1985. It was to be
•flagship' for a protest flotilla sailing to French Polynesia.
Two French agents were captured by police and later convicted of
the sabotage, in which one crew-member lost his life. France was
unrepentant, as evidenced by a statement of the President
himself: "No one can argue that France should diminish its
surveillance of the atolls and renounce its tests on the strength
of an act that does not morally engage our country." What can one
say? For an account of the circumstances and the French domestic
debate, see: Rosenblum, Mission to Civilize . pp321-39.
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Zealand's action 1 , should New Zealand be seen to "get away with
it". Lange insisted there was nothing to prevent the maintenance
of a "conventional" military relationship; it was just that New
Zealand had neither need nor desire for a nuclear dimension to be
added to its defences. The US responded with a series of
military-intelligence "sanctions" against New Zealand, coupled
with thinly veiled threats that these might be broadened into
economic sanctions too. Australian activists exulted - it was
obvious that New Zealand was being backed into a diplomatic
corner from which it cold not retreat, but would continue to
snarl and spit Australia's Prime Minister wavered, and caved in
to domestic complaints about making airfields available to US
aircraft that were going to monitor an MX missile test shot, that
1. As expressed by Deputy assistant Secretary of Defence James
Kelly in testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee on
Asia and the Pacific in March 1985: "The potential spread of
access denials to other countries with very active anti-nuclear
factions is of very serious concern." Quoted in Camilleri, pl42.
2. There was something in this, but also something to the
American argument that navies and armed forces generally were not
infinitely divisible in form and function. Lange wanted his bread
buttered on both sides; it was an impossible position to take. He
would have been better advised to take the big leap and say he
didn't need the Alliance as it had come to be understood. But
like Whitlam, he obviously figured this was too much for the
public to digest in one swallow. The American position was (and
had to be) based upon its global outlook and the need to maintain
cohesion in NATO, many of whose members also had to deal with (or
had within their governments) very sizeable anti-nuclear
constituencies
.
* I well remember speaking with a senior New Zealand Navy
officer at the depth of the dispute. He said that he (and his
countrymen) were fed up with being banged over the head with
accusations of treachery and threats of economic and diplomatic
excommunication. And they had responded accordingly, by taking
pride in their stance and refusing to be bullied.
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would splash down hundreds of miles from Australian territory. It
was a humiliating moment.
Hawke was walking a tightrope. The threat of economic
sanctions against New Zealand was of grave concern at home, where
Australia had been struggling with diminishing success to
maintain, let alone increase, a share of the United States market
for its primary products, chiefly beef and sugar, in the face of
increasing US protectionism and steadily reducing foreign
quotas 1 . Also of concern was the possibility of being cut off
from US logistic support in particular, upon which the Navy and
Air Force were especially dependent. The intelligence had always
to be taken with a grain or two of salt, but the US' huge
technical resources made access to even a part of the output
irresistible.
Australia tried to play the intermediary role, and like most
middlemen found itself pushed from pillar to post, being accused
1. It is interesting that in the face of these noises from the
United States, the Australian government was not prepared to try
a 'reverse track' and pressure the Americans; it regularly
insisted that US facilities in Australia were not "bargaining
chips" to be used to extract more sensible agricultural policies
from the United States.
* In large part this was a direct consequence of cheese-paring
budgets, which had caused the services to concentrate on capital
equipment purchases to the detriment of ordnance and spare parts
stockpiling. Administrative tangles on both sides added to the
problem; "routine" orders for various items through the US
Foreign Military Sales system sometimes seemed to take forever to
be processed and fulfilled. The causes were varied; sometimes
inefficiency, sometimes competing demands from the US armed
forces, and from those of other allies. The RAN and RAAF also
very much valued their access to the US' fully instrumented
training facilities in the Philippines, Hawaii and the
Continental United States.
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by both sides of the argument of not adhering closely enough to
their own preferred position. By mid-1986, all military and
intelligence contact was suspended, as were official contacts at
almost all levels. New Zealand opinion seemed to be headed toward
almost total neutrality and disarmament. Australia strove to
strengthen its bilateral links with New Zealand and the United
States, at no small cost to itself. 1 And the new defence
Minister, Mr Kim C. Beazley, paused frequently in public to drink
at the ANZUS trough.
After ANZUS - More ANZUS
In mid-1985, when questioning of the relationship was
approaching its height, Beazley gave a speech in which he
attempted to answer the rhetorical question "After ANZUS?". His
answer was succinct if unimaginative: "More ANZUS" 2 . But the
relationship with the United States was again entering a
contentious phase on broader issues.
Australia continued to take a more relaxed view of relations
with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam than did the US, and
advocated a more flexible approach to the Cambodian question than
either the US or ASEAN. After lagging initially, it had been
quicker to expand its relationship with China (but Sino-Russian
relations were not really an inhibiting factor for Australia)
.
1. Camilleri, ppl42-7.
2. Kim C. Beazley, "After ANZUS: Australia's Future Security
Arrangements." Australian Foreign Affairs Record . July 1985.
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Australia was a vocal critic of US policies toward central
America throughout the eight years of Ronald Reagan's presidency.
Australia and ASEAN were both getting a bit weary, and wary, of
the continued harping on "burden sharing" in the Pacific, where
the US' "Maritime Strategy" and the concept of horizontal
escalation were seen to be, along with the deliberatively
provocative actions of the USSR, the main cause of regional
tensions. There was widespread concern that the US pressure on
Japan to take up more of the burden of its own defence (against a
threat generated chiefly by American extension to Asia of
Europe's cold war) was a convenient cloak for Japanese
rearmament 1 which eventually could result in another period of
Japanese military-economic hegemony in East Asia; the more so
because the US apparently conceived that Japan had to "share the
burden" of economic assistance as well 2 . Insensitive behaviour
1. See: Robert 0. Tilman, Southeast Asia and the Enemy Beyond:
ASEAN Perceptions of External Threats . Boulder CO, Westview,
1987. This is a very useful book, drawing on a wide range of
interviews and 'local' printed sources. Tilman observed that
"many misgivings about Japanese strategies, tactics and motives
persist.
"
(pl20) Aside from fear of Japanese commercial
domination, "every ASEAN state has some concern about Japanese
rearmament" and they also expressed "concerns about the United
States as a threat in one way or another. America is urging Japan
to rearm without considering the latent security threat that
Japan may pose to the ASEAN region." In addition, it was widely
felt that "America behaves like a loose cannon on a rolling deck.
It is powerful but not predictable, and [thus] a 'danger' even if
it is not a 'threat '." (ppl50-51) The consensus seemed to be (in
1986-7) that the United States would be a formidable enemy, but
is a risky friend." (pl40)
2. Richard Holbrook, former Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, now says of American pressure for Japanese
rearmament: "From 1977-81 I participated in these efforts. The
policy was misguided and pursued with far too much enthusiasm."
It is good of him to admit it now (in a discreet footnote), but
this hardly explains why the US thought it could ignore, and pour
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by US fishermen in the South Pacific had angered regional
governments into proposing fishery agreements with the USSR, but
the US was very slow to either bring its fishermen to heel or to
propose any constructive alternative which would generate some
income for these cash-strapped micro-states.
The US seemed unwilling to exert any pressure on France to
suspend its controversial nuclear testing programme at Mururoa
Atoll (a source of irritation for over a decade) , or to have
France modify an increasingly intransigent policy towards
decolonisation of New Caledonia. 1 In the latter case, the local
'liberation front' was known to be getting aid and comfort from
the egregious Colonel Muammar Qaddaffi, who had links with the
government of Vanuatu as well. Australia had helped sponsor, and
had ratified, the Treaty of Raratonga, which declared a South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. This provoked outright hostility from
senior echelons of the Reagan administration, although Australia,
. . .Continued. .
.
scorn upon, those who demurred at the time. It should give the
ANZUS chorus in Australia something to think about as well.
Strangely, Holbrook goes on to say "Washington was on sounder
ground" in encouraging Japanese Overseas Development Aid (ODA)
throughout the region; but nearly all that 'aid' was loans and
'tied' investment, adding to regional fears of a new Co-
Prosperity Sphere. See: Richard Holbrook, "The Unequal
Partnership", Foreign Affairs , vol.70 no. 5, Winter 1991-92, p53.
1. The tension eased considerably with the departure of the
Chirac Government and its replacement by the more conciliatory
regime of Rocard. The new Premier, Edith Cresson, does not appear
especially worried one way or the other, being naturally
preoccupied with Europe and Japanese ants.
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supported by New Zealand 1 , had gone to some pains to ensure that
there was no formal commitment by any of the Treaty Signatories
to restrict transit or port access.
The administration saw no virtue in the treaty. Later,
Congressional hearings in examination of the issue of US
accession to the protocols to the Treaty, produced a venomous
outburst from former assistant Secretary Richard Perle:
I do not think that this is the kind of palliative
that in the long run is going to deal with the anti-
nuclear sentiment that exists in Australia. ... we are
going to be subjected more or less continuously to an
anti-nuclear test in a number of international forums,
and that will give plenty of grist to Mr Hayden's mill
for generating anti-American sentiment in Australia,
which I have no doubt he takes great pleasure in doing
and will continue to do at every opportunity. 2
1. Michael Hamel-Green, The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty; A Critical Assessment . Peace Research Centre Monograph
No. 8. Canberra, Australian National University, 1990.pp79-80.
From examination of the negotiating stances of the two countries,
Hamel-Green concludes that: "Australian government concern over
[New Zealand's] anti-nuclear and ANZUS policies was one of the
key factors that prompted the Raratonga Treaty. [Australia]
sought to pre-empt any New Zealand Labour regional initiative
that might have threatened US or Australian interests at the
regional level . . . [and it] successfully contain[ed] the spread
of the 'nuclear allergy' to other countries in the region... "e
also concludes that "New Zealand's vulnerability to potential
economic pressure ... [and] its continuing ambivalent support for
ANZUS [in government and in the community]", besides a now-
heightened dependence upon Australia as a defence partner, all
helped ensure its support for the Australian initiative. "New
Zealand response represented a successful example of the Treaty's
intended role as a measure to channel regional anti-nuclear
responses in a pro-ANZUS direction..." Over to you, Mr Perle.
2. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone: Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Asian and Pacific Affairs . 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 June and 15
July 1987. Chairman Stephen Solarz observed that he had "always
considered [Foreign Minister Hayden] "a friend of America".
Perle 's view was that Hayden was "not particularly well disposed
toward any of our policies." Perle was probably right there; and
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Through all of this, Beazley insisted then and later that
ANZUS did not "distort Australia's defence priorities." They had
been distorted, he claimed, by "oar Imperial heritage"; the
"ANZUS Treaty was not the cause". This was and is sheer
sophistry. The culture of dependence was simply transferred from
one relationship to another; and for a time oscillated between
the two. The issue was not, as Beazley suggested, one of choice
between "forward defence" and "continental defence"; it was
between an independent or a subservient foreign policy and the
will to carry it out. It was Australian governments' predilection
for music without instruments (and also for, as Correlli Barnett
termed them, Covenants Without Swords) that hobbled its
diplomatic initiative and its regional acceptability.
Beazley was considerably closer the mark in pointing out
that "an 'armed and neutral' Australia would require to spend
more on defence and development generally". Here was the rub,
although some things were rubbed rather more than others, to
create a distorted picture. Australia would have to support, said
Beazley, "massively increased expenditure on surveillance and
. . .Continued. .
.
Hayden was just one among many in the Western Pacific. Perle's
was a typical "get on the team" reaction of the sort so many were
tired of. Perle is in a way symbolic of what is now, hopefully,
dying out of the American post-war ethos; the 'other-directed'
person with an "unthinking faith in shared assumptions" and
"preoccupied with group identity" and conformity to a
propagandised view of "the norm" and the "organisation ethic".
See: Robert Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy . Chapter
7, "Cold War Orthodoxy".
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intelligence gathering capability".
But this seems a hollow claim when by the US' own
admission, 95% of its efforts went toward monitoring the Soviet
Union and its armed forces. Beazley hammered the money angle, but
he seemed to be referring to an enemy which had yet to
materialise, and perhaps never would . Or was he admitting that
the alliance had generated the only major threat he claimed was
feasible: subjugation and destruction by either of the two
superpowers, or a massively rearmed regional nation? Thus: "The
disastrous effects of a surprise attack would require that we
harden the defences of all key elements of our capability, which
would involve massive [again!] outlays on defence infrastructure
and manpower." It appeared that Beazley felt that the alliance
would permit him and his successors to oversee with equanimity
the sudden destruction of Australia's limited 'key capability'
elements, in the expectation that its charred chestnuts would
again be hauled out of the fire.
It was the logic of 1939 - 42. But more than this, "in
order to re-establish the supply capabilities for which we can
presently rely upon the United States", Australia would have to
"undertake huge expenditure on research, development and
* And one might reasonably expect Australia's overseas missions
to provide the necessary intelligence with which to gauge both
political intent and military 'generic' capabilities. Which would
leave open only some technical questions regarding acquisition
and performance data for specific systems. If it had this sort of
information, what sort of "friend" would deny it in time of
impending hostilities? And could it not mostly be got by national
means in any case?
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industrial infrastructure." Many observers might have felt that
the latter was exactly what the country needed to overcome its
now chronic economic problems and its deteriorating stature -
never high - as a middle industrially developed nation.* And
there was no mention of the possibilities of collaborative
development with nations in Southeast Asia or elsewhere. And
Australia's logistic support agreements with the US invariably
were - and are - subject to "the exigencies of war" and, echoing
ANZUS itself, to each party's "national laws, regulations, and
policies, and to case-by-case review and determination" 1 (my
emphasis) . Beazley was both innovative and open minded in many
matters. But he too, it seemed, already had donned the ANZUS
blinkers was just not interested in alternatives.
Discord With Indonesia
The most likely adversary, in almost any field, for
Australia still was identified as Indonesia, and relations
* The relevant high technology and advanced engineering and
design industries need not have been developed specifically for
narrow, uneconomic application only to military hardware. Indeed,
with the Australian government as their sole customer (as it is
always envisaged to be) , it would be like setting up a clothing
factory in a (tropical) nudist colony. But there is no reason why
Australia could not become a regional centre for manufacture,
sales and service of just about anything from information systems
to advanced aerospace technologies, not to mention slightly less
glamorous things such as road-building machinery and railway
rolling stock: if it got serious about developing its "vast
potentialities". There is still far too much Parliamentary
Inguiry and not enough parliamentary encouragement; the arguments
'against' always seem to outweigh the reasons 'for' any attempt
to drag the nation into the modern world.
1. United States and Australia, Agreement Concerning Cooperation
in Defense Logistic Support . 4 November 1989, Article II. In
Burnett et. al., The ANZUS Documents . p203.
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between the two were deteriorating rapidly. As in the 1950s,
there was no significant response from the United States, at
least in public. A large part of the Indonesian-Australian
difficulty stemmed from long-standing, persistent complaints from
the military-dominated authoritarian government of ex-General
Suharto about Australian media bias amounting to interference in
internal affairs. This included the broadcasts of Radio
Australia, and domestic Australian coverage in the electronic and
especially the print media. There was a good deal of antipathy in
Australia still, and perhaps particularly within the media
•club', following what appeared to be the arbitrary execution of
five Australian journalists in East Timor during the Indonesian
invasion in 1975.
Nonetheless, the root of the matter, so far as the media
were concerned, was persistent criticism of both the style and
the substance of Indonesia's governing elite. Media coverage
frequently touched on the raw nerves of suppression of internal
dissent and of increasing official corruption. The dam burst with
front-page publication in the Sydney Morning Herald of a story
that highlighted the involvement of the Suharto family in
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particular in corrupt and nepotistic business practices 1 . But
there was much more to it than that.
Indonesia was clearly upset by many aspects of Australian
policy, not least perhaps by the inference that it was
Australia's most likely future enemy - something which Indonesian
xenophobia and regional ambition did little to dispel however.
Regardless of the temper of relations at any given time,
Indonesia's geographical proximity would anyway oblige any
Australian (or Indonesian) government to at least consider in its
security planning the possibility of an adverse change in the
political character of its neighbour. Australia's involvement in
attempting to find a solution to the Cambodian problem upset
Indonesia's foreign minister , who basically wanted all the
1. Hamish McDonald, "Press War Continues", FEER, 24 April 1986,
pl8; and, "The Price of Freedom", FEER . 8 May 1986, pp44-5. The
article, entitled "After Marcos, Now For The Suharto Millions",
was published on 10 April 1986. Industry Minister Habibie was to
visit Australia two days later, and immediately cancelled his
trip and "refused even to transit Australia on his trip to New
Zealand a few days later". The Australian press, except for the
Jakarta bureau of the Australian Financial Review, had its
licenses and entry permits revoked. On 22 April, Indonesia banned
entry by Australian tourists; hundreds were 'turned around' on
arrival at Bali's Denpasar airport. The ban was lifted the next
day, but tempers rose. Also on 22 April, the Armed Forces
newspaper, Angkatan Bersentja (AB) accused Australia of
"attitudes to Indonesia ... marked by fear and racism." AB said
that "As a nation descended from the white race, Australians
[display an attitude] which we (the editors) take as arrogance,
conceit and delusions of their ability to lead." See also:
(unattrib.), "Overstepping the Mark", FEER . 8 May 1986, pp44-5.
* Now retired, Mochtar Kusumaatjada. He worked hard on a
solution to the Cambodian problem, but his (and ASEAN 's) position
differed fundamentally from that of Australia, which was not
prepared to recognise the Khmer Rouge-dominated Coalition
Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) as the legitimate
•government in exile' of Cambodia. Australia, seeing the
impossibility of either condoning the North Vietnamese invasion,
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initiatives to come from - and all the credit to go to - his
country. Australia's formal defence relationship with Malaysia
and Singapore, and its refusal, post-Whitlam, to endorse
Indonesia's cherished goal of a ZOPFAN and NWFZ in Southeast Asia
also created friction. Indonesia consistently had rebuffed
Australian attempts to gain, by varying means, something
approaching full membership in ASEAN. 1
Australia was regarded as a divisive influence - that is,
its position often ran counter to Indonesian goals of
establishing and articulating the positions it considered were
best for Southeast Asia 2 . There was also an unresolved disputed
seabed boundary between Australia and Timor, which with the
discovery of oil in the Timor Sea (on the Australian Continental
. . .Continued. .
.
or of endorsing the murderous former regime, wanted the matter
resolved through the United Nations; Indonesia's preference was
for a 'regional solution'.
1. Millar, p411 and pp428-9.
2. C.P.F. Luhulima, "ASEAN-Australian Relations: Status of the
Art", Indonesian Quarterly , vol. XIII, no.l, 1985.pp83-99. The
author refers to Australia's "political and economic ambiguities
which still colour its sense of loyalty" although its has
"professed solidarity with Southeast Asia and particularly with
ASEAN since the 1970s..." A clear exhortation to 'get on the
team' - and fall in with Indonesian policy views. Luhulima
concludes: "It is thus no wonder that ASEAN suspects that
Australia . . . keeps considering itself as an European enclave in
a region of non-Europeans, that its real identity is with the
West. This is very noticeable in economic policies [and] in its
defence policies. Unless and until Australia is able to decide
for itself that it is a Western Pacific nation, politically,
economically and in the end, culturally, ASEAN-Australian
relations will remain a function of Australia's ambiguity." I do
not believe that regional views have undergone any significant
change since this was written.
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Shelf) , the Indonesians were keen to have modified in their
favour 1 . Finally, perhaps, the Indonesian hierarchy was just
deciding to test the diplomatic water with the United States.
President Reagan was scheduled to visit in 1986: whether or not
the visit went ahead 2 after Indonesia's abrupt cessation of most
normal intercourse and cooperation, and its harassment of
Australian tourists, would perhaps give a good indication of
where the US stood in relation to its "ally" to the South.
Reagan's visit went ahead, and there was precious little comment
about press freedom or anything else. 3 Overall, it seemed that
1. Asnani Usman, "The Timor Gap in the Delimitation of the
Continental Shelf Boundary Between Indonesia and Australia",
Indonesian Quarterly , vol. XIV, no. 3, July 1986. pp375-92. Seabed
oil exploitation and fishing rights were the economic issues
driving this dispute. It has since been partially resolved by an
agreement for a "Joint Development Zone" in the Timor Sea; but
the validity of this is under challenge internationally, based on
continuing argument over the legal status of Indonesian rule in
(former) Portuguese East Timor.
2. Although it would have been hard to cancel it, since it was
not specifically a State Visit to Indonesia, but a Presidential
appearance, on 1 May 1986, at the ASEAN Summit held in Bali.
Reagan had previously cancelled a Southeast Asian tour in 1983.
The visit was in any case expected to be marked by "symbolism,
not substance". But since Suharto's attitudes to the press
freedom paralleled at least some of his ASEAN colleagues' views,
a very strong message would have been sent had the President
cancelled. The President's own agenda, apart from promoting 'good
feelings', was apparently to "draw attention ... to the growing
Soviet presence in the Pacific" and to "remind ASEAN of the
growing concern in the US over [its] mounting trade deficit [with
ASEAN]." See: Nayan Chanda, "The Sunshine Scenario", FEER . 1 May
1986, pp32-3.
3. Richard Nations, "Symbols, Not Substance", FEER . 15 May 1986,
pp46-7. There seemed to be no diplomatic gain on either side, and
Suharto in particular did not seem to gain the boost that he had
sought to give his image as regional statesman. US Secretary of
State George Schultz, however, "went to some lengths in press
briefings to applaud the improvement in the human rights climate
under Suharto." Besides religious freedom (always guaranteed,
being enshrined as one of the Indonesian Republic's Five
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Australia had, as it has been before and since, used a something
of a 'whipping boy', being for the nations of Southeast Asia a
conveniently adjacent and not too powerful target for their
generalised resentments of the "arrogance, conceit and delusions
of their ability to lead" of all the "white race" of the West.
Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew told the National Press
Club in Canberra that the press "had an obligation not to
undermine their own national interests" with "insensitive"
comment, and "used the row to develop a longstanding theme of his
- that Australia will only grow up when it sees clearly that its
future lies in Asia" 1 .
Lee's comments had been made before and his sentiments were
shared by many Australians. Throughout the difficulties with
staunchly anti-communist Indonesia, another question arose: how
would America choose if the two antagonists came to blows? Would
'even-handedness' mean refusal of supply? It may be some time yet
before we know what if any questions were officially asked, and
what answers were given.
Straining the Bonds
In the meantime, Australian relations with the US were
growing tense over the question of trade, and especially over
. . .Continued. .
.
Principles in 194 5, and since then adhered to) and succour for
refugees, Mr Schultz stated that Indonesia had become self-
sufficient in rice production "and I think that's basically a
great victory for human rights." A Soviet trade delegation
arrived in Jakarta soon after.
1. "Overstepping the Mark", FEER, 8 Mayl986, pp44-5.
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agriculture. As the Australian economy hit rock bottom (or so it
was thought; worse came later) , the US was cranking up its so-
called Export Enhancement Programme (EEP) , to the detriment of
efficient farmers worldwide. Economic relations between the
United States and its major ally, Japan, also were increasingly
strained. Over the last few years, trade relations have proven to
be the major bone of contention between the US and both its
Pacific allies. At the same time, it became clear that the cold
war was over and it was time to seek a "new world order".
But differences over what shape that order may take, and
how it may best be achieved, also are sharpening. Change
continues anyway, in Australia's environment and in the world -
and some of the most significant changes involve the status,
influence and future posture of Australia's big brother, the
United States.
Although it was briefly seduced by the notion of a "unipolar
moment" of unchallenged military power that would permit it to
take charge of the affairs of the world, the United States is
about to give up on Pax Americana, and, militarily, it is also on
the way out of Asia. Despite the fond hopes expressed by the
President and some of his Administration, the US military
presence is decreasingly necessary as a "balance wheel" in Asia,
and it is rapidly becoming a "fifth wheel", inhibiting rather
than facilitating the development of regional solutions to long-
standing problems.
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The US says its continued military presence is essential to
maintain stability in the western Pacific. But questions remain:
where, when, how and for what reasons would the US intervene in
a regional dispute over, say, the Spratly islands; or freedom of
passage through the archipelagic straits; or a Chinese
•crackdown' in Hong Kong; or in a border clash between Malaysia
and the Philippines. How does the United States, which has
significant trade links with nearly every nation in East Asia,
and defence agreements with many, choose sides, or even attempt
impartial intervention?
Only in Korea, while the US maintains its "nuclear
guarantee" for the southern part of a divided, but perhaps soon
reunited country, does there seem to be a need for permanent US
presence; and President Bush's own nuclear arms reduction
initiative 1 seems to have both removed an obstacle to
reunification, and to have reduced the certainty of the former
'guarantee'. The former imperatives for control of South East
Asian seas are diminishing as practical US concerns related to
these also diminish in scope.
The ASEAN nations are also much stronger than in the past,
aided by modern technology that makes regional military
intervention infinitely more problematic than in past years. The
US still courts Indonesia, which as before is because of its size
and geographical location, and its well orchestrated 'bluff of
1. George J. Church, "Why The Details Are Sticky", TIME, 7
October 1991, gives details of the President's arms reduction
measures.
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being the regional spokesman for ASEAN. Australia potentially has
the ability to make a very significant difference to the self-
defensive potential of the Southeast Asian states that naturally
still have fears of both China and Japan. In many areas it can
provide, as it already does in FPDA, capabilities which meet its
own needs for self defence in the last resort, and which
complement those of ASEAN countries.
Does Australia or ASEAN need the US as a security partner
in the region? Perhaps not; but both can always do with friends,
like anyone else. Perhaps if Australia were less preoccupied with
trying still to act as go-between, "building bridges" for its
western alliance partner, it could more clearly conceive and
better develop other aspects of its relationships with both Asia
and the US.
For Asia and Australia, neither continued permanent
American presence, nor its complete absence, is likely to foster
a sense of shared interest, or to strengthen any bonds of
alliance. An intermittent US presence, "showing the flag", may be
just what is needed to keep all satisfied. And whatever their
good intentions, the fact remains that despite greatly increased
contacts between the two countries, and the ability to fly across
the Pacific in only half a day, the distance between the
Australia and the United States has not diminished. Australians
and Americans are as different as chalk and cheese - and always
will be.
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ANZUS partisan Gerard Henderson has himself held out the
possibility of Australia "doing a New Zealand"; he claimed this
would happen if those who support the alliance lost "the battle
of ideas in the foreign policy debate." And then said that
Washington had to work hardest at this because "a long-time US
ally should not be mugged by Uncle Sam's rural protectionist
lobby". This reminds one of Sir George Pearce and Sir Henry
Gullet in 1935-36, and displays about the same expectation -
vocal devotion to 'shared principles' in return for economic
favour in areas of divergent interest. Henderson needs to re-
examine his mental habit of supporting ANZUS 'since a lad'
because he saw American marines marching down Collins Street. And
so do millions of others.
Australia has reached another watershed - it is just not yet
ready to admit it to itself or its ally, or its neighbours. If it
does not do so soon, it is doomed to relegation to the lowest
rank of nation states.
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CHAPTER 7
PREPARING FOR THE NEXT CENTURY
Former Defence Minister Kim Beazley was wont to remark that,
in the last decade of the twentieth century, "Australia's
strategic environment may have more in common with the political
map of nineteenth century Europe, with its shifting alliances and
multipolarity than with the situation Australia has faced as an
independent country " up to the present. It was a brave attempt
neatly to define a period of unprecedented political and economic
change by analogy to an historically familiar set of
circumstances. But the contemporary situation in the Asia-Pacific
region, as across virtually the whole face of the globe, simply
defies analogy. It seems decreasingly likely that there will be
any sort of calm, controllable, measured progress out of the
post-Word War II international 'order' into what was at first
being hopefully described as a New World Order.
There is unlikely to be much order at all for some time to
come. The world is in turmoil, and probably will still be so as
it enters a new millennium. For some, the last years of this
century may be seen as the 'hour of maximum danger' - others will
regard it as presenting unprecedented opportunity. The outcome is
scarcely predictable. Even the most optimistic nations, or groups
of nations, will wish to cling to some certainties as a form of
psychological 'stabiliser' in the currents and eddies of a world
294
in turbulent transition. Politically and economically, the entire
globe is in the process of redefining itself.
Among those for whom opportunity seems to be knocking ever
more insistently are the nations of East Asia - Australia's
•northern neighbours'. Their emergence into the forefront of
world affairs is matched by a growing introspection as they seek
to better define and assert their individual character as
nations. Much of this process takes the form of 'rediscovery' of
the past, as a step toward defining the future shape and goals of
their societies. This process is not confined to the 'emergent'
nations of post-colonial Asia; it continues in China, and in
Russia and its former ideological soulmates in Asia as well.
Although the current turbulence in world affairs is
considered largely attributable to the collapse of the former
•Eastern Bloc 1 , and therefore signifies the 'victory' of western-
democratic ethics and free-market economic ideology and practice,
the attractiveness for Asian nations of continuing with or
aspiring to membership the "western alliance", and of adhering to
its (which is to say, American) ideological-economic standards
are at least open to question.
* Perhaps the catalyst for all this was Malaysian Prime Minister
Mahathir's call in 1982 for his and other nations to "look East".
Modern examples of national redefinition include Singapore, with
its leaders' call to 'speak Mandarin' and more closely adhere to
Confucian social principles; an increasing desire for Korean re-
unification; Taiwan's budding 'native' nationalism; the
Philippines' weaning from multiple dependencies on the United
States; and Japan's slow-burning movement away from 'partnership'
with the United States.
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Both the 'leaders' and the 'followers' of the two former
superpowers' blocs must also redefine their position in a world
where economic strength is supplanting military might as the key
indicator of a nations' status and influence in the world. So,
while many nations both of the former eastern bloc and of the
self-proclaimed non-aligned movement remain fearful of the
consequences of unalloyed embrace of either free-market
capitalism or its hand maiden political pluralism, they will
continue to search for their own 'third way', regardless of
labels.
The Pacific members of the western alliance, too, are now
deeply engaged in this process, none more so perhaps than the
United States itself. 1 With the end of the Cold War, the United
States has "lost an empire and is looking for a role". So too
are Japan and Australia, which for forty years have accepted and
encouraged the "leadership" of the United States in the affairs
of the Pacific and the world. Japan must readjust to a world, and
especially a region, which demands that Japan expand its
1. 1991 has been a year of introspection for America. "Who Are
We?" asked the cover of TIME, 8 July 1991. Inside, Arthur
Schlesinger Jr. stated (p21) that "The Growing diversity of the
American population makes the quest for unifying ideals . . . all
the more urgent." The question on the cover a month later (TIME,
12 August, 1991) was, "What's Happening To Our Character?" There
are many more stories along these lines, and the agenda for the
1992 Presidential election is now firmly focussed upon the
"domestic stuff", as Mr Bush has sometimes referred to it.
2. After a phrase used to describe the predicament of Great
Britain in the post war period, in a speech by Dean Acheson at
West Point, 5 December 1962: "Great Britain has lost an Empire
and has not yet found a role." Penguin Dictionary of Political
Quotations , London, Penguin, 1986. pi.
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political involvement in international affairs to a level
commensurate with its economic power. Yet both its Pacific
neighbours and Japan itself remain uncertain, even fearful, of
the likely results of such an expansion. Japan also seems
increasingly to be regarded in East Asia as filling the
political-economic "exemplar" role formerly arrogated by (or
"thrust upon" depending on one's perception) the United States.
Central to Japan's ability to define and perform its future
world and regional roles, and allay the fears of neighbours with
long memories, will be its ability to define as unambiguously as
possible its goals and policies. Japan, much given to searching
for definitions of the "national essence", now has to come up
with a more universally acceptable set of ideas with which to
justify its actions as it begins to exercise its power as one of
the global arbiters of the fate of nations. Japan also must
overcome its feeling of amae towards the United States, and be
prepared to take the risks that go with being a more active
player in the regional and world systems.
This applies as well to Australia, although its predicament
is rather different. Australia traditionally has sought its
identity and security within the fold of its "birthplace" in the
west. There it found ready made definitions of national interest;
* Again, Mahathir's 'look East' comes to mind. But the pattern
of economic mercantilist-nationalism and in effect, one-party
government by an entrenched oligopoly of business, bureaucracy
and politicians, also seems to find much favour. As does the
continued re-assurance given the United States of its importance
as regional security guarantor in an attempt to keep it entangled
and less likely to restrict access to its domestic market.
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none of which fit its circumstances. It would quarrel, but always
stopped short of revolt; its outbursts were followed by
contrition or surly acquiescence, rather than unrepentant
reassertion. Australia needs to look for its philosophical-
ethical "soul": and discover within itself some principles to
live by and by which to conduct its international affairs, it can
draw upon its western heritage, but needs also to synthesize new
aspirations and standards of achievement more appropriate to an
independent nation.
Both the northern and southern 'anchors* of the western
alliance must, as the very basis of their future policy, review
the compatibility of their regional identities, rooted in
geography, with their present global identities as members of a
"western community". The basis for this review has to be a
reassessment of the costs and benefits of their formal alliances
with the United States. Australia's key question, then, is:
"Whither ANZUS?"
WHITHER ANZUS?
Return of the Prodigal?
ANZUS partisans were given a lift by two events in 1990. One
was the demise of the New Zealand Labor Government (Lange had
previously resigned the Prime Minister's post); the other was the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It was expected that Labor's ouster
would allow the more rational conservatives to return to the fold
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of the alliance. But they did not, even though the "nibbles" have
increased. Its public had grown guite fond of New Zealand's
in-.ependent stance it seemed; even though in a way it only made
them more visibly dependent on arch-rival Australia. New Zealand
has little to gain, it would appear, by resiling from its
position; 'normal' contact was resumed even before the fall of
the Labour Government, and the cold war is over. 1
It is said that President Bush's new disarmament initiative
will solve the previous difficulty, that NCND will no longer be
an issue 2 . It never was the issue anyway, and in their hearts,
New Zealanders (and Australians) know it. In some ways the
Administration now has more latitude to critically reassess the
worth of its alliances than it possessed before when it allies
apparently should have been more in its thrall. The US is less
needful of "the numbers" to bulk out a 'free world' roll-call,
1. Colin James, "On Speaking Terms", FEER . 15 March 1990, p20.
THe US Secretary of State and New Zealand's Foreign Minister met
in Washington on 1 March 1990, ending " a four-year ban on top-
level contacts" imposed in 1986 by former Secretary of State
George Schultz. At this time the Labour Party (under new
management) was still in power, and New Zealand public opinion,
as admitted by the Leader of the Opposition, and present Prime
Minister Jim Bolger,,was still in favour of the existing anti-
nuclear legislation banning warship visits "unless the Prime
Minister is satisfied they are not carrying nuclear weapons".
Only a week later, Bolger's National Party endorsed Labour's
policy, making ANZUS a "dead letter" according to its defence
spokesman Don MacKinnon (now Foreign Minister) . See: Colin James,
"Confirm and Deny", FEER, 22 March 1990, p27.
2. Senator Evans was guoted by The Age (Melbourne) . 3 October
1991, as saying that "New Zealand should rethink its anti-nuclear
policy in the wake of" the United States' decision to withdraw
tactical nuclear weapons from its warships. This, he said, would
"put on hold the [NCND] policy that has been at the centre of the
defence rift between the US and New Zealand."
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and must inevitably become more selective in both the commitments
it makes and the means by which they may be honoured. But what
about the corollary: surely, after 40 years, Australia and its
neighbours are now strong enough to dispense with, or at least
not presume upon, an external security guarantee. Though both the
United States and Australia regularly (by now, ritually?) restate
their "regret that New Zealand's policies prevent resumption of a
full trilateral relationship", it is hard to see why the presence
or absence of a nebulously worded "alliance" should detract from
what is once again, it seems, an otherwise "full" relationship.
Australia and New Zealand both should just let the matter
lie. They must guard against commitment to again assist with
propping up a status quo that inevitably must fall; and being
therefore condemned to fall with it. And they must realise that
this time there is no other great power to run to.
"Shoulder to Shoulder" - or Head to Tail?
The campaign against Iraq was quite erroneously taken by
many as a sign of renewed vigour and "relevance" for the
alliance. It only emphasised its fairly pointless nature.
Australia's decision to commit warships to enforce the UN-ordered
blockade of Iraq had almost nothing to do with its relations with
the US, almost everything to do with its perceptions of its
regional and wider interests 1 . Parliamentary resistance did not
1. Australian Overseas Information Service. Australia Background.
5 March 1991. The End of The Gulf War . Statement By The Prime
Minister Mr Robert Hawke to Parliament in Canberra. The Prime
Minister referred not once to any need to support the United
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diminish as time went on, mainly due to fears that the US was
just pulling others along in the wake of its unilateral action
and in the cause of preserving its own self image. But in this
case the Australian government had at least acted promptly and
with some judgment in the nature of forces it committed. Public
support for the government's prompt and positive action, in
backing a long-espoused commitment to the United Nations,
actually rose. Australia did no harm to its image in the Gulf
States, and the missions undertaken by the forces deployed were
demonstrably in keeping with the spirit of support for the United
Nations and for the restoration of "normal" life in Kuwait and
Irag after the war. Australia could justifiably claim that it was
acting on its own initiative and not simply following wherever
the US chose to wander; but is this how its action was perceived
amongst its nearer neighbours, among whom sympathy for "underdog"
Iraq and suspicion of a bullying United States combined to rouse
. . .Continued. .
.
States. His two key points were Australia's desire that: "the
United Nations would at last be allowed to fulfill the
expectations of its founders"; and that "Australia has important
trade interests in the Middle East."
* It was able to exercise some discrimination, and still make a
worthwhile but non-entangling commitment, because it had finally
done something to widen the still limited operational logistic
support capability of the Navy. Unless it had been able to
provide its own underway replenishment capability, Australia
would have been obliged from the outset to attach its warships
the major naval force present; in this case the USN. Which would
have been a diplomatic disaster. Even though the forces were
later under integrated command and control, and Australia still
had to rely on the US for spare parts support for its (American
built) warships, at least the appearance ( and if one wanted to
be dogmatic, the fact) of independent, self-sustained presence
could be maintained.
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substantial opposition to the whole enterprise in the Gulf? 1 Many
will simply look at Australia's record, and its continued
espousal of the value of its alliance with the United States, and
decide that Australia just marched out once again to the US
tune. 2
Ill-considered comment by Americans and Australians alike
is likely to help perpetuate the old image. Speaking in Sydney
early in 1991, shortly after the commencement of warlike
operations against Iraq by US and other forces, US Ambassador to
Australia Melvin Sembler proclaimed in (one presumes) ringing
tones
:
Once again, [the United States] stand[s] shoulder to
shoulder with Australia in a noble effort to stop
tyranny and aggression. 3
1. Michael Vatikiotis, Salamat Ali and Hamish McDonald, "Pax
Americana", FEER , 7 March 1991. This article canvassed views in
Jakarta, Karachi and New Delhi. "Washington ignored efforts to
find a negotiated peace, issued its own ultimatum, and finally
stuck to a preset timetable for the ground offensive." This was
the mild stuff.
2. It is worth noting that when New Zealand announced its
intention to send some (non-combat) assistance to the Gulf, the
fact was pounced upon as indicating its desire to restore itself
in American good graces and pave the way for its reentry into the
ANZUS flock. The New Zealand government sent two C-130 transports
and a military medical team, saying it "could not 'shirk our
responsibilities' in a case of aggression and concerted UN
action". Regardless of intent "Some commentators saw the move
partly as an attempt ... to re-establish ties with the Western
Alliance...". See: "New Zealand Prepares to Send Gulf
Contingent", FEER . 13 December 1990, pl4.
3. Ambassador Melvin J. Sembler, "Supporting Comments [to Opening
Address]," given at the conference sponsored by the Sydney
Institute and the Pacific Forum CSIS, "Challenges to Australian-
American Relations After the Cold War", held 4-5 February 1991.
Proceedings in: The Sydney Papers , vol.3, no.l, pp6-7.
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This rather overstated the mutuality of commitment,
certainly in both nature and scale of forces committed (and hence
in terms of operational involvement) , and, in the context of the
other remarks made by the ambassador, probably misconstrued
Australian motives.
Australia was supporting the UN, not the US; and it had an
eye to its trade relationship with the Gulf States. Warming to
his pitch, Sembler (who like nearly all US Ambassadors to
Canberra is not a career diplomat) went on to say that
Australia's early commitment to provide warships to enforce the
UN-sanctioned blockade of Iraq:
came as no surprise ... it was natural for Australia
to help uphold the rule of law. When peaceful solutions
failed, Australia was with us in this fight, just as it
had been through four other wars.
This managed to misrepresent a sizeable piece of Australian
military-diplomatic history, besides impugning (in his latter
statement) Australian motives for the limited Gulf commitment. In
only one of the four previous wars referred to - Korea - had US
and Australian forces stood "shoulder to shoulder" more or less
from the outset. In both World Wars, Australians had been
fighting alongside Britain for over two years before the US
became involved. Australian involvement in Vietnam was initially
hesitant, always limited in scope, and in the end precipitately
concluded with, some have argued, more regard for the
sensitivities of Hanoi than for either Saigon or Washington. In
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no case could Australia be said to have reached any major degree
of policy agreement with the US with regard in particular to
post-war aims, on which it was rarely consulted and even then
almost invariably disregarded. And in the Gulf, the coalition
tied together by Mr Bush included a sworn enemy (Syria) and left
out America's two key "partners in world leadership", Germany and
Japan.
Australian Foreign Minister also spoke at the Sydney
conference, again referring to "warm, fruitful, and above
all . . . increasingly mature" relationship. His observation that
it was "clearly now recognis[ed] that alliance membership and an
independent view of the world are not incompatible" 1 seemed to
reflect, if not actively support, the ingrained faith of many
Australians in the continuing value of the same old habits of
dependence on a great power ally, even though that very
divergence of "world view" has caused Australia more than a
little anxiety in the past.
And as in the past, that ally is one whose capacity and
desire for military intervention around the world will in future
be far more circumscribed than they were in the fortuitous
circumstances that allowed President Bush to give quick practical
effect to what seemed to be almost a snap decision. And it should
not be forgotten that much more than a principle was involved - a
vital national interest was believed to be at stake. Nor should
1. Senator the Hon. Gareth Evans, "Australia and the United
States in the New World Order", in: The Sydney Papers , vol.3,
no.l, pp95-102.
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the effect of American public opinion be underestimated.
Trade: The "Bad Old Days"?
The shared interests of Australia and the United States are
not much less nebulous today than they were eighty three years
ago. The sources of friction between the two countries remain
almost unchanged - Australian farmers had intended to present a
petition to President Bush to cease the United States harmful
agricultural subsidies and import guotas during his planned visit
(later cancelled for wholly inadequate reasons) in 1991. The
Leader of the Parliamentary Opposition, after ritually
reaffirming his faith in the US' essential contribution to
regional stability, observed that "our bilateral relationship
cannot live by defence cooperation alone"; and one has to wonder
* It easily can be forgotten that Mr Bush was by no means assured
of getting congressional support for his reaction, until he had
got America into a position where to pull out was to be
•humiliated'. Shades of Vietnam; but Bush's team had learned one
lesson, which was to get the Reserves involved and generate a
'wartime' atmosphere. The jingoism in Press and public alike had
to be seen to be believed. Still, Bush pulled his punches; Saddam
Hussein was not ousted; and the Bush-incited revolts of Kurds and
Shiite Muslims were allowed to be crushed. He bought Egypt with
debt write-offs, and paid-off Syria with Lebanon. In the wake of
having "shaken off the Vietnam syndrome", Congress failed to
pursue with any vigour an investigation into whether the
Administration could by better diplomatic conduct have
forestalled the whole mess erupting. I am inclined to the view
that economic sanctions were not appropriate to the problem
anyway; because the problem was a man, not a country; which Bush
regularly said himself. And then failed to solve the problem, for
fear of getting 'entangled'. How entangled is America now? The
strange thing is, Mr Bush, given the stunning success and very
low casualties of the Gulf forces, could have taken public
opinion with him. Perhaps by then it was world opinion that
caused him stop short, though he then got criticised for his
action; proving the impossible dilemmas that arise from entering
into 'half-wars'.
305
whether that cooperation can survive alone but for 'good
feelings'. Dr Hewson went on to state:
The significance, for example, of our military
cooperation in the Gulf will be greatly diminished if
Australia is excluded from American or Allied [NATO-
EEC] thinking about the requirements for post-war
stability in the Middle East or if Australian
agricultural exporters are squeezed out of their
traditional Middle east markets by heavily subsidised
American produce, particularly food aid. 1
Doc Evatt would have been proud of him! And one should note
that the only other commentators to offer "something of an
antidote to the warm inner glow presently suffusing Australian-
American relations" were also economists; but in this case,
without the need to represent a part-rural constituency. Carol
Austin, employed by Australia's largest mining-industrial
conglomerate (BHP) noted that:
. . . within the Asian region there is the potential for
decisions inimical to Australia's interests to be taken
on strategic trade grounds rather than strategic
military grounds. [She noted several possible areas of
reciprocal bilateral preferential trade arrangements
between Japan and the U.S.] ...
Similarly, with the rapid growth of the other Asian
economies , the potential for more such alliances
between some of these ... and the US will grow. 2
The examples of intense US pressure on Japan to buy weapons
it has not asked for, and to import (subsidised) American rice,
1. Dr John Hewson, "After the Uruguay Round - Whither Adam
Smith?", in: The Sydney Papers , vol.3, no.l, ppl05-114.
2. Carol Austin, "Comments", in: The Sydney Papers , vol.3, no.l,
pp90-92.
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spring readily to mind, as does the shameless intervention "in
the interest of fair trade" by President Bush to gain a slice of
a recently awarded telecommunications contract in Indonesia. 1 As
Austin went on to say, Australia has to be alert to the
possibility that such commercial "alliances" might be "of greater
significance than the military alliances we have grown accustomed
to." A narrowing economic gap between the United States and other
major economies made it more likely, she said, that the United
States would be decreasingly inclined to see what was good for
the world as good for itself; in economic matters, it had never
1. Adam Schwarz, "Indonesia on Hold", FEER, 24 January 1991,
pp40-l. Indonesia called tenders in 1989 for the supply of
digital switching equipment for 350,000 telephone lines.
Competition soon narrowed to three bidders: NEC, Fujitsu, and
AT&T. It looked like the Japanese would get the contract, and "US
officials swung into action. Secretary of State James Baker, his
deputy Lawrence Eagleburger, Trade Representative Carla Hills,
Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher and Vice-President Dan Quayle
all telephoned or wrote to their Indonesian counterparts ... to
salvage AT&T's bid. Finally, President George Bush appealed
directly to [President] Suharto not to let the contract decision
be influenced by 'improper pressure' [!!!]. " Rugged individualism
in action. Indonesia ended up letting two contracts; one each to
NEC and AT&T.
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acted out of altruism. 1 And seldom has it politically, when
considering regional conflicts in the context of its world
interests.
Austin's counterpart, veteran economic journalist Max
Walsh, put things still more bluntly; the US was likely to return
at least partially to the "bad old ways" of protectionism,
besides continuing to force its way into other nations' markets
through threats and preference. The implications for Australian-
American relations would be "negative rather than positive . .
.
the business reality . . . will be to[wards] weaker rather than
stronger links with the US." 2
Trade: Divergent Interests
It seems likely that the course of trade and diplomatic
relations over the longer term may differ little from the pattern
of the pre-ANZUS past, regardless of whether the treaty is
allowed to remain in being and simply 'fade away', or abrogated
or amended. The pattern of trade has hardly altered since the
192 0s; Asia, not America, has taken the dominant position once
1. In words similar to those used by Americans themselves to
describe their views on international politico-military
relationships, Robert Kuttner writes that: "The individualist
American model cherishes ... 'contingent' relationships. Economic
man is believed to have no attachments to his fellows except on a
short-term, purely instrumental basis. Every economic transaction
is supposed to be a one-night stand, because tomorrow someone
might make you a better offer. ... In this view, lovaltv is a
purely nonrational and sentimental value." The End of Laissez
Faire . New York, Alfred A.Knopf, 1991, p273. America has no
monopoly on this type of behaviour; it is pretty well 'the way of
the world', commercially.
2. Max Walsh, "International Trade - A Return to the Bad Old
Ways", in: The Sydney Papers , vol.3, no.l, ppl36-9.
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occupied by Britain. Asia provides about 35% of Australia's
imports, and accepts almost 60% of its exports 1 ; Japan accounts
for about half of the total within each figure. The United States
still exports far more to Australia than it imports; 27.6% of
Australian imports, versus 9.6% of Australian exports. There
seems to be little that Australia can do to correct its adverse
trade balance with the United States, given that the age-old swap
of primary products for high-technology manufactures continues.
America's main trading partners are still the countries of
its western hemisphere, and Europe, which together absorb over
62% of US exports 2 ; more than double American exports to Japan
(11.5%) and all the other nations of East Asia and South Asia,
combined (16.55%). Although trans-Pacific trade now greatly
exceeds trans-Atlantic trade, the US seems still to be having
only limited success in deepening its penetration of Asian
markets, and the strains now emerging in some regional economies,
and in that of Japan, may limit near-term opportunities for
increased sales or direct investment. 3
1. These and other figures from: OECD, Monthly Statistics of
Foreign Trade . October 1991. The figures used are the aggregates
for the year ending June 1991.
2. The breakdown at present is: Europe, 26.68%; Canada, 19.26% f
Mexico and Central and South America, 16.43%.
3. The Asian Wall Street Journal . 21 October 1991, reported that
Indonesia had "postponed nearly $10 billion of planned enrgy and
petrochemical investments" to restrain imports and foreign
borrowings and help restrain a rapidly mounting current account
deficit. Malaysia, confronted by rising inflation, may need to do
the same, and South Korea, too, has a mounting stock of foreign
debt.
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Imports from East Asia ($17.02 billion) far outweigh
in value America's exports of $9.4 billion. American resentment
is rising, and as Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew says:
If, over the next 10 years, America does not derive a
substantial stake in the industrialisation and
prosperity of East Asia, including ASEAN, there's bound
to be a swing in public opinion in America. It's not
America's job to maintain the stability and security of
the Pacific for the benefit of Japan and the Asian
nations. 1
Lee's observation is correct, but it reflects an opinion
that is widely held in America now; America has been trying for
years to solve the problem of its adverse balance of trade in the
Pacific, and the patience of its public and their Congressmen, if
not that of the President, is close to running out. America has
some potent weapons still to wield in concluding bilateral
agreements for 'managed' trade; not the least of them is
withholding access to its lucrative domestic market, still the
largest in the world. As Lee himself noted 2 , there is no reason
why America should continue granting to now-dynamic economies
such old favours as the Generalised System of Preferences for
developing-country imports or "investment guarantees, or special
economic and other benefits."
America's attempts to remedy its trade imbalances with Asia
threaten Australia's access not only to its best market for




primary products, but to what increasingly is expected to be an
important market for Australian manufactures and services.
Future economic friction between the US and Australia may
revolve more around issues of market access in Asia and probably
the less developed areas of the world such as Africa and South
Asia, than upon simple bilateral trade as has been the case in
the past.
The US: Changing Tack
The United States is now faced with the growing need to
accomplish a long-overdue internal restructuring to accommodate
an increasingly discontented and internally-polarised electorate.
This must inevitably be accompanied by what is likely to be an
accelerating contraction of its world military role, for
practical and symbolic reasons. The immediate cost savings may
not be great, but the removal of these tripwires for self-
justifying and self-perpetuating entanglements abroad will be
necessary to convince the American public that its leaders will
not continue with their perhaps unconscious preference for
meddling in the affairs of others as a way to avoid confronting
the enormous difficulties still to be faced at home. And abroad,
the perceived need for, and desirability of a permanent US
military presence is rapidly diminishing.
A substantial part of the American foreign-policy
establishment, in and outside of government, still refuses to see
the unpleasant reality that East Asia is happy enough to sell it
things, and in some matters may still feel that "it's good to
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have the Seventh Fleet around", 1 but otherwise its feelings
toward a permanent US military presence and a continuing American
•role* in Asia are ambivalent at best. Politically, it seems that
support for a US military role in East Asia stems from its
usefulness in preserving preferential market access and often
militarily biased foreign aid programmes. But perhaps the main
virtue of cultivating the United States 1 very apparent need to
believe that is still 'wanted' and needed in the region lies with
the indirect reinforcement given by military-oriented
relationships with the US to the legitimacy of authoritarian
military and/or oligarchic regimes which have flourished for so
long in East and Southeast Asia.
In the past, tolerance and support for these regimes has
been justified on the need to prevent countries being 'lost' to
Communism; and as an essential condition for internal stability
to underpin economic growth. Now, however, these countries seem
to be prospering at the expense of the US, whilst showing little
concern beyond lip-service for values held or becoming
increasingly dear to Americans; besides the usual slew of
individual rights, democratic government and freedom of
expression, Americans now are concerned with such things with
environmental protection. All this puts them at least partially
at odds, philosophically, with just about every regime in Asia.
l.Ibid. Lee was referring to the problem of the Chinese claim
over the South China Sea islands; but he seemed hopeful that the
matter could be 'talked out' rather than fought out.
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Asian leaders such as Malaysia's Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir
Mohamad are openly critical of "condescending" criticism from
industrialised nations on environmental and human rights issues,
claiming that they "are being used to obstruct the economic
growth of the developing countries". A growing sense of
grievance on both sides of the Pacific will make the American
public ever less receptive to arguments for 'patience' in
resolving trade and other disputes with Asia, and for the need
for the US to remain involved in the interest of regional
stability.
There is a growing feeling in the U.S.' Pacific coastal
states that their commercial futures lie in East Asia. 1
California Governor Pete Wilson believes that an influx of Asian
immigrants can only help put his state in "a particularly
advantageous position to exploit what we think is going to be a
trans-Pacific explosion." 2 But in Eurocentred Washington, and in
much of the country, East Asia is still a "hell of a way off".
The west coast states are ambivalent toward the administration's
"militant" approach to Asian trade, fearing it may do as much
harm as good. The hopes of the west coast may be at least
partially stymied by the fears of the rest of the country, and
perhaps by the effects on infrastructure and education spending
of mounting budget deficits in, especially, California.
1. Susumu Awanohara, "Shrinking Ocean" (and supporting articles),
FEER, 6 June 1991, pp48-52.
2. TIME, 18 November 1991, p63.
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After the (impending) ratification of the North American
Free Trade Area agreement (NAFTA) , the opportunities to the
immediately adjacent south may look ever more enticing, compared
with the sheer difficulty of penetrating the markets of East
Asia 1 . Growing resentment at the trade imbalances with China may
achieve what simple moral outrage could not, and lead to
restrictions upon or revocation of China's "most favoured nation"
treatment in US markets. Both President Bush and any Democratic
Party successor will be under great pressure to limit China's
trade privileges as much on practical as on moral grounds;
Chinese disregard of patents and its circumvention of clothing
and textile import quotas are raising the ire of business and
congress alike; and Bush's diplomatic 'open door' policy has so
far produced absolutely no visible effect on China's internal or
external policies. The events in Tiananmen Square never did make
much impression in the rest of Asia, and in their aftermath
relations between China and most other nations of the region have
actually improved.
Despite Lee Kuan Yew's assertion that East Asia must, as a
matter of self-interest, keep open its markets to American
manufactures and services, he like his neighbours is suspicious
of the implications for ASEAN of NAFTA, and so he should be. It
will divert, as he predicts, much American investment away from
Asia; further reducing America's 'stake' in the region. ASEAN 's
intended regional Free Trade Area, and an increase in intra-
1. Susumu Awanohara, "Enter the Latin Dragon", FEER, 11 July
1991, pp42-3.
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regional trade preferences 1 may be seen as much as a counter to
the foreseen effects of NAFTA, in diverting American trade and
investment, and forestalling Asian access to Latin American
markets and investment opportunities, as well as being an effort
to avoid Japanese or American 'economic hegemony' being exercised
through either Mahathir's proposed East Asia Economic Caucus
(formerly, Group) , or the more encompassing APEC, which includes
the US and the other 'English speaking peoples' of the Pacific.
In military-strategic terms, Southeast Asia is fast becoming
irrelevant to the United States' main global concerns. Its
earlier clearcut military goals of denying free movement of
Russian and Chinese maritime forces, of securing the sealanes to
Japan, and maintaining access to the Indian Ocean in support of
its global and regional postures, now all have diminished in
importance. The Cold War is over, Japan is already a strong
maritime power, and in the wake of the Gulf War, American access
to regional base and support facilities seems assured for at
least the next decade. The gradual return to 'acceptability' of
the Republic of South Africa, soon may make available once more
the facilities of the Simonstown Naval Base. And although the US
may still in the short term perform a useful "balancing" function
in Korea whilst the issue of North Korean nuclear capability
remains unresolved, an emotional, damn the consequences, rush to
reunification could, German style, suddenly occur. It is quite
1. "ASEAN Endorses Proposal For Free Trade in Region", Asian Wall
Street Journal . 14 October 1991, pl2.
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possible that those forces remaining in Korea and Japan will be
asked to leave by the host governments, due to domestic political
reasons 1 . These same factors always will have to be taken into
account in countries which grant 'access to facilities' rather
than 'basing rights'. Aggravation over such matters as trade, and
'interference in internal affairs' via pressures for internal
reform and more stringent environmental policies, easily could
lead to a sudden denial of entry to US forces. In other words, it
probably will be simpler for the United States to support its
Middle Eastern and Indian Ocean interests from the Atlantic coast
rather than from 'forward' bases in the Pacific.
Though the US apparently intends to 'pull back' to Guam
from the Philippines, it remains to be seen whether the necessary
funds will be made available even to partially replicate the
facilities that will be left behind. And if it has no bases
actually in East Asia to tend, Washington's interest in the
1. Mark Clifford, "Ambivalent Allies", FEER . 3 January 1991, 18-
19. US Ambassador Gregg reportedly noted figures from (then)
recent polls of public opinion. "The number of Koreans who view
the US favorably has dropped from 70% six years ago to 24% a t
present." Another poll reported that 79% of University students
"held the US responsible for division of the country, with 64%
believing the US was reluctant to see Korea reunified." This at a
time when the US had it was going to tell the ROK it had to "pay
a larger share of the housekeeping costs" for US forces remaining
in Korea. Japanese resentment at the rising cost of keeping US
troops in board and lodging - and at American pressure to 'pay
up' their 'share' for the 'Gulf thing' - may yet overcome most
domestic qualms about being left without any overt restraint upon
the JSDF and Police; and the powers behind them. See for example
the comments in: Tadashi Matsumoto, "Withdrawal of US Forces:
Workers Worry About Keeping Jobs", 31 December 1990; and
Yoshihiro Tsurumi, "King George [Bush] And Colonial Taxes:
Japan's Ambivalence Toward The Gulf War", 4 March 1991. In The
Japan Times Weekly International .
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Western Pacific may reduce even further, leaving the American
focus even more sharply upon 'unfair* trade imbalances and
•undemocratic' regimes.
FUTURE PROSPECTS
As it adjusts to the challenge of an extended period of
uncertainty and 'chaos', the US must in many ways shake off a
pattern of conduct, developed over the post-war era and to a
large extent now regarded as normal and necessary by the current
administration and by leaders in many of its satraps abroad. The
era of the cold war represents an aberrant interregnum in the
traditional pattern of American diplomatic practice; no less than
was the isolationism that followed Wilson's abortive attempt to
make the world safe for democracy. For the most part, America's
leaders advocated and pursued a policy that might be described as
"discretionary involvement" in world affairs; being in general
careful to discriminate between the superficially appealing and
the indubitably necessary.
President Bush now says that "America must lead again - as
it always has, as only it can." 1 But America never had the right
and now no longer has the resources to recreate the world in its
own image. The American model in any case has deteriorated to
such a degree that while many may covet the ideal, they see
little virtue in the reality. America is frittering away it
1. Quoted by Peter McGrath, "The Lonely Superpower", NEWSWEEK, 7
October 1991.
317
substantial resources of "soft power" 1 because its President
still clings to a preference for the "hard", coercive power that
could be exercised by an economically and technologically
unchallengeable America in the decades following World War II.
James Madison had thought that if Americans "be free and
happy at home, we shall be respectable abroad." And thus both
respected and emulated. The ultimate elaboration of this line of
thought was rendered in 1821 by Monroe's Secretary of State, John
Quincy Adams:
Wherever the standard of freedom and Independence has
been or shall be unfurled, there will [America's]
heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she
does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy.
She is the well wisher to the freedom and independence
of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her
own. She will commend the general cause by the
countenance of her voice, and the benignant sympathy of
her example. She well knows that by once enlisting
under banners other than her own, were they even the
banners of foreign independence, she would involve
herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the
wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice,
envy and ambition, which assume the colours and usurp
the standard of freedom. The fundamental maxims of her
policy would insensibly change from liberty to
1. A term coined by Joseph S. Nye, Jr, in his book Bound to Lead .
Soft Power is essentially the power of influence by example, the
"power of ideas". Nye points out (pl95) that America has an
enormous soft power advantage, through its control of global
media: "in 1981 [before worldwide CNN] the United States was
responsible for more than 80% of world-wide data transmission and
processing of data." America exported seven times as many
television shows as Britain; but many of these only contribute to
an image of violent decadence. As Nye said in an interview (TIME,
29 July 1991, p32) America has lost much of its hard (coercive)
economic power, due to its descent from creditor to debtor
status, and risks losing as well its soft power "if our cities
fall apart, if we can no longer offer our citizens upward
mobility..." He could have added affordable health care and
education to the list too.
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force ... She might become the dictatress of the world.
She would be no longer the ruler of her own spirit." *
John Quincy Adams and President George Bush probably would
not get along at all well. While Adams advocated great caution
and selectivity in foreign involvements, keeping uppermost the
concern for their direct relevance to American national interest,
President Bush seems to have no such concern. He remains
concerned to exercise "world leadership", though the idea of an
American-led 'new world order* leaves a very great deal to be
desired in the eyes of much of the world, and perhaps especially
in the western Pacific. At present, the envisaged new order seems
to be little more than a re-jigging of the same tunnel vision
which saw American foreign policy over its 'leadership' period
become obsessed with combating global communism through,
principally, 'hard' power: force of arms and refusal of normal
commercial and diplomatic intercourse. America went out in search
of dragons to slay; and neglected the goannas in the back yard.
This has come to be seen as "typically" American behaviour;
further degrading the ideal. It is worth asking what it was in
the American image that so appealed to Asia's 'freedom fighters'
during the colonial era; and what it is that so disturbs them
now. Lee Kuan Yew, never lost for an answer, said this last year:
1. Quoted by Walter La Feber, The American Age . p80. La Feber
notes that Adams' words were 'repeatedly quoted 150 years later
by those opposing the US war in Vietnam". Whilst they seemed to
fit that situation almost like the proverbial glove, the broad
intent and guidance offered is I think, a pretty useful statement
of principle for most powers in most circumstances.
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Asians are in little doubt that a society with
communitarian values, where the interests of the
society takes (sic) precedence over that of the
individual, suits them better than the individual
rights of Americans. Asians see Japanese achievements
as higher and the Japanese are not pushy or self-
proselytisers - at least not yet. 1
Mr Lee did not mention the deep distrust still harboured
toward the Japanese in especially China and Korea, in no small
part due to Japan's inability still to come satisfactorily to
terms with its past excesses. Controversy continues over ordered
rewrites of school textbooks, and Japan's 'unapologetic
'
attitude, fuelled by such outrageous assertions as that made by
Shintaro Ishihara that the Rape of Nanking "is a story made up by
the Chinese." 2 Even so, America itself may be coming around to
Lee's view; TIME magazine deplored the fact that America was
becoming a nation of "finger pointers, crybabies and busybodies",
obsessed with individual "rights" to the detriment of individual
responsibility and social obligation. It quoted approvingly a
view in The Economist of "a decadent puritanism within America:
an odd combination of ducking responsibility and telling everyone
else what to do."
One can only applaud America's still undiminished capacity
for ruthless self-examination; and hope it yields results, which
will allow America to 'lead' through the 'soft power' of
influence by example, and not through either coercion, or
1. Hamish McDonald, "Shaking The Perch", FEER, 8 November 1990,
p22
.
2. Interview in Playboy Magazine, October 1990, p63.
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cooption of regional 'partners'. The domestic focus of the 1992
Presidential campaign is a sign that this process may soon be
underway, leading, with luck, to a less engaged, but more
engaging, United States.
A New Cold War?
The 'new world order' dimly articulated by U.S. President
Bush and more or less acquiesced to by Japan and Europe for lack
of their own ideas, serves only as a conceptual crutch;
inhibiting nations great and weak alike, from standing up alone
to offer alternatives to a world sorely in need of a
revitalisation of spirit. The strong and weak alike lack
confidence, in themselves and in the future of their regions and
the world. Nonetheless, some are better equipped to resolve to
their own satisfaction at least some of their uncertainties.
Of the "power-centres", the United States has the habit but
no longer has the means to guide world affairs. And its internal
state is rapidly eroding its claim to moral authority. Much the
same can be said of Europe, which in any case looks less
homogeneous on the eve of union, than it has for the last two
decades. Neither the United States nor Europe has the economic
leverage of Japan - but Japan is still something of an unknown
quantity in regional and world affairs. The Russian empire is in
chaos. China remains more concerned with internal stability than
with 'changing the world'. Neither direction nor control of the
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future world system is likely to be found until the regional
position of these power centres has stabilised, and their
relative power capacities and proclivities has clarified.
Having seen out the end of one cold war, the US and the West
in general now should be alert to the possibility of a new cold
war developing - a war that will be fought on two fronts, between
shifting coalitions of adversaries. One front will be the battle,
chiefly philosophical in origin, between Asia and the West. It
has its origins in the sense that the growing prosperity and
political influence of Asian nations demonstrates the
'correctness* of the path adopted by most in both internal and
foreign and trade policies. The west is perceived to be in
decline morally and physically, even as it seeks to impose its
own precepts (which in matters of trade and statecraft it does
not adhere to) as the basis for a 'new world order' in
international relations.
The preoccupation of Western Europe with its own problems of
political-economic union and absorption of its "lost cousins"
from east of the Oder-Niesse line, and the apparent likelihood of
an accelerating drift apart between the champion of the west (the
US) and its erstwhile acolytes in Europe and elsewhere, tends
only to reinforce the notion of Europe and a USA that
increasingly are concerned with maintaining a no-longer
justifiable stranglehold on the world economy and political
system. Resentment of the dictatorial ways of the West was very
evident during the Gulf War, from top to bottom of East Asia. It
is complemented by growing self-assertiveness, reflected in the
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views of Singapore's Minister for Information, George Yeo who
"has asked why Southeast Asia should judge its relations with
neighbouring states on the basis of 'Western values' [which], he
argues, are likely to become more irrelevant in Asia as 'Eastern
values' come into their own and change the present intellectual
convention that Western values should dominate the world." 1
This is the main difference in international affairs in the
post-colonial, post-cold war world: regional affairs no longer
are subordinate to broader global trends in the balance of
political and economic power. Instead, the global trend will
itself mainly be determined by what happens in the various key
regions of the world. In all respects, Australia is between a
rock and a hard place. It is linked militarily and
philosophically to a western alliance whose three key components
are drifting inexorably apart. The leader of this system is
increasingly alienated from Australia's near region, even while
its supposed "key ally" and "partner" (Japan) is striking forth
on its own and being encouraged (within and from without) to
assert its potential as leader of the Asians and "first among
equals" in the world system.
Australia has a military alliance with the US, but its
largest market is Japan; and its second largest is East Asia "in
the broad". It retains a strong cultural dependence on the west,
which is gradually being alienated from Asia. Both the European
1. Michael Vatikiotis, "Join the Club", FEER, 20 June 1991, p26.
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and American wings of the west are geographically remote, and
increasingly preoccupied with internal and regional questions.
For all its efforts, Australia may be drifting to the periphery
of regional and hence world affairs. This is an unwholesome
position which if not forestalled could lead to revival of the
old paranoia about invasion and subjugation.
Goodbye To All That
Australia and Japan are about to lose their key patron, in
substance if not in theory. Militarily, the US is on the way out
of Asia and it is futile for Australia, and possibly for Japan
too, to try and prolong the agony as a means of clinging
desperately to a false sense of security.
The current difficulties in the American-Japanese
relationship are good for the principals and for the world. It is
widely held that the US still acts as a restraint on Japan,
containing its ambition and tendency to arrogance and lust for
hegemonic power. But then again the US has been no angel in this
regard, since it prefers direction to inconvenient consultation.
A more competetive relationship may be good for both. The
continuing presence of US military forces in Japan is less a
brake upon Japanese ambition that a balm applied to sooth US
fears of irrelevance and impotence, and Japan's fears of itself.
For all their own studies of the national spirit, the Japanese
believe they are essentially power mad and untrustworthy, it
seems, when given power. Unable or unwilling to restrain
themselves, they rely upon pressure from the outside to do it for
them.
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The recent behaviour of Japanese business and the Liberal
Democratic Party offers some justification for that view. But
basically the US presence in Japan and the illusory notion of
equal "partnership" is maintained to assuage the fears of both
parties as they confront an uncertain future. For Japan, it has
to overcome its fears of facing up to: the political
responsibilities of economic power; the inherent weakness of its
resource base and trade dependency; and the problem of its
cultural separation from most of the world, due mainly to
language and ingrained xenophobia.
For the US, its concerns are the erosion and possible loss
of overwhelming coercive power; and the need to resort once more
to the power of persuasion and compromise. Both nations are
reluctant to come to grips with the mounting pressure for change
within their own societies. The privileged relationship of the
past was a comfort to both, an emblem of stability at home as
well as abroad. Neither wants to change what once served each so
well; both must.
The US-Australia relationship is far more in the classical
patron-client mould. Since neither wants to be alone in the
world, they continue to swear mutual allegiance on the basis of
the past, to avoid confronting the future. However both Australia
and the US must of necessity become more introspective and
regionally oriented as a precondition for the inner
revitalisation and regional economic integration that are
essential to staking out a claim to a sustainable position, let
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alone eminence, in the future world system. Australia especially
has no time left to delay pursuing this course; the longer it
delays defining its future in the Southeast Asian region ( and in
the Indian Ocean region as well) , the greater the chance that it
will not become a valuable part of an 'interdependent' community,
but will be faced with the more stark and infinitely less
desirable choices of absorption into something 'bigger than
itself, or relegation to the periphery on which will wander
various minor nations that lead a mendicant existence on the
table scraps of charity thrown by an otherwise self-satisfied
world.
AUSTRALIA: CATHARSIS OR STASIS?
Australia's attachment to the west has inhibited it from
finding itself. To some extent this is recognised in Australia,
and manifested in increasing disaffection with the nation's
continued and anachronistic link to the British Crown. But while
the form of real political independence is being pursued with at
least some little vigour, the substance of independence - putting
an end to psychological and physical dependency on the US in
particular, and the west in general, and asserting a genuine
self-reliance in all senses - still is avoided like the plague.
Foreign Minister Evans claims Australia is undergoing a
revolution in its identity; but it still shows few signs of a
revolution in its outlook or its aspirations.
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Not too long ago, announcing his 'new look' for Australian
policy Senator Evans said that "it is erroneous to assume that
•stability' is good and 'instability is bad." 1 Yet his government
still maintains that Australia's military alliance with the
United States is a "cornerstone" of its strategic policy, and
that the "continuing strategic engagement of the United States in
the western Pacific" is the "key to maintaining a stable security
system in Asia." Prime Minister Hawke's hopeful sentiment that
"the US is inclined to work through the network of its existing
defence links in the region" bodes ill for Australian regional
policy. Hawke, it seems, is yet again falling for the old
illusion of Australia as a western emissary to Asia. He thinks
Australia can "build bridges of cooperation" through its military
alliances.
Perhaps the Five Power Defence Agreement has helped and
will continue to help demonstrate a positive Australian interest
in the continuing secure development of Southeast Asia; it is
hard to see what value there is in this role for ANZUS. To set up
Australia as America's messenger to Southeast Asia is to revert
to the behaviour of the past, and suffer the same consequences of
subordinating the pursuit of national interest and sound
bilateral relations to the ethereal goal of generating 'good
feelings' between opposing parties. Let the UN, or some truly
impartial nation mediate; and let Australia carve out and adhere
to its own position on regional issues, not some pale reflection
1. Australia's Regional Security . December 1989, p41.
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of the desires of either America or another. Australia cannot
assert or be true to itself cast in the role of errand boy for
the US, nor as whipping boy for the nations of Southeast Asia.
The Australian government should pay less attention to
reinforcement of old habits and old prejudices, and more to the
fact that:
...from an Asian perspective, Australia - or at least
Hawke - often seems to be more interested to be seen
playing a role outside Asia[:] in the Middle East or
South Africa, making use of its strong [British]
Commonwealth and US ties, than cultivating immediate
neighbours . ...
Too close an identification with the US and APEC could
be a liability for Australia if trans-Pacific
relationships between East Asia and North America
deteriorate 1
Australia continues to define itself (and thus is defined
by its neighbours) as part of the west, and it acts that way.
This may be logical in terms of the past, and there is no harm in
recognising a cultural debt to its European forebears, any more
than various nations around the world have deemed it expedient to
adopt certain aspects of western social, legal and parliamentary
practice. Any attempt to deny its essential commitment to the
inherited and evolved western liberal-democratic tradition would
sunder the very fabric of Australian society - and remove one of
the main attractions for the immigration and investment upon
which the viability of the nation so much depends. But the fact
remains that the imperatives of geography and regional political,
1. Philip Bowring, "Take Your Medecine" , FEER, 10 October 1991,
p34.
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economic and military developments are all of direct relevance to
Australia's security, whereas they exercise at best a peripheral
influence upon the policies of the other nations of the west. For
the United States, Southeast Asia has never amounted to much more
than a sideshow to its major struggles; economic struggles with
colonial 'closed shops', ideological struggles with communism,
and now another economic struggle with Japan and perhaps much of
East Asia.
In sum, Australia may feel culturally part of the "west"
for some time to come, but strategically it cannot afford to
retain the same attitude. Its goals and its likely problems are
far different from those of both Europe and the USA. It cannot
deny the acquaintance - it has to discard the alliance.
Australia must prepare to wind its way between the traps and
pitfalls of what is emerging as a new cold war in the Pacific - a
war of politics and economics no less difficult to resolve, and
perhaps no less dangerous in its potential, than the ideological
division from which much of the world is now emerging. Another
confrontation looms, too, between the conspicuous haves and the
equally conspicuous have-nots of the world - with those nations
in the middle, like Australia, trying strenuously to avoid
relegation to the latter and avoid over-identification with the
former; attempting to moderate the fears of the haves and the
demands of the have nots, at least as much in order to avoid




The growth of political regionalism and regional trading
blocs is probably inevitable and its durability unpredictable.
Europe is self-absorbed and unremittingly selfish; the US is less
selfish perhaps, but has a potentially dynamic 'third world'
right on its doorstep, and this will decrease its interest in the
Western Pacific. Asia is both resentful of the west and
determined to outstrip it, assertive of its dynamism and destiny,
yet fearful of the possible reaction elsewhere. The pressure for
Japan to 'secede' from its unnatural position as the west's Asian
satrap will eventually achieve its aim. Competition for influence
and markets in Africa and South Asia will be dominated by Europe
and Japan's East Asian bloc - with China possibly playing a lone
hand wherever it can, and Russia still distracted by its own
problems. Australia faces the possibility of being left out of
all of this: it is too far away from the West; it is 'too
different' to gain ready acceptance into an Asian bloc; it may
have too little else to offer to be worth wooing as a partner,
except as a supplier of raw materials.
Australia must abandon its western-built crutches to
liberate both its policies and its image (and self image is a
important as regional image) from the conceptual shackles and
practical deadweight of military, diplomatic and economic
dependence upon the councils and counsels of the west. It is no
use trying to team up with the US to arrest the pace and alter
the nature of the inevitable changes sweeping East Asia and the
adjacent regions. The US (or at least, its Eastern 'ruling
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circles') may already have departed spiritually, being more
concerned with short-term responses to regional affairs than with
long-term planning or taking new initiatives in regional
development. On the limp excuse of pressing domestic
circumstances, President Bush postponed his long-arranged visits
to an ally of "enormous strategic importance" 1 (Japan) , another
"steadfast ally and key Pacific partner" 2 (Australia) , and to
hardly less important South Korea and Singapore. Instead he sent
Secretary Baker, who seems to have had a fine time telling others
what to do again, before returning his attention once more to
Eastern Europe and the Middle East.
Australia has to adjust to no longer having even the
illusion of a guarantor in the west, as the end of US military
presence in the region removes the last imperative for the US to
get involved on any side but its own. A recent report says that
Australia's Leader of the Opposition and his colleagues believe
1. National Security Strategy of the United States . The White
House, August 1991, p9
.
2. Ibid.
3. Mr Bush cancelled on 5 November, to avoid accusations of
excessive overseas travel associated with his preoccupation with
foreign affairs. But he went ahead with visits to Europe, which
seemed to achieve nothing in particular. And he got nothing done
at home either. The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly reported
(11 November 1991, pl6) that reaction was "muted". So it was in
public; I would bet that it was not in private. Only weeks before
the cancellation, Bush's trip was described as "an excellent
opportunity to reverse the pervasive feeling that Washington in
recent years has neglected [Asia]." See: Susumu Awanohara,
"Crying For Attention", FEER, 24 October 1991, pp24-5. Also:
Susumu Awanohara and Jonathan Burton, "Under The Carpet", FEER .
21 November 1991, ppll-12.
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that "Australia needs a cathartic experience administered by
damn-the -political consequences leadership" 1 ; but they refer
only to internal economic policies. Opposition industry spokesman
Ian McLachlan reportedly said that "After 25 years of drifting
along, Australia faces a pretty monstrous set of circumstances
which demand radical change." 2 These are revolutionary words, yet
despite this apparent sense of urgency and determination, "no
significant change of policy would be likely if there were a
change of government". Neither Government nor Opposition, it
seems, has a sufficiently revolutionary outlook to embrace the
possibility that a nation can thrive on instability, and the
opportunities it offers.
Defence Minister Robert Ray has acknowledged that Australia
faces:
considerable strategic uncertainties as we enter the
1990s, we are not in Europe, where we might benefit
directly from the decline in superpower tensions. We
have regionally based defence needs and they have not
diminished. There are tensions and pressures which
could impact our security, and which require us to
maintain our military capacity to protect Australian
interests, or to contribute to regional efforts to
resolve a problem. 3
1. Philip Bowring, "Liberals Flex Their Faith", FEER . 10 October
1991, p29.
2. Ibid.
3. Australia Background, Defence Into The Twenty First Century ,
statement by the Minister of Defence to Parliament in Canberra,
30 May 1991.
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Senator Ray acknowledged that "we must plan on carrying out our
primary combat tasks ourselves." But he prefaced these remarks
with the hoary old belief that any:
potential aggressors will need to be wary of the
response of the United Nations and the United
States. ... Australia will continue to receive support
from alliances, including access to advanced technology
and intelligence, and emergency resupply . .
.
If Australia should have learned any lessons from its
history, it is that none of these things can be relied or
calculated upon. Neither can defence programmes that require a
decade or more to bear full fruit. Most of Australia's modest
plans for improved naval capability will not show results until
near the end of the decade, or even into the next century. In a
mainly maritime region, where the potential causes for
international tension lie so largely at sea, the dilatory pace of
Australia's maritime force modernisation and expansion is a
positive liability in its efforts to play a more effective
diplomatic role independent of the good offices of the west and
the United States.
Even in respect of the low level of direct threat Australia
is expected to face, the fact is that its warship strength and
capability will not reach even the projected bare minimum level
in numbers until 2004: thirteen years hence, and well beyond the
turbulent "next decade" that ought rightly to be Australia's main
concern. The navy's smaller warships will not even start to be
replaced until then; one can only hope nothing much comes up in
the meantime. Similarly, Australia is content to place such vital
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assets as airborne early warning and control aircraft 'on hold*,
reducing the already limited potential of its small fighter-
strike force , and more importantly limiting their opportunities
for training and tactical development. The absence of such key
appurtenances of modern warfare only helps reinforce Australian
dependence on the USA.
The United States too will increasingly, rather than
decreasingly, be obliged to cultivate bilateral rather than
multilateral relations. Few of Asia's smaller nations wants to be
part of multilateral organisation with the United States, which
explains both the attempt to develop an alternative to APEC and
resistance to the idea of a regional security grouping which
includes America. The US often seems unwilling to accept anything
less than primacy in its dealings with any such arrangements; 1
the US and Japan in tandem is an even more disturbing prospect.
Australia ought to have learned that its attempts to have the US
"included in" lead mainly to the feeling amongst its neighbours
that Australia has to be "included out" of regional
organisations. It is becoming like some person who cannot be
invited anywhere because he always brings some uninvited guest.
Australia must learn to go places on its own, and America has to
learn to accept this imperative. The US has no entitlement to use
its alliance as a means of imposing itself upon every regional
arrangement which Australia may wish to enter into. And Australia
1. In the military context, this is understandable, in those
cases where the US is committing sizeable forces, whose
capabilities and doctrine are virtually unigue in the world.
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has no right to try and pull America along with it as some kind
of 'power amplifier' in regional affairs.
On the other side of the coin, America's pursuit of
bilateral relations in Asia, be they economic or military, may
bring it increasingly into economic and diplomatic conflict with
Australia. There is no guarantee that in a bilateral dispute with
another regional nation, the US might not feel that its own
interests were best served by either withholding support from
both parties, or from either one - which could mean Australia. So
far as the supposed advantages of alliance go, they need to be
taken with a hefty grain of salt. Both American and European
defence industries face a great contraction in local demand and
will compete ever more ferociously to sell their wares abroad.
And the continuing technological development of Australia's
neighbourhood offers bright prospects for regional co-development
of both defence and other equipment.
Former Ambassador Bill Lane recounts that in 1985 he told
Hawke, Beazley "and others . . . that Australia was indeed
fortunate to have an ally such as the United States from whom
high quality goods in the defence industry could be purchased." 1
Hawke and Beazley might have pointed out that America was indeed
fortunate to have an ally who himself paid full price for what
was purchased and did not require other forms of financial
bribery in return for his support. The implied 'threat' of
1. The Sydney Papers , vol.3, no.l, pl34.
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withholding access to high-technology products is an unnecessary
and unjustifiable slur upon Australia's 'reliability' as a non-
aggressive nation. If the main condition for access to US
armaments is act as a regional sub-contractor on its behalf,
Australia should seriously consider its alternatives.
As for intelligence, Australia in the past has been both
misinformed or left uninformed by its allies. There is no reason
to suppose that they would not do the same in future if it suited
their purposes, and so ultimately Australia still has to rely
upon itself. As shown in any number of instances, supply of
armaments and related wares can be seriously affected by
competing demands and political chicanery within alliances, and
its denial may be used as coercive pressure in a bilateral
relationship.
Finally, just as Australians are repeatedly told not to
judge their neighbours by their own standards of either conduct
or logic, nor should they apply the same logic to dealings with
the United States. "Mateship" has no place in the American
lexicon, and in fact be more closely paralleled by Asian concepts
of reciprocal obligation and group loyalty, no faith can be put
in the willingness of America to rush to the aid of a "stalwart
ally" any more than it might rush to the aid of a distant and
rather dubious acquaintance. Most Americans know nothing of
Australia and could care less. This does not mean the two
countries cannot work together in areas of mutual interest, nor
should they deprecate the value of such values and experiences
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that they share. But they come from different places, and have
different destinations; any coincidence of view point must be
regarded as a bonus, not a given.
New Identities, New Ideas
Australia has already had plenty of cathartic shocks, from
the fall of Singapore to Heating's 'Banana Republic" comment that
sent the Dollar plummeting, from Britain's 'betrayal' to enter
the EEC, to the present spectre of double-digit unemployment. It
doesn't need any more shocks - its needs some sensible policies
to anticipate and mitigate, even turn to its advantage, those
shocks that will accompany the shaking down of a new regional and
world system. It needs its own comprehensive and self-
administered shock - of revolution not just in identity or
'business spirit', but in foreign relations and defence.
The end of first, colonialism in Asia, and then of the
distortions created by the cold war, has permanently changed the
face of Australia's strategic environment, creating new
uncertainties, but reducing the crushing fear of former ingrained
fear and prejudice. Over 32% of each years' more than 100,000
"new Australians", now are of Asian birth. The former Immigration
Minister (now Minister for Defence) Senator Robert Ray, reckoned
in late 1988 that by 2025, "Asian born migrants will represent
about 7% of the Australian population"; and this does not count
migrants from west Asia or those Australians "with an Asian
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heritage, whether one generation or 130 years old" 1 . This is
enormously important to Australia. It will accelerate replacement
of the last vestiges of "yellow perilism" with a wider and deeper
appreciation of, especially, East, Southeast and South Asian
cultures. And it will also provide the links of family and old
friends that once helped bind Australia so tightly to Britain and
the ideal of the Anglo-Saxon world. This will greatly facilitate
the development of both the opportunities for Australian
business, and of the skills needed to identify and take advantage
of them. Australia will at last develop empathy with its
neighbours; and with this, at last, that long sought-for sense of
"shared destiny".
Australia's defence policy rightly should be the handmaiden
of its foreign and economic policies. For too long, these last
have been subordinated to the spurious logic of the indefensible
continent and the notion of western solidarity. The plodding
progress of Australian defence policy, and the continuing
dependencies that this fosters, however, still serve to inhibit
both Australian foreign and economic-industrial policy. Unable
since 1914 to see armed forces as a necessary (however
regrettable, it still is so) underpinning for a vigorous and
positive diplomacy and commercial policy, Australians continue to
regard their defence policy in an essentially negative light.
1. Robert Ray, "Still the Land of a 'Fair Go' Despite Racialist
Fringe", FEER, 15 December 1988.
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Lacking the positive justifications of providing ultimate
sanction for diplomatic goals, or for safeguarding commercial
interest, the only remaining reason for armed forces has been to
either react against direct threat to the nation, or to show
tangible support for a protecting power. The assumption always
has been that a 'real 1 threat could only be that of invasion, for
which there would be plenty of time to prepare. There never has
been; only in 1914 was Australia even close to being ready to
protect those of its immediate interest that might be threatened.
Both in World War II and during the disputes over West New Guinea
and Confrontation of Malaysia, it reached some adequate level of
military preparedness after the main threat had passed. Its long
term plans have never been carried through. In unanticipated
events, such as the Indonesian invasion of Timor in 1975, it has
been left flat-footed, as it was also during the first Gulf
crisis during the Iran-Iraq War. It had no answer to the
threatened 'collapse' of ANZUS other than redoubled pledges of
loyalty.
It was not necessary to regard as Australia's only other
defence option, some such stark alternative to ANZUS as "armed
neutrality" . The opportunity was presented for a thorough
reconsideration of the terms of the treaty, if not at once, out
of deference to American wider concerns, then later, and in
private. It is ridiculous too, to continue the harping on the two
great alternatives of "forward" or "continental' defence, either
of which, founded in the notion of the Indefensible continent and
the reactive role of armed forces, only helps perpetuate the
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sense of dependency. Senator Ray says that "Australia must not
return to the old and discredited forward defence policies of the
1960s." Certainly it should not. More importantly, it should not
revert to the old and discreditable habits of dependency on a
foreign protector whose good graces had to be sought by military
tokenism and diplomatic complaisance, complemented by a form of
mendicant economics in which Australia has wasted more time
begging for favour than it would have spent getting out and doing
for itself.
I do not see what is wrong with forward defence based in
forward thinking diplomacy, economic-industrial enterprise, and
judicious commitment of armed forces to cooperation with regional
nations. Australia has long identified the security, stability
and prosperity of Southeast Asia as almost synonymous with its
own interests. Australia could be in a very useful position of
being able to contribute both to the security of Southeast Asia,
through heightened military, industrial, economic and diplomatic
collaboration, as well as easing Japanese fears about the
security of the sea lanes upon which its prosperity so heavily
depends. Australia has a vested interest in ensuring the
continuing safe and unrestricted passage of shipping in the South
China Sea and the waters to the north: 60% of its income depends
on it.
The United States of course has a long-standing commitment
to uphold the freedom of the seas, but regional intervention even
in support of this very important principle is likely yet again
to lead to more charges of US 'bullying' and 'hegemonic
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tendencies'; and thus to shift the regional focus from problem-
solving to America-baiting and revival of anti-Western sentiment.
Australia should be alert to the possibility that it may in
future need to provide maritime peacekeeping or intervention
forces in support of United Nations action, or support for a
regional security body of some kind, not mention its continuing
commitment to the FPDA. And there really is no telling what sorts
of tensions and conflicts might arise as almost all of Asia's




In so asymmetrical a partnership of so differently
situated allies, trans-Pacific perceptions are likely
to coincide rarely indeed, except by accident. And
there is not much that anybody on either side of the
Ocean can do about that. 1
The greatest curiosity of the relationship between Australia
and the United States is the enduring tendency of spokesmen from
both nations consistently to make so much of so little.
Politicians, diplomats, official and unofficial spokesmen of all
kinds seem able at the drop of a hat to summon up a vision of
inseparable partnership, based most usually upon "shared ideals
and experiences" which must inevitably lead to "shared
commitments". The most striking example of this is the popular
mythology surrounding the ANZUS alliance, which has come to be
regarded as the guintessential expression of the durability of
Australian-American relations in all fields of national
endeavour.
Maintenance of the military alliance between the two
countries appears to be regarded as a sine qua non for
maintenance of relationships across the board. But this clearly
cannot be the case. Both Australia and the US have found it
1. Glen St. J. Barclay, Friends in High Places . Melbourne, Oxford
University Press, 1985, p210.
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expedient and even vital to develop and sustain economic,
diplomatic and cultural ties with many nations that have at some
time been regarded as actual or potential enemies. One does not
need to be identified as a formal "ally" to at least conduct the
normal round of diplomatic and commercial intercourse with
another state - nor even to gain particular favours. Australian
politicians in particular are prone to entertain grandiose
notions of Australia being party to a "special relationship" with
the United States. They would do well to bear in mind the astute
observation of no less a person than George Washington that " the
nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred, or an
habitual fondness, is in some degree a slave" and that a truly
independent nation bent upon charting its own course in the world
"may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary
emergencies". Australia's own history points to the enduring good
sense of those observations. There is little more to be gained
from alliance than from acquaintance - and to sustain the latter,
existence of the former is neither necessary nor desirable as a
permanent state of affairs.
Australian governments go to some pains to discount the
fact that Australia's national security policy has indeed become
"in some degree a slave" to the illusory benefits of alliance^
with the world's greatest military power. The relationship, they
say, is "mature" and "a genuinely equal partnership". The very
notion is absurd - equality of circumstance there never has and
never will be. And maturity in this context means little more
than senescence. It may be that, as hopefully stated by James A.
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Kelly, that the "historic cooperation [between Australia and the
United States] will continue to meet each party's needs and
therefore earn and re-earn the right to sustain itself for many
years to come." 1 But the scope and mutuality of desire for that
cooperation are less than is commonly assumed. The relationship
itself has no "right" to future sustenance on the basis of past
coincidence of interest, which has been more fitfully perceived
and less harmoniously pursued, than frequent allusions to
"historic cooperation" would suggest.
And regardless of how one may view the past, an inexorable
divergence of interest is now well underway. Politicians and many
influential commentators in both countries habitually deny this,
ritually citing reasons of natural affinity between the two
countries. Similar heritage, cultural influences, shared
(almost!) language, democratic-pluralist societies, all are
regularly invoked. For all the talk of shared values, and some
dimming memories of "stand [ing] shoulder to shoulder against
tyranny", the two nations have less in common than either might
wish to believe. The relationship has been, is and will most
probably continue to be something less than 'special'. It has
been given the illusion of greater depth and substance mainly
through the existence of a formally concluded security treaty
1. James A. Kelly, Australian-American Relations After the Cold
War . Paper presented at the Sydney Institute 1991 Conference of
the same title, published in The Sydney Papers. Vol.3. No.l .
Sydney, The Sydney Institute Publications, 1991. Kelly was
formerly Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan for
National Security Affairs.
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concluded in 1952 between Australia, New Zealand and the United
States. Australian governments, their ministers, advisers and
critics have all been prone ever since to make more of the
agreement than its provisions would warrant, and have also tended
to see it as extended the level of 'partnership' far beyond the
military-ideological confines in which it was conceived and
acquiesced to by a reluctant senior partner. Only lately have US
administrations tended to outwardly attach much significance to
the Treaty; at first to prevent the spread of "New Zealand
disease", and now perhaps to arrest a waning of influence in the
western Pacific. But even that belated interest may simply help
foster (or perpetuate) some dangerous delusions on both sides of
the ocean.
Retired US Navy Admiral (and former CINCPAC) Ronald Hays
observed that "in the absence of the cold war, strategy to
justify alliances for the next several years will be complex, far
more so than [before]." 1 He is right, and it is likely that the
justification for extra-regional alliances in particular will
become increasingly difficult to identify and sustain, especially
in an economically straitened and militarily contracting United
States. Prime Minister Hawke insists that Australia's "most
important alliance is with the United States", which Australians
have traditionally seen as "a shield against an Asian threat."
He asserts that we now maintain that alliance as a means to help
"build bridges of cooperation with the region." It is more likely




to prove a barrier. In any case, assessments of the worth of any
alliance or agreement between Australia and other nations must
be, as Ian McLachlan says, a question whose answer has more to do
with what it will mean to be an Australian in the future than
what may have been understood to be 'Australian' in the past - in
terms of both identity and national interest: "less with being
an historian than with being an Australian now." Towards the end
of his bicentennial offering, Mclachlan observed - and this three
years ago - that undoubtedly:
"this is the time to take careful stock of our present
and likely future. I've always been sceptical of
defence spending - until researching this book brought
home the full, miserable story of hopeless neglect."
Like him, I too think it is time for Australians to confront
a number of questions. He asked if Australians were prepared "to
complete the [1987] Beazley programme in less than the ten years
envisaged...". The answer has already been given: No. The
programme has been trimmed and stretched out over twenty years.
He asked if we were "prepared to reconsider our ANZUS
commitment." Again, the answer is, no. How much longer must we
wait for the revolution?
Only for as long as it takes to admit the truth; identity
is not developed within an alliance, but separate from it. An
alliance is not a "pillar" of national security policy, but
scaffolding, that serves a purpose to enable building or repair
of the structure of national security: and which must then be
dismantled . And perhaps to be re-erected when repairs or
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strengthening are needed; both Australia and the United States
can in the future "safely trust to temporary alliances for
extraordinary emergencies".
The alliance has been a diplomatic burden for Australia,
and something of a fool's paradise economically. The healthy
shock of the Japanese threat of isolation and impotence, if not
of invasion, revealed the weakness of Australian diplomacy as
well as of industry, exposing the stark folly of dependence for
protection (diplomatic and commercial, as well as military) upon
a great and powerful ally with his hands full and half a world
away. But the pain of these shocks, and of the realisation of a
radically changing political-economic landscape in Asia, was very
largely nullified by the balm of membership in a new protective
'family'; and as the pain subsided, so too did the stimulus it
had given for Australia to carve itself a new place in the region
and the world. In the meantime, its near and not so near
neighbours have done so - are still doing so. Australia is the
laggard, and in large part has only itself to blame.
In seeking a short term solution (the ANZUS treaty) to a
short-term and short-sighted perception of potential military
threat from Japan and, then China, Australia's politicians
created an illusion no less seductive, and no more substantial,
than that of "Imperial Union" in defence and foreign policy, and
Imperial Preference in economic and trade policy. And in the
process they acted counter to Australian national interest.
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In addition to the damage done to the substance of
Australian economic development and diplomatic relationships, a
more lasting and pernicious damage was done to Australia's image
in the region of greatest proximity, concern and potential
benefit - East Asia. Australia's future security hinges heavily
on how it is regarded by regional nations. The ANZUS connection
has contributed in no small measure, and continues to help
foster, feelings of negative regard bordering on hostility, or
perhaps even worse, just plain indifference. Australia may be
becoming irrelevant to East Asia, and ANZUS can serve no longer
as the opiate of either the government or the people.
So far as shared or reciprocal alliance obligation goes,
there is no certainty of what is meant by it on either side. The
US-Australia Joint Communique in 1990 referred to the United
States'
understanding that the Australian Government's
[defence] programme ... focussing on strategic
responsibilities and regional cooperation, contributes
both to the defence of Australia and to Australia's
fulfillment of its alliance responsibility.
Another pat on the head for Australia, whose
"responsibility" under ANZUS is to defend itself; as is that of
the US, which is reflected in the fact that there was no mention
of the US having fulfilled its alliance responsibility - because
it has none. And if there is at least some hazy understanding or
agreement as to ends (in terms of defence of intangible assets
such as 'freedom') there is rather less as to means. There has
been some unity of purpose in war, both hot and cold. There is
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some basis of shared principle and ethical standards, social
mores, cultural background and preference. But the relationship
lacks depth, which is not entirely surprising since the physical
differences in circumstance, to say nothing of the immense
distance which separates the two nations, and the considerable
disparity in environment and experience, are not really the stuff
of which lasting bonds are made - certainly not permanent
alliances which will endure regardless of the constant and it
seems, accelerating, changes in the order of world affairs.
Undoubtedly the United States is well aware that the world
is changing - it has been devoted to bringing about many of the
changes that have taken place, at the rush, over the last few
years - yet it has seemed very much to be taken by surprise.
There is no doubt too, that the US is chiefly concerned with
change in Europe. For all the talk of the Pacific century, and
for the westward shift of much of its population, the US primary
region of concern remains, as it has been since at least World
War II (and arguably since World War I) , Europe and Russia.
Australia, not always willingly, has always been obliged to at
least pay attention as a matter of life and death to the events
taking place in East Asia. In its history as a nation, Australia
has also been too inclined, though, to continue to see itself as
part of the west and rely upon its links to those far distant
nations for its security in all senses - its prosperity, its
population, its defence and even its sense of community and
identity. This has to change, fast.
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Australia has hitched its wagon once already to an empire in
decline in the hope of security and amplification of its
importance in world and regional affairs. It has been sadly
disappointed. Despite the infinitely stronger bonds which existed
between Britain and Australia, the smaller partner had it
forcibly revealed that in the end, national interest counted most
- and Australia, for all the ties of "shared blood and allegiance
to the crown" was not Britain - was not a "vital interest" to its
supposed patron and defender. The preservation of Australia, its
people, way of life, economy, territorial integrity, national
sovereignty - none of these things are vital to the US either,
and are important only in the abstract. The US gets nothing from
Australia - tangible or otherwise - that it could not normally,
even in a pinch, do without. Perhaps less obvious to Australians
is the fact that the reciprocal is largely true as well. The
assumption of mutuality of interest is stronger than, today, the
fact.
There is one fundamental difference, perhaps - Australia is
groping, however haphazardly and stumblingly, towards a better
future in Asia. The US still appears to be trying desperately to
patch up the dangerous but comfortably familiar fabric of the
past; but an attempt to hold together the order of the last forty
years is doomed to failure - potentially ignominious failure at
that. Unfortunately for Australia, it is once again falling for
the seductive voice of a 'powerful and willing 1 friend whose
power and willingness may in future be greatly reduced. The
uncertainties of the future are great indeed - but they are less
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threatening, and offer more opportunity, than is willingly
conceded by a US administration that seems most concerned to
maintain for America a position as arbiter of the world.
Asia has only reluctantly accepted America in this role,
and will actively contest what the US does not concede over the
next decade. The mood in Asia is of the ascendant - the
conviction appears to be that the west has finally reached its
peak and is now in the descendant. Australia has no future in
acting regionally as an outgrowth of the west, impossible as it
may be to deny the heritage of two centuries' largely exclusive
European influence. It has a vested interest in upsetting, not
maintaining the status quo. This could put it irretrievably at
odds with the US.
In February 1991, US Ambassador Sembler claimed that the
"friendship" between the US and Australia "has passed many tests,
and it has been strengthened in times of conflict even more than
in times of peace." Perhaps, and perhaps not. The relationship
has really only existed in any definable way due to the existence
of conflict, or the sense of impending conflict. In times of
•peace', the US and Australia have been largely indifferent to
each other; and even in war, the passage of time and events has
tended to make the relationship even more fractious, rather than
"even stronger". Today, it seems that it is the US which may be a
•frightened country' in the Pacific, while Australia, however
hesitant, may at last be on the verge of overcoming its
western-induced lack of confidence and becoming genuinely
involved in the affairs of its adjacent region.
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This is not to say that the US is entering a period of
decline leading to "fall": but it is about to undergo a period of
great change in its relationships abroad, and in its world view,
and a contraction in its overseas military presence is
undoubtedly already underway. The latter is likely to exceed in
scope and scale the forecasts of the current administration, and
with diminished forward military presence will come diminished
willingness to respond with force to events which do not fit the
administration's desired pattern of "new world order". The
attempt to leave "stay behinds" in the form of regional powers
equipped and "briefed" to act as surrogates for US-perceived
world desiderata is fraught with peril but will still be hard to
resist for both policy and pecuniary reasons.
Nonetheless, it has proven disastrous in the past and is
likely to prove so again, and is certain to be resisted by
concerned regional nations. The nominated 'surrogates' may find
it convenient to play along with the US, minimally satisfying,
outwardly, its apparent expectations for their regional
"leadership roles" - but their own eminence in the world and
desire to preserve it is and will continue to be a primary source
of friction with the United States. The only really effective
way of avoiding the problems likely to arise is to convince the
US that its perceived role of "balance wheel" is unnecessary and
even counterproductive - so that a surrogate would be the same.
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The US will have to change its attitude to Australia as
well. Australia can no longer be a mere acolyte, to be petted or
brushed off at will. It is essential for both nations now to
conduct an honest appraisal of their relationship, and determine
how and in what ways they would prefer it to develop in the
future. They should begin from the assumption that a permanent
military alliance is neither essential nor is it desirable for
either Australia's physical security or for its development into
an influential participant in the affairs of its adjacent region,
Free of all pangs of kinship, of false expectations of
mateship, of illusion of 'equal' partnership, Australia and the
United States had better get started, if they are still
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